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ARTICLE
A Comparative Legal Approach for the Risks
of Offshore Methane Hydrates: Existing Laws
and Conventions
ROY ANDREW PARTAIN*
This article provides a review of the existing laws and
conventions that might be applied to the development of offshore
methane hydrates. Offshore methane hydrates are an exciting
emerging new energy resource; one with great potential to
provide vast energy supplies, and also one with substantially
novel risks and hazards to the environment, marine flora and
fauna, and adjacent human communities. Some of these new
risks include cataclysmic levels of greenhouse gas emissions,
subsea landslides, and tsunamis. As such, it is important to take
a survey of the existing laws and conventions that could be
applied to such risks, examine them for their ability to efficiently
govern those risks, and take account of where risks from offshore
methane hydrates are insufficiently addressed by current laws
and conventions. This article undertakes that task in order to
compare and contrast existing rules against recommended legal
policies, and to offer potential solutions to existing shortfalls.
The first section of this article provides an introduction and
review of the potential impacts from the development of offshore
methane hydrates. It will discuss the potential economic and
public welfare improvements to be gained from the development
of offshore methane hydrates. It will also provide an exposition of
the risks posed by that same development.
* Reader of Energy Law, University of Aberdeen School of Law. The author
is most grateful to Prof. Dr. Michael Faure (Erasmus & Maastricht), Prof. Dr.
Louis Visscher (Erasmus), Dr. Stefan Weishaar (Groningen), and Dr.
Alessandra Arcuri (Erasmus) for all of their guidance and suggestions with this
study.
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The second section of this article will demonstrate the
application of law and economics theory to the choice of risk
governance mechanisms. Within the rules of civil liability, a rule
of strict liability is found to better fit the facts and circumstances
of offshore methane hydrates, and would thus be more robust in
the efficient governance of its risks compared against a rule of
negligence. Arguments for the application of both public and
private regulations will be provided. The resultant risk
governance strategy is a mechanism of complementary
implementation of strict liability, public regulations, and private
regulations.
The third section provides a review of the major international
laws and conventions that have a nexus to the development of
offshore methane hydrates as well as the federal laws of the
United States and the legal instruments of the European Union.
Because so many laws or conventions might have some minimal
application to the governance of offshore methane hydrates, only
those with the greatest a priori expected nexus are reviewed. For
each law or convention, two levels of analysis are provided: an
examination of the nexus and potential applicability of the law,
and an examination of the law’s risk governance mechanisms.
Thus, each law is examined for both applicability and for
alignment with the recommended three-prong risk governance
strategy.
Conclusions are provided on the state of the existing laws
and conventions to address the potential risks and harms from
the development of offshore methane hydrates. Potential
improvements to the existing laws and conventions and efficient
means to that end are discussed.
Finally, looking at the whole article: are the world’s laws and
conventions ready for the development of offshore methane
hydrates? No, not quite yet, but they could readily be amended
and extended to better provide for the efficient protection of the
environment, marine biota, and impacted human communities.
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I. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF OFFSHORE
METHANE HYDRATES
The most important facts about methane hydrates can be
summarized quickly.1 Offshore methane hydrates offer abundant
energy and fresh water supplies to practically every coastal state
in the world, and the commercial development of offshore
methane hydrates could substantially impact both developed and
developing economies. Offshore methane hydrates offer the
means to provide those benefits, while also serving as substantial
sinks for climate change policy makers. It is a policy trio of
substantial benefits: water policy, energy policy, and climate
change policy. But, the downside is that the commercial
development of offshore methane hydrates could unleash both
cataclysmic and non-cataclysmic risks and harms.
A.

Benefits of Offshore Methane Hydrates

Methane hydrates are a potential source of both methane and
fresh water.2 After the methane volumes are extracted, the
methane can be converted expeditiously into routine natural gas
for use in both industrial and residential energy supplies.3
Extracted water can be used for both consumer and agricultural
purposes. As the methane volumes are extracted from the
hydrate deposits, streams of carbon dioxide can be injected into
the same hydrate structures to provide carbon capture and
storage (CCS).4 It also appears that the costs of extracting and
producing offshore methane hydrates are dropping, and may
become price competitive with other energy sources in the near
1. For a detailed exposition of the scientific and engineering circumstances
of offshore methane hydrates, of the potential benefits from the commercial
development of offshore methane hydrates, and of the potential risks and
hazards from that development, see Roy Andrew Partain, Primer on Methane
Hydrates, in MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE: CIVIL LIABILITY AND
REGULATIONS FOR THE EFFICIENT GOVERNANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS
FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE OPERATIONS (forthcoming 2015), available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2465612
[hereinafter
MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE].
2. Id. at ch. 2, § 2, n.18.
3. Id. at ch. 3, § 3.
4. See id. at ch.3, § 5.1, n.141.
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future, and it may already be price competitive with certain
liquid natural gas (LNG) prices.5
In the alternative, the methane can be combusted on-site to
generate electricity, and the exhaust therefrom can be re-injected
into the hydrate deposits for CCS storage. Or, the methane can be
reformed with steam (created with extracted fresh water and
heated with methane) to create hydrogen fuel.6 From methane
fuels, to carbon-neutral electricity, to hydrogen fuel options, the
commercial development of offshore methane hydrates could
enable a wide array of green and greener energy options.7 In an
era concerned with anthropogenic climate change, these are
potentially exciting options.
Methane hydrates exist abundantly in many locations,
including locations found onshore in arctic permafrost. Almost
every coastal country is expected to possess methane hydrate
reserves,8 and those countries with onshore methane hydrates
also possess offshore methane hydrates.9 Developed countries,
such as Japan and South Korea, that do not currently possess
strategic volumes of domestic energy supplies, do possess
substantial offshore methane hydrate supplies.10
Many
developing countries with no domestic energy supply are expected
to possess substantial offshore methane hydrate reserves; many
of those countries might also be interested in the freshwater coproduced with methane hydrates to assist in their agricultural
development and consumer freshwater needs.
The world has faced critical energy supply shortages since
the dawn of the fossil fuel era of industrialization. While not a
perfect cure to that problem, the commercial development of
offshore methane hydrates could enable local access to energy
supplies, and level the geo-political playing field of energy
markets. The potential benefit of both lowering energy costs and

5. See id. at ch.3, § 2, n.16. The LNG comparison here is to spot prices seen
in the recent decade in northeast Asia.
6. See id. at ch.3, § 5.2, nn.150-52.
7. See MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 3, § 1.
8. Id. at ch. 2, § 1.
9. See id. at ch. 2, § 3, nn. 78-79.
10. Id. at ch. 3, §§ 4.1, 4.2.
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the potential stability of supplies could assist in global economic
development.
B.

Hazards of Offshore Methane Hydrates

The extraction and production of offshore methane hydrates
is a “new thing under the sun.”11 Innovative technologies and
new risks heretofore untouched in offshore energy extraction are
required to extract energy supplies from under subsea mud
layers.12 Previously, offshore operators feared methane hydrates
as one of the most dangerous aspects of offshore drilling and in
gas pipeline transportation. A lot of unlearning must be
accomplished, as methane hydrates are increasingly seen as
valuable energy resources.
Methane hydrates collect under mud layers in the ocean.13
The icy crystals are endothermically stable, as they need extra
energy to be added to their reservoir system before they will
begin to disassociate and release methane volumes from the
hydrate structures.14 Left alone, they are, and have been, stable
for geologically long time frames.15
But, scientists have found evidence that ancient earthquakes
or landslides have added that necessary energy to ancient
hydrate deposits.16 When that happened, earthquakes and
tsunamis occurred, which resulted in massive impacts on coastal
flora and fauna.17 For example, the Mesolithic-era Storegga
event sent tsunami waves forty meters high directly into the
coasts of Iceland and Norway; such an event in modern times
might kill millions of coastal dwellers and severely impact a
broader radius of coastal communities. 18
Without tsunamis, major disruptions of the mud layer and of
the underlying hydrate deposits could enable massive and sudden

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

With apologies to the author of Ecclesiastes 1:9. Ecclesiastes 1:9.
MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 3, § 3.
MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 2, § 1.
See id. at ch. 2, § 6.
Id. § 6.
Id. at ch. 4, § 4.2.
See id.
Id. at ch. 4.
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disassociation of methane.19 If a sufficient amount of methane is
released, a funnel or chimney can be created, which can enable
the methane to be directly released into the atmosphere without
first transmitting through the water column.20 Such a large
emission of methane into the atmosphere could cause several
problems. Methane itself is combustible and explosive; such an
event would create a radius of danger preventing emergency
crews from gaining immediate access to the damage area. Such
volumes could also potentially asphyxiate first responders.
Finally, the emission of methane into the atmosphere would be a
grave accident in climate change consequences, as methane is
considered substantially more dangerous than carbon dioxide for
inducing climate change.
Are cataclysmic events likely? Probably not; however, until
more information is acquired from completely developed offshore
extraction projects, the risk might remain difficult to ascertain.
However, given that methane hydrates are endothermic, and
given the potential to measure the amounts of energy injected or
placed into the hydrate deposits, it should be feasible to
substantially limit black swan type events by setting standards to
ensure that cautious energy budgets are enforced to prevent
overstimulation of the hydrate deposits. Yet, given the complexity
of the hydrate structures, the limits of sub-mud-line surveillance,
and the complex marine interactions that will continue to exist
from natural processes, it would likely remain impossible to
prevent all likelihood of cataclysmic events at offshore methane
hydrate installations. Thus, whatever resulting standards emerge
to address the risks and hazards of offshore hydrate accidents,
there will remain a need to ensure that those standards
contemplate how to address cataclysmic accidents.
Gentler events also could make substantial impacts to the
adjacent coastal communities and to the flora and fauna of the
oceans wherein the offshore methane hydrate projects enable
methane venting or seepage to occur.21 The preparation of fields
19. Id. at ch. 4, § 6.
20. MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 4, §
4.1.
21. MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 4, §
4.1.
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for production involves a variety of drilling and vibration
inducing activities. Extraction may well include various heating
injections and flooding techniques.22
The depletion of the
methane or water volumes could cause hydrate bed collapses that
Both the
in turn could lead to structural problems. 23
development and on-going operation of offshore methane
hydrates could lead to non-cataclysmic methane accidents. Given
the many modes in which the hydrate deposit could become
disturbed and begin to emit methane, the chance of noncataclysmic venting and seepage would not be expected to be
slight; rather, one might reasonably conclude that minor events
could reasonably occur in most fields. But, it would also be more
likely than not, that such events would lose their energy source or
be detected and addressed, and thus be events of limited duration
and of limited impact.
Methane itself is a greenhouse gas, and its constant seepage
and emission could enable additional anthropogenic climate
change to occur. Methane is also interactive with the biota of the
ocean, both as a food stock for certain micro-biota and as a
displacer of oxygen.24 Methane can be digested and converted
metabolically into carbon dioxide, which is another critical
greenhouse gas. 25 The nuisance of emitted methane and carbon
dioxide gas volumes, the potential interference into marine
economies, such as fishing and tourism, and the general anxiety
of living near a field of risk, could all be considered part of the
harms and hazards of living near offshore methane hydrate
projects. 26
The commercial development of offshore methane hydrate
technologies would offer both risks and rewards. The needs of
certain countries to achieve domestic energy supplies, to sustain
economic development, and to potentially address parallel issues

22. See id. at ch. 4, § 4.2.
23. See id.
24. See MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 4,
§ 6.
25. Some marine biota can metabolize methane. There are also non-biotic
chemical processes in the water column that can enable the decomposition of
methane into carbon dioxide. See id. at ch. 4, § 6.
26. See id.
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of freshwater supplies and of effective climate change policies
could encourage an earlier timeframe for development. On the
other hand, there are substantial risks and hazards that
endanger both the local communities to methane hydrate
accidents and global communities impacted by climate change
events. The risks and benefits need to be balanced, and an
efficient means of obtaining the optimal levels of safety and
extraction activity are needed.
II.

MODEL GOVERNANCE OF THE RISKS FROM
OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATES

The primary tools available for the governance of accidental
risk are both the public and private rules of civil liability and
regulations.
This section will summarize the overall circumstances of
offshore methane hydrates. Literature from law and economics
support an argument that it would be best governed under the
rule of strict liability.27 However, there are certain circumstances
that frustrate a rule of strict liability; in those cases public
regulations were found to be an efficient means of risk
governance for offshore methane hydrates.28
Additionally,
private regulation can be integrated into a regulatory mechanism
with public regulation.29
27. For a detailed, yet non-mathematical, discussion on the models and
arguments supporting the application of a rule of strict liability to the risks and
hazards of offshore methane hydrates, see Roy Andrew Partain, The Application
of Civil Liability for the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates, 26(2) FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 225 (2015). For a summary of the mathematical models
presented in the aforementioned article, see MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE
FIERY ICE, supra note 1 (mathematical appendices).
28. For a detailed, yet non-mathematical, discussion on the models and
arguments supporting the application of public and private regulations to the
risks and hazards of offshore methane hydrates, see Roy Andrew Partain,
Governing the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates: Part II – Public and Private
Regulations (Rotterdam Inst. of Law & Econ., Working Paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2466079
[hereinafter
Governing the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates: Part II]. For a summary of
the mathematical models on regulatory mechanisms presented in the
aforementioned article, see MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE,
supra note 1 (mathematical appendices).
29. See Governing the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates: Part II, supra
note 27, § 5.
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Ergo, the recommendation of this article is a rule of strict
liability, employed alongside public and private regulations. This
will produce the optimal set of incentives to efficiently set the
correct standards for safety and precaution and the correct levels
of operational activity when offshore methane hydrates are
installed.30
A.

A Rule of Strict Liability Should Apply

In the last fifty-plus years since Calabresi’s first foray in the
law and economics of accident law,31 much advancement has been
made. There is now a substantial body of literature to draw from,
and a strong consensus has emerged on when certain rules of civil
liability could be efficiently applied, and under what
circumstances other rules might be efficiently applied.32 Of
course much theoretical activity remains, and not all models
agree, but there is a workable standard model that can be utilized
for the present article.
When accidents are primarily or exclusively under the
control of a single actor, theory suggests that a rule of strict
liability would be more efficient than a rule of negligence.33
When accidents are a result of both the tortfeasor’s and the
victim’s actions, but the tortfeasor’s acts are more critical to
containing the risk of harm, again, theory suggests that a rule of
strict liability would be more efficient.34 When the underlying
activity creating the harm is abnormally hazardous, theory
suggests that a rule of strict liability would be more efficient.35
When particular uncertainties are to be encountered, theory
suggests that a rule of strict liability would be more efficient.36
And when it is important to prevent stress to a judicial system,

30. See Partain, supra note 27, at 316-18; see Governing the Risks of Offshore
Methane Hydrates: Part II, supra note 28, § 6.
31. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
32. See Partain, supra note 27, at 252-57.
33. See id. at 257.
34. See id. at 258.
35. See id. at 266.
36. See id. at 270.
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theory suggests that a rule of strict liability would present fewer
transaction costs on the path to justice.37
The development of offshore methane hydrates contains the
circumstances that advocate for a rule of strict liability.38
Offshore methane hydrates projects would primarily be of a
unilateral nature of activity and risk and the operator would be
the primary, if not sole, determiner of which risky acts would be
undertaken, when they would be undertaken, and how they
would be undertaken, and thus a rule of strict liability would be
the efficient policy choice.39 Even if there were a nexus between
the operator and local community members in the acts leading to
methane hydrate accidents, i.e., a bilateral accident model, the
determinants of risk would still primarily sit with the operator,
and thus a rule of strict liability would be the efficient policy
choice.40 When the potential risks of cataclysmic events are
considered, the development of offshore methane hydrates could
reasonably be characterized as abnormally hazardous. 41 But, one
need not rely on the risks of tsunamis and earthquakes, as the
damages from non-cataclysmic accidents could also be
characterized as abnormally hazardous in that the combined
risks, both local and global, are neither normal nor safe, and thus
a rule of strict liability would be the efficient policy choice.42
Given the novelty of the nascent industry, many uncertainties are
to be encountered, such as indeterminate ex ante duty of care,
uncertainty of future harms, and complex interactions of
precaution and activity levels.43 Therefore, a rule of strict
liability would be the efficient policy choice. And given that many
of the countries wherein methane hydrate deposits lay have
developing legal institutions and may not be able to bear the full
brunt of transaction costs from a major methane hydrate

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See id. at 273.
See Partain, supra note 27, at 275-82.
See id. at 275.
See Partain, supra note 27, at 275.
See id. at 276-78.
See id.
See id. at 278-79.
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accident, a rule of strict liability would again be the efficient
policy choice.44
A rule of negligence cannot be excluded from consideration,45
but the circumstances of offshore methane hydrates strongly fall
on the side of those favoring a rule of strict liability.46 However,
if only a rule of strict liability were employed, a number of
circumstances that would fail to provide the correct incentives to
optimally set precautionary and activity levels would likely arise.
To correct for these potential events, public regulations should
complement strict liability.47
B.

Public and Private Regulations Should be Engaged

Public regulations can directly set standards ex ante of a
tortfeasor’s engagement in a risky activity; as such, public
regulations can enable the tortfeasor to make strategic decisions
on activity levels and on care levels in alignment with the
standards set by the regulatory body. This could facilitate the
development of offshore methane hydrates by setting optimal
standards before financial investment decisions would need to be
made. Clear ex ante regulations could also communicate to the
engineers and developers of the offshore hydrate installation,
what standards and tolerances for safety their designs and plans
should achieve. The establishment of optimal standards, under
the deliberative process requirements as set out under the
Environmental
Impact
Analysis
(EIA)
and
Strategic
Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directives, and under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),48 would also disclose
to the public critical information about the risky activities
undertaken at the installations, and enable many groups to
engage in the development of those standards.

44. See id. at 282.
45. See id. at 281-82.
46. See Partain, supra note 27, at 275-82.
47. See Governing the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates: Part II, supra
note 28, §§ 5-6.
48. See discussions of the EIA, SEA, and NEPA deliberative procedures to
develop correct institutional responses to novel harms and hazards, infra
Parts III(D)(1), III(D)(2), and III(E)(1), respectively.
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Public regulations can be usefully applied to cure certain
circumstances so that routine economic decisions can be properly
performed, as these regulations can cure or at least ameliorate
missing markets or market failures.49 The consensus view holds
that regulations could be efficient at achieving optimal levels of
precaution and activity levels when civil liability rules are
stymied by: (i) informational asymmetries, (ii) insolvency, (iii)
problems of underdeterrence, and (iv) of institutional juridical
capacity.50
The development of offshore methane hydrates demonstrates
aspects from each of the above concerns. Informational
symmetries would likely be a concern as offshore methane
hydrates projects are developed and operated.51 For example,
while the development of the technologies and science related to
offshore methane hydrate operations has been greatly fostered by
public investments, the ability to continually monitor on-going
events would be dangerous and prohibitive if extended to all of
the potential victims. Thus, there is an efficient role for a
regulatory body to play to enable both a quality collection of data
to be obtained and made publicly available while limiting the
overall impact to the safe operations of the hydrate fields. Public
regulations could be the efficient policy choice for methane
hydrates to address these informational asymmetries.
While one would hope that the revenues from the sales
associated with commercially operated offshore methane hydrates
projects would ensure solvency, there are a variety of reasons
that policy vigilance should be maintained to ensure that the
potential insolvency of operators does not diminish the
effectiveness of public safety planning.52 Whereas a strict liability
rule begins to falter when the operator becomes insulated from
the informational incentives of potential damages, regulations
can provide policy tools to incentivize the operator to both stay
solvent and to provide non-monetary behavioral incentives.
49. See Governing the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates: Part II, supra
note 28, § 2.
50. See id. §§ 3.2.1-3.2.4.
51. See id. § 3.2.1.
52. See Governing the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates: Part II, supra
note 28, § 3.2.2.
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Public regulations could be the efficient policy choice for methane
hydrates to address insolvency.
Underdeterrence can result when various plaintiffs fail to
plead their injuries and receive judicially determined damages. In
the event of offshore methane hydrate accidents, there are a
variety of means in which victims might fail to plead their
injuries.53 For example, in non-cataclysmic methane leakages
and venting, plaintiffs might not have sufficient evidence of the
leakage events, or they might not be able to directly connect their
injury to the leakage event, or their incidental harm might not
cost-justify litigation on an individual basis. In such scenarios, a
regulatory body might be able to collect a superior set of evidence,
be able to connect more points of causation, and be able to
integrate many injury claims into a cost-justifiable set. In other
considerations, potential victims may be missing; it might be due
to the long timeframes of some injuries or the results of a
cataclysmic accident that swept victims away. Public regulations
could be the efficient policy choice for methane hydrates to
address underdeterrence.
Private regulations enable those closest to the activity and its
risks to develop the optimal standards.54 Because the technology
of developing and operating offshore methane hydrate fields is
likely to continue to advance, and because the risks and hazards
will become better understood as more experience is gained, it
would be advantageous to have those parties closest to those
learning engaged in setting the optimal standards.55
Additionally, it has been demonstrated that private regulations
can be developed to function alongside of public regulation; such a
mechanism is called an integrated regulatory mechanism.56 This
article recommends that regulation should be developed in
harmony with public regulation to ensure that all of the
advantageously informed parties could participate in standards
setting efforts.57
53. See id. § 3.2.3.
54. See id. § 4.1.
55. See Governing the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates: Part II, supra
note 28, § 4.4.
56. See id. § 4.4.
57. See id. § 6.
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Finally, in consideration of certain legal systems, not all
jurisdictions have court systems that can support the litigious
demands that a major methane hydrate accident event might
entail.58 A regulatory or administrative body might be better
equipped to gather and handle legal claims than a singular
litigant with a rule of strict liability. The presence of private
regulations could also assist with these concerns.
C.

Application of Civil Liability, Public Regulations, and
Private Regulations

Thus, public regulations and private regulations would be
efficient in certain circumstances. But, so was the rule of strict
liability. Might they well be implemented in a complementary
fashion? Yes, they would.59
Rules of civil liability can help to protect the effectiveness of
public regulations when such regulations or regulatory bodies
would be affected by agency costs and lobby capture.60
Regulations can help to provide critical information to lower
transaction costs and to better ensure the function of a strict
liability rule in court.61 When it is difficult to determine ex ante
safety standards, regulations can serve as a floor beneath which
potential tortfeasors are incentivized to stay above.62 In this
article, other reasons for complementary implementation were
reviewed, and few reasons were found to support a contrary
result.63
Thus, this article supports the combined approach of both
public regulation and rules of civil liability. This article further
supports the choice of a rule of strict liability for the civil liability
system.

58. See id. § 5.8.
59. See id. §§ 5-6.
60. See id. § 5.1.
61. See id. § 5.8.
62. See Governing the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates: Part II, supra
note 28, § 5.2.
63. See id. §§ 5.4-5.7.
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III. STATE OF EXISTING GOVERNANCE FOR
OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE RISKS
There is a wide array of international, regional, and national
legal frameworks that address situations analogous to offshore
methane hydrate operations. Some of the governance directly
addresses oil spills and related emissions into the ocean; others
address various environmental liabilities or climate change
concerns. Some of these legal systems appear to apply as
currently enacted to offshore methane hydrates, but few properly
provide sufficient attention to the particular needs of offshore
methane hydrate accidents. It would appear that the lack of
historical examples has prevented a more complete drafting of the
existing laws; this is not a critique, as laws need not regulate
what is not yet in existence.
A.

Laws of the United Nations

The international legal community has taken dramatic steps
in the last several decades towards clarifying a common
perspective on international environmental law.
Within the United Nations’ (UN) umbra, there are three
major conventions that would likely govern or coordinate with the
domestic governance of offshore methane hydrates. Other
conventions might have limited nexus or applicability.
First, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
would provide jurisdiction over the waters and subsea lands that
contain methane hydrates.64 While UNCLOS does not apply to
every country in the world, its paradigm of Exclusive Economic
Zones (EEZ) does appear globally recognized, either by
ratification of the Convention, by functioning opinio juris, or, as
with the U.S., by presidential declaration. UNCLOS calls for
comprehensive “rules, regulations and procedures” to protect the
ocean and its environment.65 Also, to the extent that methane
hydrates were found further offshore than the EEZ, UNCLOS
provides that the International Seabed Authority (ISA) would
64. See infra Part III(A)(1).
65. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 151, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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become the regulatory body to both establish the relevant
regulations, and to provide for the leasing of such methane
hydrates.66
Second, the UN Convention on the Transboundary Effects of
Industrial Accidents (UNCTEIA) provides a per se exclusion to
offshore hydrocarbon accidents with the understanding that oil
pollution has been dealt with by separate international efforts;67
many conventions make similar provisions and assumptions.
However, UNCTEIA does establish what is likely an expectation
for ratifying states to adopt strict liability type rules in their civil
liability or regulatory systems. When states do develop those
regulations, they are “to protect human beings and the
environment against industrial accidents by preventing such
accidents as far as possible,” by reducing the frequency and
severity of those accidents that do occur, and by mitigating the
effects of the accidents that do occur. 68 Further, UNCTEIA does
list methane and hydrogen as hazardous substances that might
be within its ambit of regulation were it not otherwise specifically
excluded for offshore oil and gas operations. So while UNCTEIA
would not directly apply to the development of offshore methane
hydrates, it does strongly suggest an approach to take in
governing such risks.
Third, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), and its Kyoto Protocol do not provide a liability
framework for accidental greenhouse gas emissions, but they do
set absolute limits on emissions for a certain sub-class of
signatories.69 Those countries that have assumed obligation
emission limits are required to enforce those obligations with
domestic law; the EU, its Member States, and Japan are such
parties, but the U.S. and Canada are not. The EU has a
sophisticated mechanism to ensure compliance, see infra at
Section 3.3, but many other countries with methane hydrate
assets have not assumed emissions obligations. As such, the
66. Id. at art. 156.
67. See infra Part III(A)(2).
68. United Nations Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial
Accidents, art. 3.1, Mar. 17, 1992, 2105 U.N.T.S. 457 [hereinafter UNCTEIA]
(emphasis added); see infra Part III(A)(2).
69. See infra Part III(A)(3).
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UNFCCC will be challenged by the development of offshore
methane hydrates, and further developments would be needed.
Thereafter, both the Espoo EIA Convention and the Rio
Declaration should be examined, as they guide the development
of other future conventions and domestic governance systems.
While much work remains in order to develop complete and
comprehensive international regulations, a set of Kelsian norms
have been established.
1.

UNCLOS

The 1982 UNCLOS70 is one of the most comprehensive
international law conventions functioning in environmental
law.71 UNCLOS governs many aspects of activities that occur
within coastal, marine, and oceanic locations.
a.

Rules on Mineral Exploitation

UNCLOS establishes the oceanic boundary lines for coastal
states. The “Zone” is defined as that area of the oceans and seas
that is beyond national jurisdiction.72 The territorial limits of
coastal states are set at twelve miles offshore, as measured
against the baseline of its coastal geography.73 For the twelve
miles beyond the territorial waters, coastal states are given rights
to their contiguous zones, which are intended to enable them to
enforce their territorial waters.74 Within these areas, the coastal
states retain comprehensive sovereignty.
For the exploitation of minerals, coastal states’ EEZs extend
far beyond their territorial waters. EEZs are limited to stretch no
further than 200 nautical miles beyond the baseline that
determines their territorial waters.75 Additional details are
provided on the definition of the continental shelf, which is
70. UNCLOS, supra note 65.
71. Craig H. Allen, Protecting the Oceanic Gardens of Eden: International
Law Issues in Deep-Sea Vent Resource Conservation and Management, 13 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 563, 586 (2001).
72. UNCLOS, supra note 65, at art. 55.
73. Id. at art. 3.
74. UNCLOS, supra note 65, at art. 33.
75. Id. at art. 57.

17

5_Partain

808

FINAL_EDIT

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

10/2/2015 2:19 PM

[Vol. 32

similarly defined at 200 nautical miles beyond the baseline, in the
base case, but there are more concerns about the actual
underlying geography and geology, which may enable a coastal
country to claim up to 350 nautical miles beyond its baseline.76
Coastal states enjoy full sovereignty over the minerals
contained in the sea, seabed, and its subsoil in both the EEZ and
the continental shelf areas. Coastal states retain their:
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living
or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the
sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the
production of energy from the water, currents and winds. 77

And coastal states exercise:
over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. . . . The natural
resources referred to in this Part consist of the mineral and other
non-living resources of the sea-bed and subsoil together.”78
Coastal states “have the exclusive right to authorize and regulate
drilling on the continental shelf[,]” and thus within their EEZs,
“for all purposes.79

There are economic differences for minerals further out
offshore. For minerals extracted from within the EEZs’ 200
nautical mile limits, the coastal states retain all of the economic
benefits of produced minerals. The coastal states are required to
make payments, or payments in kind, to the ISA against the net
value of minerals with mineral extraction that occurs beyond the
200 nautical miles.80 The ISA is to redistribute those funds “to
States Parties to this Convention, on the basis of equitable

76. Id. at art. 76.
77. Id. at art. 56(1)(a).
78. Id. at art. 77.
79. Id. at art. 81.
80. The first five years are free of payments; then in year six, a one percent
payment is required; every year thereafter increases the toll by one percent until
the toll rate equals seven percent. All subsequent years pay a toll rate of seven
percent. UNCLOS, supra note 65, at art. 82(2).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/5

18

5_Partain

2015]

FINAL_EDIT

OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATES

10/2/2015 2:19 PM

809

sharing criteria, taking into account the interests and needs of
developing States, particularly the least developed and the landlocked among them.”81
b.

Protection of the Environment

In addition, the coastal states retain the jurisdiction and
duty to handle “protection and preservation of the marine
environment.”82
UNCLOS provides guidance as to where coastal states retain
certain aspects of sovereignty at different points in the ocean to
define and delimit the Zone, which is the area of the ocean beyond
any national jurisdiction. Within the Zone, all minerals and
resources, living and non-living, as said to belong to “the common
heritage of mankind.”83 Resources include methane hydrates, as
resources are defined as “all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral
resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the sea-bed.”84 So,
within the Area, all methane hydrates belong to all of mankind,
and therefore, their development and exploitation would be
administered by the ISA.85
UNCLOS takes a very clear line that environmental concerns
should remain front and center with all activities taking place in
the Area. The operation behavior of the Member States in the
Area are controlled by UNCLOS. State parties are liable for the
damages, including environmental damages, caused on their
behalf within the Area.86
Within all three locations, the EEZ, the continental shelf, and
within the Area, “States have the obligation to protect and
preserve the marine environment.”87 Within the areas under
their sovereignty, States have the “right to exploit their natural
resources,” but only if “pursuant to their environmental policies

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at art. 82(4).
Id. at art. 56(1)(b)(iii).
Id. at art. 136.
Id.at art. 133(a).
Id. at art. 151(1)(a).
UNCLOS, supra note 65, at art. 139.
UNCLOS, supra note 65, at art. 192.
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and in accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the
marine environment.”88
There are several requirements set out to establish the
manner in which the ocean and its associated ecologies must be
protected.89 Those subsections most relevant to the commercial
development of methane hydrates are listed hereunder:
i. “States shall take . . . all measures consistent with this
Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment from any
source, using for this purpose the best practicable means
at their disposal.”90
ii. “States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that
activities under their jurisdiction or control are so
conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other
States and their environment, and that pollution arising
from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or
control does not spread beyond the areas where they
exercise sovereign rights.”91
iii. “These measures shall include, inter alia, those designed
to minimize to the fullest possible extent: (c) pollution
from installations and devices used in exploration or
exploitation of the natural resources of the sea-bed and
subsoil, in particular measures for preventing accidents
and dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of
operations at sea, and regulating the design,
construction, equipment, operation and manning of such
installations or devices.”92
Within the Area wherein states lack sovereignty or
jurisdiction, State Parties are liable for their own behavior, as
well as “state enterprises or natural or juridical persons which
possess the nationality of States Parties or are effectively
controlled by them or their nationals.”93

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at art. 193.
Id. at art. 194.
Id. at art. 194(1).
Id. at art. 194(2).
Id. at art. 194(3)(c).
UNCLOS, supra note 65, at art. 139(1).
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The Area shall only be used for the “benefit of mankind as a
whole.”94
(a) the prevention, reduction and control of pollution and other
hazards to the marine environment, including the coastline, and
of interference with the ecological balance of the marine
environment, particular attention being paid to the need for
protection from harmful effects of such activities as drilling,
dredging, excavation, disposal of waste, construction and
operation or maintenance of installations, pipelines and other
devices related to such activities. 95

Article 145 further clarifies the environmental duty of care:
“(b) the protection and conservation of the natural resources of
the Area and the prevention of damage to the flora and fauna of
the marine environment.”96
Similar to how UNCLOS provides operational details of how
environmental safety should be guarded and preserved with
precautionary behaviors,97 Annex III of UNCLOS also provides a
full set of operation guidelines for the ISA to manage the
exploitation of minerals within the Area. Key among the concerns
enumerated are:
(i) Given that the extraction and production of methane hydrates
are regulated by UNCLOS, the selection of qualified operators is
to be determined by the rules, regulations, and procedures of the
ISA.98
(ii) To be qualified, the Annex requires both financial and
technical competence to be established.99
(iii) Additionally, the applicant operator must be sponsored by a
Member State and the Member State must be able to
demonstrate that they have the capacity to “ensure, within their
legal system” that the applicant operator will be required to
operate to the environmental protection standards of the ISA.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at art. 140(1).
Id. at art. 145(a) (emphasis added).
Id. at art. 145(b).
Id. at art. 147.
Id. at Annex III, art. 4(1).
UNCLOS, supra note 65, at art. 4(2) (emphasis added).

21

5_Partain

812

FINAL_EDIT

10/2/2015 2:19 PM

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

That said, if the Member State has sufficient regulations and
institutions to “reasonably appropriate for securing compliance”
from the applicant operator, and that operator later fails its
duties under the Member State’s laws, then the Member State
itself will not be liable for any harms caused by the sponsored
operator.100 Thus, in the event that extraction from methane
hydrates becomes operationally commercial in nature, then
Member States have a strong incentive to provide sound
regulatory regimes and institutions to better defend themselves
under UNCLOS.
c.

Risk Governance Under UNCLOS

UNCLOS requires the development of regulatory systems
prior to the commercial development of methane hydrates.
“Rules, regulations and procedures shall be drawn up in order to
secure effective protection of the marine environment from
harmful effects directly resulting from activities in the Area” if
undertaken with regards to the exploitation of minerals, such as
methane hydrates.101
Should an operator cause harm, they will be liable for the
actual amount of damage; on the other hand, if the damage was
caused by a failure of the ISA to operate correctly under
UNCLOS, then it shall be liable for the actual amount of
damages.102 It does not appear that there is any provision for a
prescriptive level of care or prevention that would exclude the
“cautious tortfeasor” from damages; thus it appears that
UNCLOS contemplates a strict liability rule if civil liability rules
were to be employed by the coastal state.
While there are requirements for the operators to
demonstrate their financial capacity to respond to the harms they
might create, nowhere in UNCLOS is it explained where the ISA
or the UN more broadly might receive sufficient revenues to
handle the burdens of a major methane hydrate catastrophe. But,
the requirement for a regulatory body to address insolvency is

100. Id. at Annex III, art. 4(4).
101. Id. at Annex III, art. 17(2)(f).
102. UNCLOS, supra note 65, at Annex III, art. 22.
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reassuringly close to the model of governance suggested in this
article, supra, at Section II.
Also intriguing under UNCLOS is the idea that all
technology developed to operate within the Area should be shared
and distributed as part of the “common heritage” paradigm of
UNCLOS.103 The data from activities in the Area is required to
be shared and transferred inter-members.104
This type of
arrangement would normally assume a regulatory body is
involved; perhaps the ISA would coordinate, but it is not clear if
other regulatory bodies could lead, or if the ISA and the UN could
coordinate a “methane hydrate data clearinghouse registry.”
In conclusion, UNCLOS has a sufficient ambit to regulate the
development of methane hydrates. If the extraction of methane
hydrates happened within the Area, the environmental
regulations would apply and there would need to be a new set of
regulations and rules to establish proper safety practices and
methods of handling environmental damages. Such rules and
regulations do not currently exist.
2.

UNCTEIA

UNCTEIA would not likely apply to the development of
offshore methane hydrate projects.105 But, the Convention might
apply to the onshore facilities related to the processing and
marketing of natural gas and hydrogen.
a.

Exclusion of Certain Hydrocarbon
Accidents

UNCTEIA applies to “the prevention of, preparedness for and
response to industrial accidents capable of causing transboundary
effects, including the effects of such accidents caused by natural
disasters.”106 However, UNCTEIA provides a seven-point list of
exceptions to the Convention.107 Within that list, accidents that

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See generally UNCLOS, supra note 65, at Annex III, art. 5.
Id. at Annex III, art. 14.
UNCTEIA, supra note 68.
Id. at art. 2(1).
Id. at art. 2(2)(a)-(g).
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occur in the marine environment, including seabed exploration
and exploitation, are excluded from UNCTEIA.108 Similarly,
leakages into the sea, such as oil or other harmful substances, are
excluded from UNCTEIA coverage.109 Thus, any accidents related
to the seeping, leakage, or venting of methane from an offshore
methane hydrate project is excluded from the coverage of
UNCTEIA.
b.

Application to Onshore Facilities of
Offshore Installations

If a project had onshore facilities that were otherwise related
to the offshore activities, but an accident arose onshore from
those onshore facilities, without direct causation to the offshore
activities, then UNCTEIA might apply. Such events might be the
leakage of a gas transportation pipeline or the rupture and
conflagration of an onshore methane storage facility.
UNCTEIA provides that industrial accidents result from the
loss of control during hazardous activities over hazardous
substances either during the processing or storing within an
installation, or when such hazardous substances are in
transport.110 Hazardous activities are those activities that use
hazardous substances and are capable of transboundary
effects.111
Transboundary effects are those serious effects that occur
within one jurisdiction as a result of industrial accidents in other
jurisdictions, as long as both jurisdictions are under the
sovereignty of signatories to UNCTEIA.112 Also, the industrial
accident needs to qualify as such and also not be listed as an
exception to UNCTEIA; e.g., onshore methane processing,
storage, and transportation are not per se excluded.113
Methane and hydrogen gases are reasonably characterized as
hazardous substances under UNCTEIA. A substance is a
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

UNCTEIA, supra note 68, at art. 2(2)(f).
Id. at art. 2(2)(g).
Id. at art. 1(a)(i), (ii).
Id. at art. 1(b).
Id. at art. 1(d)-(f).
Id. at art. 2(1)-(2).
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hazardous substance if it is listed under Annex I, either as a
named substance or as a chemical that meets certain minimum
quantities.114 Methane, as natural gas, is included under Annex
I, either as regular gaseous methane or as a cryogenic liquid,
such as LNG.115 To the extent that hydrogen is extracted,116 or
otherwise associated with the onshore activities, it would also be
a named substance under Annex I.117
c.

Risk Governance Under UNCTEIA

Once the character of a hazardous activity has been
identified, such as an onshore methane processing facility or a
hydrogen generation facility, then the obligations of UNCTEIA
are binding upon the parties.118 Foremost among the obligations
is “to protect human beings and the environment against
industrial accidents by preventing accidents as far as possible,”
by reducing the frequency and severity of those accidents that do
occur, and by mitigating the effects of the accidents that do
occur.119
UNCTEIA establishes a very high duty of care to prevent
accidents “as far as possible;”120 but it does not appear to be an
unlimited demand, but rather the highest reasonable level of due
care, which implies a balancing of social benefits and costs. The
Parties are to “take appropriate measures for the prevention of
industrial accidents.”121 In addition, the Parties are to “take
appropriate measures to establish and maintain adequate
emergency preparedness”122 and “the Parties shall support

114. UNCTEIA, supra note 68, Annex I, pts. I, II.
115. Id. at Annex I, pt. II, § 11 (minimum quantity of 200 metric tons, a
functionally tiny amount of methane for a methane producing facility).
116. For a more complete discussion on producing hydrogen from methane
hydrates, see MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 3, § 5.2.
117. UNCTEIA, supra note 68, at Annex I, pt. II, § 5. The minimum amount
required is fifty metric tons. If the daily production of hydrogen were assumed,
to provide a green fuel stock, then this volume would be readily met. Id.
118. Id. at art. 3.
119. Id. at art. 3(1) (emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. Id. at art. 6, § 1.
122. Id. at art. 8, § 1.
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appropriate international efforts to elaborate rules, criteria, and
procedures in the field of responsibility and liability.”123
Does the requirement for “as far as possible” require a strict
liability rule, or a rule of negligence? It is likely that the drafters
had a strict liability rule in mind, but left sufficient flexibility to
the Parties to determine the details.124 The overall semantic
character of the UNCTEIA reasonably appears to support and
suggest the development of a rule of strict liability, or a unique
form of a negligence rule with the duties of care set at the highest
feasible levels.
Indeed, one might be able to comply with a combination of
regulations and civil liability rules. For example, UNCTEIA
takes care to highlight the type of minimal goals of safety that
should be addressed by the implementing state; Annex IV
provides a non-binding, non-obligatory listing of methods to
prevent industrial accidents.125 Yet, precisely because of this
non-binding, non-obligatory character of these rules, no
particular duty level is prescribed therein. Thus, there is little
evidence for the duty of care needed for a rule of negligence; yet,
the means to attain decentralization under a rule of strict
liability has been left unblocked by the regulatory suggestions.
Thus, a combined regulatory and strict liability framework would
coordinate with UNCTEIA.
UNCTEIA engages in such discussions with regard to
sufficient or fitting levels of precaution, and the drafters
expectations suggest that a regulatory approach would be taken
by many, and therefore, parties would benefit from some sort of
template to facilitate later coordination intra-parties.
3.

UN Framework Convention on Climate Change

The UNFCCC126 addresses the problems posed by
anthropogenic climate change; it is particularly focused on the
123. UNCTEIA, supra note 68, at art. 13.
124. UNCTEIA, supra note 68, at art. 13.
125. See id. at art. 6(1) (“[s]uch measures may include, but are not limited to”);
id. at Annex IV, pmbl. (“the following measures may be carried out”).
126. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
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issues related to the emissions of greenhouse gases.127 Additional
details necessary for the effective administration of the UNFCCC
were developed and adopted as the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCC
(Kyoto Protocol).128
a.

Governance of Anthropogenic Climate
Change

The UNFCCC defines greenhouse gases in a scientific frame,
“gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and
anthropogenic, that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation.”129
The Kyoto Protocol provides an enumerated list of greenhouse
gases: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorcarbons,
perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride.130 Thus, methane and
methane hydrates are potentially regulated by the UNFCCC.
The UNFCCC recognizes two determinants of anthropogenic
greenhouse gases, emissions, and sinks. Emissions are the
release of greenhouse gases “into the atmosphere over a specified
area and period of time.”131 Emissions arise from a source of
greenhouse gases; a source is any process or activity that releases
greenhouse gases or their precursors to the atmosphere.132 Sinks
are those processes, activities, or methods that remove
greenhouse gases or their precursors from the atmosphere.133
The anthropogenic venting and seeping of methane to the
atmosphere from offshore methane hydrate installations qualify
as emissions under the UNFCCC because methane is a listed
greenhouse gas, and the transmission to the atmosphere would
qualify as an emission. Likewise, there is a reasonable argument
to be made that the release of carbon dioxide from interactions of
vented or seeped methane volumes could also qualify as
emissions; however, there is an intermediate role played by
127. Id. at pmbl.
128. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter
Kyoto Protocol] (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005).
129. UNFCCC, supra note 126, at art. 1, § 5.
130. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 128, at Annex A (greenhouse gases).
131. UNFCCC, supra note 126, at art. 1(4).
132. Id. at art. 1(9).
133. Id. at art. 1(8).
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nature in converting that methane into carbon dioxide, and thus
the emission is indirectly anthropogenic in character.
The absorption of carbon dioxide back into the hydrate beds
in replacement of the extracted methane volumes would likely
qualify as a sink under the UNFCCC.134 Many of the promoted
means of developing offshore methane hydrate installations have
included the option of CCS alongside methane production in part
to facilitate minimizing the net impact of offshore methane
hydrate installations under the UNFCCC. Thus, offshore
methane hydrate installations might qualify as both emitters and
sinks, and therefore, need netting under the UNFCCC accounting
procedures.
b.

Governance of Regulatory Character

The UNFCCC requires its Contracting Parties to employ the
precautionary principle, which states that they should “take
precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the
causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.”135
However, the UNFCCC takes a measured approach to which
strategies should be undertaken, in that it requires the
“measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so
as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.”136
Additionally, the UNFCCC is sensitive to the fact that each
country or culture may face different determinants of costeffectiveness and that each country is enabled to take its unique
circumstances into account.137 Thus, the potential for methane
hydrate projects to both emit and sink greenhouse gases needs to
be integrated within the framework of the precautionary
principle. However, the UNFCCC does not particularly determine
134. E.g., Japan has expressed interest in a plan that would extract the
methane in order to fuel offshore electrical generation coordinated with reinjection of the exhaust carbon dioxide volumes back into the hydrate reservoirs.
Also, Germany has a research interest in offshore CCS that coordinates with
methane hydrate reservoirs. Projekt SUGAR and Eco2 lead those efforts. See
MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, ch. 3, § 5.1, for a more
complete discussion.
135. UNFCCC, supra note 126, at art. 3(3).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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how a particular country might utilize its methane hydrate
resources, this depends on the unique “socio-economic contexts” of
each Contracting Party. Thus, the UNFCCC has preserved to its
Contracting Parties the decisions of regulations or rules of civil
liability. These burdens are imposed at the state-level and not
lower.
While all of the Contracting Parties are obligated to
undertake broad responsibilities to ameliorate and reduce the
threat of anthropogenic climate change,138 the UNFCCC
distinguishes between Annex I Parties and Annex II Parties.
Annex I Parties are developed countries, and are expected to lead
the UNFCCC’s Parties by establishing national policies and
measures to limit anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases
and to protect and enhance greenhouse gas sinks and
reservoirs.139 The Annex I Parties are obligated to provide
measurements and metrics on their progress in achieving those
goals.140 The Kyoto Protocol took the next step to make those
requirements functional.141 The Protocol set an aspirational goal
to limit anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.142 There is
a new list of Parties so committed at Annex B to the Protocol. 143
The goals, as drafted within the Protocol, are percentage targets
against an estimated level of emissions from the year 1990; e.g.
the United States committed to reduce its emissions to ninetythree percent of its 1990 emission levels.144 The overall changes
to emissions are reduced by increases to sinks and reservoirs;145
thus the use of methane hydrate deposits as both an energy
resource and as a CCS facility could be tallied on both sides of the
emissions target.
Groupings of Annex I Parties can agree to achieve their
targets as an aggregate;146 this could assist methane hydrate
138. UNFCCC, supra note 126, at art. 4(1)(a)-(j).
139. Id. at art. 4(2)(a).
140. Id. at art. 4(2)(b), (c).
141. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 128, at art. 2(1)(a) (list of specific
obligations).
142. Id. at art. 3(1).
143. Id. at art. 3(1); id. at Annex B.
144. Id. at art. 3(1)-(3); id. at Annex B.
145. Id. at art. 3(3); id. at Annex A.
146. Id. at art. 4(1).
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projects by including a transboundary perspective on the
combined emissions and sink planning related to the project.
Additionally, Parties may volitionally transfer or acquire
emission reduction units by engaging in projects that reduce
anthropogenic emissions or enhance their removal by sinks.147
The Protocol also provides for a Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM), which enables Parties outside of Annex I to engage in
sustainable development in line with the UNFCCC.148 The CDM
enables developed countries to sponsor efforts within the
developing countries that would assist the attainment of
UNFCCC targets by enabling the Annex I Parties to receive some
emission reduction units for their own accounts.149 Also, more
broadly the Annex II Parties and other developed Parties are
obligated to provide new financing mechanisms to support the
attainment of the UNFCCC targets by assisting in the financing
of projects that would limit emissions and enhance sinks.150
Thus, there are several means for the financing and development
of methane hydrate projects if they are characterized as green
energy projects that reduce emissions and enhance sinks.
Annex II countries undertook additional financial,
technological, and burden-sharing obligations to assist developing
countries to reduce and mitigate their own anthropogenic
emissions.151 The developed parties have special obligations to
assist those countries particularly vulnerable to the impacts of
the effects of climate change due to anthropogenic emissions.152
There are particular concerns raised for a limited number of
critical situations:
(a) Small island countries;
(b) Countries with low-lying coastal areas;
(c) Countries with arid and semi-arid areas, forested areas and
areas liable to forest decay;
(d) Countries with areas prone to natural disasters;
(e) Countries with areas liable to drought and desertification;
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Kyoto Protocol, supra note 128, at art. 6.
Id. at art. 12(2).
Id. at art. 12(3)(a), (b).
Id. at art. 11.
UNFCCC, supra note 126, art. 4(3).
Id. at art. 4(4).
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(f) Countries with areas of high urban atmospheric pollution;
(g) Countries with areas with fragile ecosystems, including
mountainous ecosystems;
(h) Countries whose economies are highly dependent on income
generated from the production, processing and export, and/or on
consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive
products.153

Subsections (a), (b), (d), and (g) could be adversely affected by
the potential harms and hazards of methane hydrate projects.
Subsections (c), (e), and (f) might benefit from the potential
freshwater reserves associated with methane hydrates or the
pollution abatement that methane hydrates might offer over
existing energy resources. Finally, subsection (h) raises a query
on the potential impact on those countries highly dependent on
other non-methane hydrate, fossil fuel industries from the
development of methane hydrate technologies. For if methane
hydrates are developed as a form of green energy under the
UNFCCC, this surely would affect the revenues of those countries
previously benefiting from coal and crude oil industries.
c.

Risk Governance Under the UNFCCC

The approach to risk governance taken under the UNFCCC
is best described as regulatory in nature. What discipline that
exists is to coordinate at the state level of international law and
not below to lesser actors, thus rules of civil liability are not
engaged in directly by the UNFCCC. The previous paragraphs,
supra section III(A)(3)(b), demonstrated a variety of requirements
that could only be properly undertaken by regulatory bodies at
both the UNFCCC level and within its Party States.
To the extent that ratifying states opt to facilitate their own
domestic obligations under the UNFCCC by enacting domestic
regulation or civil liabilities to limit the risks of unplanned
emission accidents is not explicitly addressed within the
UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol. Some countries have taken

153. UNFCCC, supra note 126, art. 4(8)(a)-(h).
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stricter discipline into account,154 but others countries have
not.155
In conclusion, the UNFCCC does support a regulatory body’s
oversight of the data and operations of offshore methane hydrate
installations. To the extent that a Contracting Party needs to
monitor its overall levels of emissions and sinks, the offshore
installations could fit within that regulatory rubric. To the extent
that such observation data overlaps with similar data needs for
accident awareness and prevention, that regulatory framework
could both directly improve precautionary efforts and could also
provide secondary support to reducing the various transaction
costs of implementing a strict liability regime.
4.

Espoo EIA Convention

The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context functions as the UN’s equivalent to the
EU’s EIA Directive.156 When a proposed activity emerges that
would be likely to cause a significant adverse transboundary
impact, then the Contracting Parties have a duty to notify those
other Contracting Parties that would be affected by the
activity.157
Appendix I provides a list of activities that are likely to have
transboundary effects.158 Offshore hydrocarbon production is a
listed activity under the Appendix; it is defined to include the
extraction of natural gas if the installation extracts more than
500,000 cubic meters (m3) of methane a day.159 However, as of
154. See infra Part III(D)(7) (discussing the EU efforts to limit greenhouse
gases, which established fiscal discipline for Member States falling short of their
greenhouse gas emissions-reduction commitments).
155. Several key developed countries, including the United States, who are
significant emitters, have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol despite their
ratification of the underlying UNFCCC.
156. The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context, adopted Feb. 25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter
Espoo EIA Convention] (entered into force Sept. 10, 1997).
157. Id. at art. 3(1).
158. Id. at Appendix I. See id. at art. 3(1).
159. Id. at Appendix I, § 15. “Offshore hydrocarbon production. Extraction of
petroleum and natural gas for commercial purposes where the amount extracted
exceeds 500 metric tons/day in the case of petroleum and 500,000 cubic
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January 2014, Appendix I was not in effect as an insufficient
number of Contracting Parties had ratified the Appendix.160
Because the commercial development of a methane hydrate
project would have the potential to make an impact “on the
environment including human health and safety, flora, fauna,
soil, air, water, climate, landscape and historical monuments or
other physical structures or the interaction among these factors”
there is no requirement for adverse effects.161 To the extent that
such impacts could cross from one jurisdiction to another
jurisdiction, such an impact would qualify as a transboundary
impact.162 In that sense, the awareness of an impending
methane hydrate project that would have a transboundary impact
would raise the requirement to provide notification to the other
impacted Contracting Parties.
This system of notifications would be primarily a regulatory
action that collects information but provides for no judicial
damages, and thus the Convention provides no explicit form of ex
ante anticipation of ex post costs to provide incentives in the
manner that civil liability systems provide. But, the Convention
would clearly be an information-clearing house that would
complement a strict liability system.
5.

Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development

UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)
was held in 1992; it has been described as one of “the most
meters/day in the case of gas.” Decision III/7 Second Amendment to the ESPOO
Convention,
UNITED
NATIONS
ECON.
COMM’N
FOR
EUR.,
http://www.unece.org/env/eia/about/amendment2.html (last visited Nov. 30,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/GU8K-T6ML.
160. Only twenty-one Parties had ratified the Appendix as part of the second
amendments as of January 26, 2014. The underlying Convention has forty-five
Parties, so a total of thirty-four Parties need to ratify the Appendix (i.e., thirteen
more Parties). Amendment to the Convention on Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION
(June 4, 2004),
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII4-c&chapter=27&lang=en, archived at https://perma.cc/8Z7A-3EBZ.
161. Espoo EIA Convention, supra note 156, art. 1(vii).
162. Id. at art. 1(viii).
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ambitious international environmental conferences of the
twentieth century.”163 Both binding conventions, such as the
Convention on Biological Diversity and the UNFCCC, and soft
law documents, such as the Rio Declaration on Environment and
The
Development, were accomplished at the UNCED.164
Conference effectively shifted international customary law
towards a paradigm of precautionary law and a broader notion of
protecting whole eco-systems, as contrasted against earlier
paradigms of limited numbers of specifically targeted species.
The Rio Declaration is akin to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, in that it is aspirational in character. Unlike the
previous discussed matters, the Rio Declaration is not binding
law. It might reflect developing opinio juris, but it is a relatively
recent source of soft law.
The document lists twenty-seven specific principles and
guidelines for future efforts to better coordinate economic growth
and ecological conservation.165 Several of those principles have
direct application to the development of methane hydrates.
Principle 2: States maintain their sovereign rights to exploit
their own resources, but they have a
corresponding duty to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
transboundary damage to the environment.
Principle 4: Requires that planning and actions to mitigate
potential environmental harms are included
within all developmental efforts.
Principle 10: Calls for all states to engage their citizens in
the due and deliberative processes of
engagement and decision making on matters
that could affect the environment. Information

163. See Allen, supra note 71, at 599.
164. Id. at 599-600.
165. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), Annex 1 (Aug. 12, 1992),
available
at
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&Art
icleID=1163&l=en, archived at http://perma.cc/5T3D-U6AF.
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sharing and awareness building are also called
for.
Principle 11: Calls, amongst other targets, for recognition
that different states have different legal
institutions and stages of economic development,
and as such the regulatory standards applied by
some countries may be inappropriate and of
unwarranted economic and social cost to other
countries.
Principle 13: Calls for the development of national laws
regarding liability and compensation for the
victims of pollution and other environmental
damage. States should also cooperate to develop
international law regarding liability and
compensation
for
adverse
effects
of
environmental damage caused by activities
within their jurisdiction or control to areas
beyond their jurisdiction.
Principle 15: Calls for states to protect the environment by
widely adopting the use of the precautionary
approach, limited only according to their
capabilities.
Principle 16: Calls for the international adoption of the
polluter pays principle into domestic and
international laws.
Principle 17: Calls for Environmental impact assessments to
become a standard activity for all activities that
might endanger or harm the environment.166
Thus, the Rio Declaration establishes norms of comportment
with regards to prospective acts of commercialization, and the
aspirational goals of the international legal community for the
prospective protection of the environment.
a.

Risk Governance Under Rio Declaration

Perhaps the most important risk governance issues with the
Declarations are the recognition of: (i) the necessity to establish
166. See id.
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liability systems to address environmental protection concerns,
(ii) both regulatory and civil liability systems could be engaged,
(iii) different countries and cultures might need different
manners of liability and regulations implementations, (iv)
precautionary principles should be applied, and (v) the polluter
pays principle should be applied.
The general call for liability rules reflects a growing
recognition that polluters or tortfeasors need to know ex ante that
they will be held accountable for their decisions. The Declaration
enables the retention of legal flexibility, particularly for jointly
and complementarily implementing civil liability rules and
regulations as circumstances fit. The precautionary principle sets
a Coasian right to the general public, that they have a right to
retain their current enjoyment of nature and to their way of life;
it places the burden on the tortfeasor to prevent harm even if it is
unclear that harm would result. The polluter pays principle,
without additional clarification, appears to prefer a rule akin to
strict liability. Put together, it would appear that the Declaration
on the whole is more closely aligned with a strict liability
perspective, or a very stringent regulatory system, and not with a
rule of negligence or permissive regulatory framework.
B.

Regional Marine Conventions

The rise of oceanic transportation of fuel and other
potentially hazardous materials gave cause to the development of
a group of regional marine pacts and international oil spill pacts.
The two groups of conventions are somewhat interwoven, as they
both address the potential leakage of hazardous elements into the
ocean.
Both of these legal paradigms provide for the development of
risk governance schemes with historical perspectives and
insights. At large, the international maritime conventions and oil
spill conventions are in alignment with strict liability and the
coordinated implementation of regulations. They all either
explicitly or implicitly call for the implementation of strict
liability; not a single convention in the collection below advocates
or supports a rule of negligence. None of them disavow the useful
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role of regulation, and most provide frameworks of the
regulations that they expect to be put into place.167
Yet, it will be seen that both sets of conventions are likely to
apply only indirectly to the potential risks and hazards of offshore
methane hydrates. As will be explored, some of the disconnection
stems from the ocean going vessel paradigm underlying the
conventions, and some of the disconnection arises from linguistic
word choices that leave methane and related concerns out of the
domain of the conventions.
The challenges of responding to oil spills resulted in multiple
international conventions. The problems of transboundary oil
spills, particularly in the waters off of Europe, led to a collection
of regional marine pacts. Herein is provided a review of four of
the major regional marine conventions:
i. the Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR)
(North East Atlantic Ocean),168
ii. the Barcelona Convention (Mediterranean Sea),169
iii. the Bonn Agreement (North Sea),170 and
iv. the Helsinki Convention (Baltic Sea).171
The regional marine pacts, taken as a group, call for the
adoption of two key legal principles: (i) the polluter pays principle,
and (ii) the precautionary principle.172 As such, the fundamental
tone of the regional marine pacts is to support rules of strict
liability.173
The regional marine pacts also call for the
implementation of certain measures to ensure high safety
standards are maintained; it is most likely that such measures
would be carried out as public regulations.174 These measures
167. The main goals of those regulations are to both provide a certain
standard of sufficient breadth and coverage of contracting states’ resultant
regulations and to provide for better intercommunication and cooperation on the
eventual need to work together to address transboundary problems associated
with oil spills and other marine pollutants.
168. See infra Part III(B)(1).
169. See infra Part III(B)(3).
170. See infra Part III(B)(2).
171. See infra Part III(B)(4).
172. See infra Part III(B)(5).
173. See infra Part III(B)(5).
174. See infra Part III(B)(5).
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should include those measures that could eliminate and
remediate pollution from the exploration and exploitation of the
continental shelf, the seabed, and its subsoil; such measures
would be applicable to offshore methane hydrates and any
potential methane venting or seepage. Several of the pacts, such
as the Barcelona Convention, have additional protocols to
specifically address the risks associated with the operations of
offshore facilities, such as would be needed to extract methane
hydrates.175
However, a fundamental disconnect remains in that most of
the aforementioned conventions would barely be applicable to the
risks and hazards of offshore methane hydrates. Not that the
conventions are in any form structurally opposed to such, but
rather, it appears that need for such coverage was not foreseeable
at the time the conventions were drafted and implemented.
Indeed, much of the language and vocabulary of the conventions
could readily be extended to coordinate with the particular
circumstances of offshore methane hydrates.
Because the existing international maritime and oil spill
conventions do reflect both a history of diplomatic draftings and
accumulated practical experiences, it might be wise to build upon
their foundations in addressing the risks and hazards of offshore
methane hydrates.
The employment of standards, such as requirements to
maintain “best available techniques” and “best environmental
practices,” are clearly relevant in providing the standards for
offshore methane hydrates. Many of the functional definitions
from these conventions, such as “offshore activities” and “offshore
installations” can readily be extended to cover similar or identical
concepts related to offshore methane hydrates. Other definitions,
e.g., such as “pollution” within OSPAR, already might be
interpretable as applicable to methane hydrates, as they include
all “substances or energy” that could result in hazard to human
health or the marine ecosystem.176
However, more clear
standards could be set by a provision of explicit terms that make
175. See infra Part III(B)(3).
176. The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
North-East Atlantic, art. 1(d), opened for signature Sept. 22, 1992, 2354
U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter OSPAR] (entered into force Mar. 25, 1998).
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clear that emissions, seeps, and ventings from methane hydrates
should be included within that definition when introduced by
human activities.
The international maritime and oil spill conventions have
histories of textual evolution.177 Thus, it is a reasonable option to
consider that the existing international maritime and oil spill
conventions might be amendable to include the circumstances
related to the events of offshore methane hydrates that could lead
to risk and harms of the oceanic domains that those conventions
currently protect.
1.

OSPAR Convention (North East Atlantic Ocean)

OSPAR stands for Oslo and Paris, and the acronym refers to
the documentary history of the Convention in that it conjoined
the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, “Oslo Convention” (1972),
against at-sea dumping of wastes with the Convention for the
Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources, “Paris
Convention” (1974), against land-based sea pollution and oil
pollution.178 OSPAR was founded under Article 197 of UNCLOS
for global and regional cooperation.179
OSPAR requires the Contacting Parties to take all possible
steps to prevent and eliminate pollution to protect the maritime
area.180
OSPAR requires the Contracting States to adopt
programs and measures and to cross-harmonize their policies.181
OSPAR states that nothing in OSPAR is to be taken to prevent
Contracting States from undertaking more stringent measures
than that required within OSPAR, both substantively and

177. For example, OSPAR’s Annex III addresses novel concerns related to CCS
events. Id. at Annex III. The Barcelona Convention’s Offshore Protocol
addresses offshore exploitation events more directly. Convention for the
Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the
Mediterranean, adopted June 10, 1995, 1102 U.N.T.S. 27 [hereinafter Barcelona
Convention] (entered into force July 9, 2004).
178. OSPAR supra note 176.
179. Id. at pmbl. See discussion on UNCLOS supra Part III(A)(1).
180. OSPAR supra note 176, at art. 2(1)(a).
181. Id. at art. 2(1)(b).
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procedurally, to protect the maritime area.182 OSPAR requires
application of both the polluter pays principle183 and the
precautionary principle184 in the design of the program and
measures to be adopted by the Contacting Parties.
OSPAR mandates the best available techniques and the best
environmental practices.185 The term “best available techniques”
requires the use of the latest stage of development or state of the
art processes or methods of operation.186 Economic feasibility is
to be taken in account when determining the best available
technique.187 The best available technique should be based on
those recently successful comparable processes or methods of
operation and up-to-date technological advances and changes in
scientific knowledge and understanding.188 Given the inputs of
economic feasibility, advancing science and newly successful
comparable processes and methods, the best available techniques
should be expected to change over time.189
The phrase of ‘“best environmental practices’ means the
application of the most appropriate combination of controls and
strategies.”190 In developing the combination of measures, seven
key factors are taken into consideration.191 The environmental
hazard of the product and its production is considered.192 The
social and economic implications of the measures should be
integrated with the analysis.193 The potential for substitution
and the scale of use should both be considered, as well as the
potential environmental benefit or penalty of substitute.194
Advances in scientific knowledge and understanding should be
182. Id. at art. 2(5).
183. Id. at art. 2(2)(b).
184. Id. at art. 2(2)(a).
185. Id. at art. 2(3)(b)(i). See id. at Annex III, art. 2 (explicit requirements for
offshore sources).
186. OSPAR supra note 176, at Appendix I, § 2.
187. Id. at Appendix I, § 2(c).
188. OSPAR supra note 176, at Appendix I, § 2(a), (b).
189. Id. at Appendix I, § 3.
190. Id. at Appendix I, § 6.
191. Id. at Appendix I, § 7(a)-(g).
192. Id. at Appendix I, § 7(a).
193. Id. at Appendix I, § 7(g).
194. OSPAR supra note 176, at Appendix I, § 7(b)-(d).
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taken into account.195 Finally, the time limits for implementation
of the measures should be considered.196
The Contracting Parties are required to undertake all
possible steps to prevent and eliminate pollution from offshore
sources, as guided by the OSPAR’s Annex III.197 “Offshore
sources” are defined to include both offshore installations and
offshore pipelines.198 An offshore installation is any “man-made
structure, plant or vessel or parts thereof, whether floating or
fixed to the seabed, placed within the maritime area for the
Pollution is defined as
purpose of offshore activities.”199
“introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or
energy into the maritime area which results, or is likely to result,
in hazards to human health, harm to living resources, and marine
ecosystems, damage to amenities or interference with other
legitimate uses of the sea.”200 However, vessels and aircrafts,
and wastes therefrom, are exempt from inclusion under offshore
sources.201 Vessels include any water-borne crafts, including “aircushion craft, floating craft whether self-propelled or not, and
other man-made structures in the maritime area,” but excludes
offshore installations.202 The critical definition is that of offshore
activities: those activities undertaken for “exploration, appraisal
or exploitation of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons.”203
All potential discharges or emissions from the offshore
installations and activities must be authorized and regulated by
“competent authorities of the Contacting Parties.”204 Accidental
venting or seeping of methane is not considered dumping, as
dumping requires the deliberate act of disposal.205
Thus,
accidental venting and seeping of methane is not regulated under

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at Appendix I, § 7(e).
Id. at Appendix I, § 7(f).
Id. at art. 5.
Id. at art. 1(k).
Id. at art. 1(l).
OSPAR supra note 176, at Appendix I, § 1(d).
Id. at Annex III, art. 1(a)-(b).
Id. at art. 1(n).
Id. at art. 1(j).
Id. at Annex III, art. 4(1).
Id. at art. 1(f)(i)-(ii).
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Annex III’s Article 3.206 Thus, the exclusion of weather and other
cause-based force majeure does not apply to accidental venting
and seeping, unless so granted under the domestic laws of the
Contracting State.207
OSPAR Annex III has already addressed the offshore
sequestration of carbon dioxide, in that such carbon dioxide is not
considered a dumping of waste for OSPAR.208 So, offshore
sources of pollution basically arise from offshore installations,
vessels, and pipelines associated with the exploration, appraisal
or exploitation of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons (such as
methane from offshore methane hydrate deposits). If the
development of methane hydrate projects offers risks of harm and
hazards from offshore installations that may potentially emit
pollution, then OSPAR’s Contracting Parties would be obligated
to prevent and eliminate hazards to human health, harm to living
resources, and marine ecosystems from those potential methane
hydrate projects.
2.

Bonn Agreement (North Sea)

The Bonn Agreement covers the North Sea and attempts to
protect it from pollution by oil and other harmful substances.209
The Agreement is fairly brief and leaves out much in the way of
detail, as opposed to the details seen in OSPAR or in the
Barcelona Convention.210 The Agreement serves primarily to
coordinate national level efforts to respond to specific pollution
events.211 Additionally, the Bonn Agreement coordinates within
the OSPAR Convention’s shadow.
The Agreement is to be invoked whenever a Contracting
Party is presented with either the actual presence or the

206. Compare OSPAR supra note 176, at Annex III, art. 3(2)., with id. at
Annex III, art. 4(1).
207. Id. at Annex III art. 4(2), (6).
208. Id. at Annex III art. 3(3)(a)-(d).
209. Agreement for Cooperation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea
by Oil and Other Harmful Substances, Sept. 13, 1983, 1984 O.J. (L 188) 9
[hereinafter Bonn Agreement].
210. See infra Part III(B)(3).
211. See Bonn Agreement, supra note 209.
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prospective presence of oil or other harmful substances.212 The
phrases “oil” and “harmful substances” are not defined nor
detailed within the Agreement.
The Agreement was not intended to alter in any form the
underlying laws or civil liability rules that affect the prevention
and combat of marine pollution.213 While the Agreement itself
coordinates international action and facilitates cost-recovery
between the Contracting Parties,214 nothing in the Agreement
limits further pursuit by the Contracting Parties against third
parties.215
Where the Bonn Agreement lacks substantive details, its
The chapter
affiliated Manual provides some details.216
addressing oil pollution clearly is focused on persistent crude oils
and liquid petroleums.217
Natural gas and methane are
addressed as flammable and exploding gases within the chapter
on hazardous materials; however the operatic paradigm is vesseltransported gases.218 Hazardous chemicals are sorted into four
classes: evaporators, floaters, dissolvers, and sinkers.219
Evaporators are sub-sorted into three response modes: toxic gas
cloud, toxic and explosive gas cloud, and explosive gas cloud.220
Methane is listed as being both a health risk gas, for
distances within 200 meters of the gas cloud, and as an explosion
risk for distances within 200 meters of the gas cloud.221
212. Id. at art. 1(1).
213. Id. at art. 8(1).
214. Id. at arts. 9-10.
215. Id. at art. 11.
216. BONN AGREEMENT SECRETARIAT, BONN AGREEMENT COUNTER POLLUTION
MANUAL,
available
at
http://www.bonnagreement.org/site/assets/files/3946/bonn_agreement_counter_p
ollution_manual.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2KXM-5NN5 [hereinafter
COUNTER POLLUTION MANUAL].
217. See COUNTER POLLUTION MANUAL, supra note 216, at ch. 22 (the
frequency and dominant use of the phrase “oil slick” to describe oil pollution).
218. See id. at ch. 26 (specifically, the discussion on how harmful substances
leak from vessels).
219. Id. at ch. 26, § 1.4.
220. Id. at ch. 26, § 1.8.
221. Id. at Annex I (“Intervention on Gases and Evaporators: Card Number
F1.1, F1.2, F1.3”). It is important to recall that the risk stated therein is related
to leaks of methane from LNG-type containers at sea, not methane vented or
leaked from the ocean at any low or high rate.
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It is perhaps noteworthy that the development of offshore
windmill farms has been included within the coverage of the
Bonn Agreement.222 The installations associated with offshore
windfarms are seen as novel risks for shipping and the
installations could also complicate oil pollution recovery and
abatement efforts.223 To the extent that methane hydrate
projects are foreseen in the North Seas area, it would probably be
reasonable to assume that a similar chapter might be drafted to
take the particular harms and hazards of subsea methane
extraction into the greater Bonn Agreement framework.
3.

Barcelona Convention (Mediterranean Sea)

The Barcelona Convention and its associated documents are
designed to provide protection to the Mediterranean both within
and without the EU.224
It applied general concepts of
transboundary coordination and of monitoring.225
Pollution is defined as “the introduction by man, [both]
directly and indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine
environment” that could cause a variety of harms to both the
marine environment and human use and enjoyment thereof.226
The Barcelona Convention implements several key
environmental law policies. It requires the application of the
precautionary principle: a lack of full scientific certainty should
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures.227
All appropriate means should be undertaken to preserve
biological diversity.228 This implementation of the precautionary
principle balances the prevention of environmental degradation
against the costs-effectiveness of such measures.229 The best
available techniques and the best environmental practices are
called for within the Convention;230 this clarifies the
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

See id. at ch 8.
See id.
Barcelona Convention, supra note 177.
Id. at arts. 9-12.
Barcelona Convention, supra note 177, at art. 2(a).
Id. at art. 4(3).
Id. at art. 10.
Id. at art. 4(3)(a).
Id. at art. 4(4)(b).
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precautionary principle, but also requires data sharing among
both competent authorities and operators. Finally, the means to
be undertaken are to reflect the reality of the social, economic,
and technological conditions of the signatories.231
While the Convention calls for early implementation of
potentially effective measures, it constrains its call to cost
effective socially balanced measures; it does not call for any and
all measures at all costs.
The Convention applies the polluter pays principle.232 The
costs of pollution are to be borne by those individuals that
introduce the pollution to the environment.233 The Convention
calls for the contracting parties to formulate and adopt
appropriate rules and procedures for the determination of
liability and compensation resulting from harms to the
Mediterranean region.234
The Convention requires the signatories to take all
appropriate measures to eliminate and remediate pollution from
the “exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf and the
seabed and its subsoil.”235
These requirements make no
reference to hydrocarbons, instead they apply to any and all
minerals, including hydrocarbons, and potentially methane
hydrates.
The Convention expands the concepts from the EU’s EIA
Directive to the broader Mediterranean region.236 Functionally,
the Convention supports the development and adoption of
Protocols to expand, and details the objectives of the
Convention.237
For the purposes of this article, the most
important protocol to the Convention is the “Offshore Protocol.”238

231. Id. at art. 4(4)(b).
232. Barcelona Convention, supra note 177, at art. 4(3)(b).
233. Id.
234. Id. at art. 12.
235. Barcelona Convention, supra note 177, at art. 7.
236. Id. at art. 4(3)(c).
237. Id. at arts. 21, 22.
238. Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution
Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the
Seabed and Its Subsoil, Oct. 14, 1994, 13 I.L.M. 976 [hereinafter Offshore
Protocol].
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The stated goal of the Protocol is: “[t]he Parties shall take,
individually or through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, all
appropriate measures to prevent, abate, combat and control
pollution in the Protocol Area resulting from activities, inter alia,
by ensuring that the best available techniques, environmentally
effective and economically appropriate, are used for this
purpose.”239
The Protocol does not designate a rule of civil liability, but
requires that such be employed by the signatories to ensure that
the polluter pays, i.e. the operator, and the polluter pays prompt
and adequate compensation.240 Also, the Protocol requires each
signatory to ensure sanctions exist to punish violators; the
character of the requirements appear to be more regulatory than
civil liability in design: “[e]ach Party shall prescribe sanctions to
be imposed for breach of obligations arising out of this Protocol, or
for non-observance of the national laws or regulations
implementing this Protocol, or for non-fulfillment of the specific
conditions attached to the authorization.”241
Additionally, the Protocol requires the operators to maintain
insurance or other financial securities to ensure that the
problems of insolvency do not arise at the time of
compensation.242 The Protocol provides for certain limited
applications of force majeure and certain public welfare
justifications.243 But those exceptions are terminated if “intent to
cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage will
probably result.”244
Methane hydrate projects broadly appear to qualify for
regulation under the Offshore Protocol. “Activities” are defined to
include scientific activities, exploration activities, and
exploitation activities that would include the development and
production stages of a methane hydrate project, but apparently
not the abandonment and sequestration period.245 Removal of
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at art. 3(1).
Id. at art. 27(1), (2)(a).
Id. at art. 7.
Offshore Protocol, supra note 238, at art. 27(2)(b).
Id. at art. 14(1)(a).
Id. at art. 14(2).
Id. at art. 1(d).
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Installations,
otherwise
known
as
sequestration
and
abandonment within oil and gas, are defined and addressed
within the Protocol;246 similar EIA and authorizations
requirements are found.247 Installations are defined as floating,
mobile, or fixed; they include drilling units, production units,
storage units, and loading and transporting units.248 Operators
include both those authorized or licensed to operate offshore
facilities or those in de facto control of such facilities.249 Article 5
of the Protocol essentially requires the performance of an EIA,
and strictly does so for EU waters.250
The Offshore Protocol does not list methane or natural gas as
“oil.”251 Oil is defined as “petroleum in any form including crude
oil, fuel oil, oily sludge, oil refuse and refined products.”252 Crude
oils, and various refinery products, are listed as harmful or
noxious substances.253 But, the Protocol integrates the definition
of pollution from the Convention; methane or natural gas might
qualify as a form of a substance that could be deleterious to the
environment.254 Additionally, the venting or seeping of methane
into the water column may be seen as adding energy, and thus
qualify as pollution in that sense.255
The Protocol addresses both the support of developing
countries within the region, and the support of transboundary
concerns.256

246. Id. at art. 20.
247. Id. at art. 20(1)-(2).
248. Offshore Protocol, supra note 238, at art. 1(f)(i)-(v).
249. Id. at art. 1(g)(i)-(ii). A literal reading suggests that even non-normal
personnel might be included within this scope; e.g. a pirate or terrorist of an
offshore facility might be classified as a de facto operator.
250. Id. at art. 5.
251. Id. at art. 1(l). See id. at Annex V, App. But, the Appendix title carries a
footnote that states, “the list of oils should not necessarily be considered as
exhaustive.” Nevertheless, nothing in the list, or in the nomenclature of oil and
refining, suggests that methane should be included within the category of oil
under the Protocol.
252. Id. at art. 1(l).
253. Offshore Protocol, supra note 238, at Annex I., Part A(6).
254. Barcelona Convention, supra note 177, at art. 2(a).
255. See id.
256. Offshore Protocol, supra note 238, at arts. 24, 26.
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Helsinki Convention (Baltic Sea)

The Helsinki Convention serves a similar role to OSPAR and
the Barcelona Convention: to protect a marine region from
environmental harms.257 Overall, the Helsinki Convention is
drafted similarly to other regional marine conventions.
The Helenski Convention carries the same definition of
pollution as seen in other regional marine documents, the
“introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or
energy into the sea . . . which are liable to create hazards to
human health, to harm living resources and marine
ecosystems.”258 The Convention has a similar definition of
dumping as OSPAR.259 Oil is narrowly defined as oils, refinery
products, or sludge260; definitely exclusive of natural gas or
methane. Harmful substance is defined as any substance that
could cause marine pollution.261
The Helsinki Convention mandates that the Contracting
Parties take all appropriate legislative, administrative, or other
relevant measures to prevent and eliminate pollution in the
region.262
The Convention requires the application of the
precautionary principle.263 It requires the application of the best
available technology264 and of the best environmental practice.265
Specifically, the Contracting Parties are required to apply the
polluter pays principle.266
The Convention requires the
prevention of the introduction of harmful substances267 and

257. Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic
Sea Area, adopted Apr. 9, 1992, 1507 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Helsinki
Convention] (entered into force Jan. 17, 2000).
258. Id. at art. 2(1).
259. See id. at art. 2(4); compare id. at art. 2(4)(a), with OSPAR, supra note
171, at art. 1(f).
260. Helsinki Convention, supra note 257, at art. 2(6).
261. Id. at art. 2(7). Methane, hydrogen, or even potentially freshwater, or
mud might qualify.
262. Helsinki Convention, supra note 257, at art. 3(1).
263. Id. at art. 3(2).
264. Id. at art. 3(3).
265. Id. at art. 3(3).
266. Id. at art. 3(4).
267. Id. at art. 5.
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pollution from ships,268 including waste dumping.269
The
Convention requires the Contracting Parties to take all
appropriate action to conserve natural habitats and biological
diversity and to protect ecological processes.270 Broadly speaking,
the Helsinki Convention is well aligned with both other regional
marine conventions and UN environmental policies.
The exploration and exploitation of the seabed and its subsoil
require both the prevention of pollution and the precautionary
preparation to ensure adequate preparedness is maintained in
order to provide immediate action to respond to accidental
pollution when it occurs.271 Annex VI to the Convention provides
additional guidelines for offshore oil and gas activities.272
Offshore activity is defined to be any exploration or exploitation
of oil and gas by either fixed or floating installations.273 An
offshore unit is any particular installation engaged in oil or gas
exploration, exploitation or production activities, including
transportation.274 EIAs are required before any licensing can
occur within the marine region.275 A compositional analysis of
the deposit zone, its sediments, hydrocarbon content, and
potentially hazardous substances or hazards should be among the
items investigated during the EIA assessment.276 On-going and
subsequent studies should be made on the deposit zone to ensure
the prevention of pollution and the emission of harmful
substances.277 Finally, each offshore unit should have a pollution
emergency plan to ensure quick and appropriate responses to
accidents.278

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Helsinki Convention, supra note 257, at art. 8.
Id. at art. 11.
Id. at art. 15.
Id. at art. 12, § 1.
Id. at Annex VI.
Id. at Annex VI, Regulation 1, § 1.
Helsinki Convention, supra note 257, at Annex VI, Regulation 1, § 2.
Id. at Annex VI, Regulation 3, § 1.
Helsinki Convention, supra note 257, at Annex VI, Regulation 3, § 2(d).
Id. at Annex VI, Regulation 3, §§ 3, 4.
Id. at Annex VI, Regulation 7.
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Risk Governance Under the Regional Marine
Conventions

The regional marine conventions are very similar in design
with regards to risk governance. While they are all high level
international agreements that leave specific implementation to
the signatory states, the conventions provide clear guidance on
the types of governance needed to both attain the policy goals and
to enable coordination across parties.
They all call for the contracting states to implement liability
rules that function in harmony with the polluter pays principle.
The polluter pays principle does not provide for a duty of care that
would indemnify tortfeasors as a rule of negligence would. The
polluter pays principle at its core would be opposed to the idea
that victims of environmental pollution would need to bear the
costs of damage simply because the tortfeasor operated
reasonably; the quintessence of the polluter pays principle is that
the polluter always pays; this is the spirit of the rule of strict
liability. The polluter pays principle could be implemented in
regulations, but the overall spirit that the victims are not to
blame and not to pay would remain the same.
There is clearly support within the conventions for the use of
regulations to govern risk. There are many items to be achieved
and confirmed, and it would be very inefficient to allow private
civil liability claims to pursue that level of investigation;
additionally, no rule of civil liability would be able to enforce or
perform those investigations until an actionable cause arose,
thus, the purpose and function to provide on-going safety
monitoring would be defeated. A regulatory body would be far
better suited to the needs of on-going monitoring and procedural
assurances.
Another aspect is that the conventions require an
undertaking of active steps to prevent and eliminate pollution;
again, a regulatory body could act daily and currently without the
need of actionable causes so long as the regulations receive a
sufficient delegation of power to act.
Further, the conventions heavily discuss permits and
licensing, which remains the exclusive territory of regulatory
bodies.
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There are also many scientific and other specialized
knowledge sets required to implement the obligation of the
conventions. It would be more efficient to train and maintain a
dedicated pool of experts instead of the stop and start of civil
liability lawsuits.
In conclusion, the conventions set high standards and
provide a framework for contracting states to base their domestic
enactments upon. Both regulations and rules of civil liability are
encouraged, but it would appear that more attention has been
given to the development of the regulatory framework. If a rule of
civil liability were employed by a contracting state, it would likely
need to be a rule of strict liability.
C.

International Oil Spill Conventions

This section follows the discussion on the history,
paradigmatic aims, and risk governance mechanisms as
presented in the introduction in Section B, supra. The oil spill
conventions mirror the regional marine conventions in many
ways, key is their common pre-occupation on surface oil spills,
but they operate beyond regional limits.
The international oil spill conventions address liability. They
call for the implementation of strict liability regimes; limited
defences of force majeure-type events and limited defences from
grossly or recklessly negligent victims are also provided.
The conventions also assume that many procedural aspects of
oil pollution prevention, detection, and remediation can be
coordinated internationally. It is hard to imagine how that might
be coordinated without manifestations tantamount to regulations.
Indeed, a common regulatory body, the International Maritime
Organization under the UN, oversees several of these
conventions.
Thus, the international oil spill conventions are broadly in
alignment with the recommendations of Section 2.
1.

A Brief History of Marine Oil Spill Conventions

The current oil spill regimes were developed primarily as a
reaction to several significant spills, all from seagoing vessels.
The paradigm of oil spills as currently understood by existing oil
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spill regimes is the broken tanker or leaking crude oil well in
shallow waters paradigm.279 That the laws and conventions
responding to catastrophic oil spills respond primarily to this
paradigm made practical sense. Historically, this type of oil
spillage in shallow waters has been the most common type of
offshore-based oil spill, as documented in governmental
records.280 A recent Congressional Research Service report
documented that only approximately one percent of all oil spill
incidents were from extraction activities.281
The original spill of concern was the Torrey Canyon spill of
1967,282 which contaminated eighty kilometers (km) of French
coastlines and 190 km of Cornish shorelines in the United
Kingdom. This spill leaked 119,000 tons of crude oil into the
279. The marine oil spill paradigm assumes that crude oil is spilled near or at
the ocean surface, for the oil to collect at the surface, or very near the surface,
and that the oil is likely to be spilled sufficiently close to shore to quickly
threaten the shoreline and coastal areas with persistent crude oil
contamination. The paradigm assumes that only certain heavy crudes will yield
persistent crude contamination removing lighter fuels, such as gasoline or
natural gas, from substantial focus of the damages.
280. This is not to say that offshore well-based leaks were unknown; however,
these well-based catastrophes were “the exceptions that proved the rule” until
recently. Two well-known examples are the Union Oil event offshore Santa
Barbara, CA, and the Ixtoc event offshore the Yucatan Peninsula in Mexico.
Both of these events pre-date the 1990 Oil Pollution Act and the International
Convention of 1992. The Santa Barbara offshore blowout and seeps began on
January 28, 1969. Keith C. Clarke & Jeffrey J. Hemphill, The Santa Barbara
Oil Spill: A Retrospective, UNIV. OF CAL. SANTA BARBARA (2001), http://www2.
bren.ucsb.edu/~dhardy/1969_Santa_Barbara_Oil_Spill/Essays.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/KX79-NFWZ. It was the third largest oil leak in U.S. history,
ranked behind only the BP Macondo explosion and the Exxon Valdez shipwreck.
The oil leak occurred in only fifty-seven meters of water, so the effects were
largely similar to a vessel leak. The Ixtoc was an offshore drilling catastrophe
that began on June 3, 1979. Tim Johnson, Mexico’s Ixtoc 1 Oil Spill a Distant
Mirror
to
BP
Disaster,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(May
22,
2010),
http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/mexicos-ixtoc-1-oil-spill-a-distantmirror-to-bp-disaster/, archived at http://perma.cc/Y8VW-WU9P. It too was in
fifty meters of water, so its leak, while massive and long lasting, functionally
resembled a massive vessel leak in many ways.
281. JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33705, OIL SPILLS IN US
COASTAL WATERS: BACKGROUND, GOVERNANCE, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3
(2010).
282. Michael G. Faure & Hui Wang, The International Regimes for the
Compensation of Oil-Pollution Damage: Are They Effective?, 12 REV. EUR. CMTY.
& INT’L ENVTL. L. 242, 242 (2003).
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sea.283
That spill resulted in several legal regimes and
conventions: the Civil Liability Convention of 1969,284 the Fund
Convention,285 the Tanker Owners’ Voluntary Agreement
concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP),286 and the
Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability
for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL).287
These four conventions were revealed for their weaknesses
under the Amoco Cadiz spill of 1978. The Amoco Cadiz spilled
223,000 tons of crude oil onto the shores of Brittany, France,
nearly double the amount spilled in the earlier Torrey Canyon
spill. That accident led to updates to the Civil Liability
Convention of 1969/1992 (CLC) and the Fund Convention.288 The
updates were entitled the “Protocols.” The two protocols were the
Protocol of 1984 to amend the International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, and the Protocol of 1984
to amend the International Convention on the Establishment of
an International Fund for Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage,
1971.289
283. Oil Tanker Spill Statistics 2013, INT’L TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FED’N
LTD.,
http://www.itopf.com/information-services/data-and-statistics/statistics
(last visited Oct. 9, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/VK2X-Y7FR.
284. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CLC], available at
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/InternationalConvention-on-Civil-Liability-for-Oil-Pollution-Damage-(CLC).aspx, archived at
http://perma.cc/5AGS-EGE3. The CLC was updated in 1992, and is still
currently in force. See also International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989.
285. International Maritime Organization Protocol of 1992 to Amend the
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, adopted Nov. 27, 1992, 1953 U.N.T.S.
373 [hereinafter Fund Convention] (entered into force May 30, 1996).
286. TOVALOP was originally intended as a stop-gap measure by the owners
and operators of oil-transporting vessels until the adoption of the CLC in 1975.
Since February 20, 1997, TOVALOP is no longer operational as an industrial
convention.
See
History
of
ITOPF,
ITOPF,
http://www.itopf.com/fileadmin/data/Documents/Company_Lit/HistoryofITOPF.p
df (last visited Oct. 9, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Y6P8-J6RR.
287. CRISTAL was originally intended as a stop-gap measure by the
producers and refiners of petroleum until the adoption of the Fund Convention
in 1975. Since February 20, 1997, CRISTAL is no longer operational. See id.
288. See infra Part III(C)(2).
289. See Faure & Wang, supra note 282, at 245.
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Despite the public support for the international conventions,
the U.S. did not join as a signatory to those conventions. After the
Exxon Valdez spill of 1989, again a large sea-going vessel leak,290
the U.S. finally responded with the enactment of the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 (OPA).291 In responding to the Exxon Valdez
incident, OPA primarily targeted the shipment of oil in tankers
and the types of harm caused by those previous spills discussed
herein. Global awareness to the Exxon Valdez spill resulted in
additional updates to the CLC and Fund Convention; those
updates are known as the 1992 Conventions.292
The OPA does apply to offshore oil and gas facilities, and
thus would now apply in some contexts to offshore methane
hydrate facilities; the mineral lessee is the deemed tortfeasor,
and the liability for offshore facilities is distinct from other
sources of oil pollution. 293 The OPA also provides a “limited
liability” version of strict liability due to certain caps placed on
the maximum amount of assessable damages.294 However, OPA
is substantively distinguishable from several important sections
of the CLC and Fund Convention, so their legal responses to oil
spills are significantly different from each other.295
There are doubts on the ability of the crude oil spill regimes
to address major spills from deep-sea wells, such as the BP
Deepwater Horizon, and by extension, methane hydrate
extraction projects. An extensive review and critique of the

290. Interestingly, the Exxon Valdez spill only released 37,000 tons of crude
oil, significantly less than the earlier volumes, 223,000 tons for the Amoco Cadiz
and 119,000 tons at the Torrey Canyon spill, which drove reform efforts in
Europe.
291. For more information on OPA, see infra Part III(E)(3).
292. See discussion on CLC, infra Part II(B).
293. See 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(C) (2012) (defining “responsible party” ). See also
id. § 2704(a)(3) (providing the limitations on liability for “offshore facility”).
294. OPA provides for routine strict liability up to certain maximum limits
and below those limits there are no “duty of care” protections for the tortfeasor.
See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). The types of damages are limited to certain categories
of damages. See id. § 2702(b)(2). And there are defenses of force majeure, see id.
§ 2703(a), and limited defenses of contributory gross negligence on the part of
the victims, see id. § 2703(b).
295. See relevant discussions, infra Part III(C).
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overall liability system of U.S. oil spill law has recently been
provided by Faure and Wang.296
2.

Civil Liability Convention of 1969/1992

The CLC derives from an earlier sequence of agreements
originally designed to respond to crude oil spills from vessels and
boats and was later extended to include other hazardous
substances.297 It would not likely apply to damages resultant
from methane hydrate harms, but it is guiding in its approach to
liability management.
The CLC defines oil as “any persistent hydrocarbon,” and
provides examples of crude oil, fuel oil, diesel oil, and lubricating
oil.298 However, nothing in this definition appears to include
methane or any of the lighter alkanes that might be found in
methane hydrate deposits. Pollution damage is defined as, “loss
or damage outside the ship by contamination resulting from the
escape or discharge of oil from the ship.”299 While the definition
provides extensions of damage to include the environment, it does
not appear to include any pollution caused by forces or substances
other than oil. Because the CLC provides exclusively for pollution
damage within the territories of the Contracting States,300 it
296. Michael G. Faure & Hui Wang, Civil Liability and Compensation for
Marine Pollution - Lessons to Be Learned for Offshore Oil Spills, 8 OIL, GAS &
ENERGY L. INTELLIGENCE 1 (2010).
297. CLC, supra note 284. The CLC is still in force as updated by the CLC of
1992. See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
(CLC),
INT’L
MAR.
ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/InternationalConvention-on-Civil-Liability-for-Oil-Pollution-Damage-(CLC).aspx (last visited
Oct. 9, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/R6VW-MMZS. See also International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, 12 U.S.T.
2989; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov.
2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319 [hereinafter MARPOL]. The latter, when combined with
its 1978 Annex, creates MARPOL.
298. CLC, supra note 284, at art. I(5). For the additional language defining
crude oil and fuel oil, see Fund Convention, supra note 285 at art. I(3)(a), (b).
Crude oils are defined as liquid hydrocarbons, apparently in distinguishing
them from gases, and fuel oils are heavy distillates or residues. Neither
definitional refinement appears to include any light alkanes, especially not
methane.
299. CLC, supra note 284, at art. I(6)(a).
300. Id. at art. II(a).
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would be difficult to connect the hazards and harms of methane
hydrates to the CLC.
The owner of a ship is to be held liable for any pollution
damage caused or associated with that ship.301 Owner’s liability
is extinguished if: (i) damage resulted from war or hostilities, 302
(ii) damage resulted from exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible
natural phenomena,303 (iii) “wholly caused by” undertaking by a
third party’s act or omission,304 (iv) caused by Governmental
negligence or wrongful act,305 (v) and if in partial or whole
causation by the victim of the pollution damage.306 As such, the
rule employed is essentially a rule of strict liability.
Liability is limited to a fixed amount determined by the
tonnage of the ship.307 However, that limit to liability is not
preserved if the act that resulted in pollution was committed with
the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with the
knowledge that it would probably result in pollution damage.308
The availability of limited liability is predicated on the
establishment of a fund capable of making such payments in
presentation to the court before which liabilities are
established.309 Expenses undertaken by the owner to prevent or
remediate the pollution damage are equally ranked for
301. Id. at art. III(1). See also id. at art. IV (describing where that liability is
extended to joint and severable liability if multiple ships are involved in joint
causation of pollution damage).
302. CLC, supra note 284, at art. III(2)(a).
303. Id. at art. III(2)(a).
304. Id. at art. III(2)(b).
305. Id. at art. III(2)(c).
306. Id. at art. III(3). If the victim is wholly and solely responsible for the acts
that caused the pollution damage, then no liability attaches to the owner; if the
victim is partially at cause, then the owner’s liability is limited to that extent
covered by the victim.
307. The maximum amount of liability was set at 89,770,000 accounting units.
Id. at art. V(1). The accounting unit is defined to be the Special Drawing Rights
unit of the International Monetary Fund. See id. at art. V(9)(a).
308. CLC, supra note 284, at art. V(2).
309. Id. at art. V(3). See Fund Convention, supra note 285, for the details of
the fund and its stewardship. It is because of the advancements in the funding
under this Convention that other earlier funds, such as CRISTAL and
TOVALOP, have since been abandoned or folded into the International Fund.
See also WILLIAM TETLEY, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME AND ADMIRALTY LAW 454
(Yvon Blais ed., 2002).
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recompense under the fund with other pollution damage
claims.310
The assignment of liability under the CLC displays liability
channeling to the owner, a form of strict liability in that no
excuse of reasonable care is provided, multiple defenses to the
strict liability rendering it close to a functional negligence rule,
and that the idea of strict liability must be tempered with the
recognition of limited liability.
As the primary focus of the “Civil Liability Convention” is on
civil liability, its text is primarily focused on establishing strict
liability as the agreed to rule and the means of coordinating civil
liability across affected jurisdictions.311
3.

International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)

MARPOL312 was designed to address marine pollution and
contamination from crude oil and noxious liquids. MARPOL
follows the CLC in establishing strict liability for accidental
emissions. But, because exploitation of subsea minerals is exempt
from MARPOL, because methane is excluded from consideration
as an oil, and because methane is not a defined liquid or noxious
liquid, MARPOL would not likely apply to methane hydrate
projects. However, methane might qualify as a hazardous
substance, and if discharged apart from the “exploration,
exploitation and associated offshore processing of sea-bed mineral
resources,” then MARPOL might be applicable.313
MARPOL’s definition of harmful substances is very broad; if
the substance might harm human life, marine life or the local
ecology, then it is a harmful substance, and therefore, methane
might qualify as a harmful substance.314
310. CLC, supra note 284, at art. V(8).
311. There is insufficient material to draw conclusions on regulations.
312. MARPOL, supra note 297.
313. Id. at Annex I, Regulation 21.
314. Id. at art. 2(2) (“Harmful substance means any substance which, if
introduced into the sea, is liable to create hazards to human health, to harm
living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other
legitimate uses of the sea, and includes any substance subject to control by the
present Convention.”) (internal quotations omitted).
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MARPOL could apply to offshore facilities. Oil tanker is
defined as a ship that primarily carries oil;315 similarly, a
combination carrier is a ship designed to carry a combination of
oil and solid freight.316 Furthermore, the regulation primarily
applies to ships;317 but offshore structures engaged in the
“exploration, exploitation and associated offshore processing of
sea-bed mineral resources,” whether floating or fixed, will be
treated as legally equivalent to ships of 400 tons gross tonnage.318
Additionally, MARPOL’s definition of ships includes all sea-going
vessels and platforms that might be related to an offshore
methane hydrate installation.319
MARPOL defines discharge as the release by any cause of
harmful substances from a ship into the oceanic environment;320
however, events arising from the “exploration, exploitation and
associated off-shore processing of sea-bed mineral resources,” are
exempted from the definition of discharge.321 Thus, to the extent
that methane hydrates or methane were held to be harmful
substances, if they were released, e.g. vented or seeped, from
activities associated with a methane hydrate project, then that
situation would not be a discharge and not a reportable incident
of a discharge of harmful substances.322
Annex I of MARPOL 73/78,323 hereinafter Annex I, provides
extensive rules on the handling, disposal, and leaking of oil from
ships and platforms. However, it would not apply to methane
hydrate accidents. Annex I defines oil as “petroleum in any form
including crude oil, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse and refined products
. . . and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes

315. Id. at Annex I, Regulation 1, § 4.
316. Id. at Annex I, Regulation 1, § 5.
317. Id. at Annex I, Regulation 2, § 1.
318. MARPOL, supra note 297, at Annex I, Regulation 21.
319. Id. at art. 2(4) (“Ship means a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in
the marine environment and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles,
submersibles, floating craft and fixed or floating platforms.” (internal quotations
omitted)).
320. Id. at art. 2(3)(a).
321. Id. at art. 2(3)(b)(ii).
322. Id. at art. 2(6).
323. Id. at Annex I.
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the substances listed in appendix I to this Annex.”324 The listed
chemicals at Appendix I include the classes of Asphalt solutions,
Gasoline blending stocks, Gasolines, Oils, Jet Fuels, Distillates,
Naphthas, and Gas Oils, but nowhere in the listings are light
alkanes nor methane products.325 Thus, Annex I would not apply
to the types of harms and hazards contemplated by this article.
Annex II responds to noxious liquids other than oils.326
Methane will not likely be present as a liquid in Nature, nor is it
technically a liquid within hydrate structures;327 it would also not
qualify under the Annex II definition of liquid.328 Thus, the
concerns on noxious liquids do not relate to the harms and
hazards of methane hydrate projects.
4.

International Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness, Response, and Cooperation
(OPRC)

The 1990 OPRC focuses on the actual events and incidents of
oil pollution.329 The focus, though, is tightly on oil. Oil is defined
as “petroleum in any form including crude oil, fuel oil, sludge, oil
refuse and refined products;” thus methane hydrates and
methane are excluded from the category of oil.330 Oil pollution
incidents are defined as situations wherein oil is discharged,331
thus methane hydrate events would not normally lead to an oil
pollution incident.

324. MARPOL, supra note 297, at Annex I, Regulation 1, § 1.
325. Id. at Annex I, Appendix I.
326. Id. at Annex II.
327. For a more complete discussion on the chemistry of methane hydrates, see
MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 2, § 2.
328. “Liquid substances are those having a vapour pressure not exceeding 2.8
kp/cm2 at a temperature of 37.88C” (internal quotations omitted). MARPOL,
supra note 297, at Annex II, Reg. 1, § 5.
329. “Parties undertake, individually or jointly, to take all appropriate
measures in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and the Annex
thereto to prepare for and respond to an oil pollution incident.” 1990
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, Nov. 30, 1990, 1891 U.N.T.S. 51, art. 1 [hereinafter OPRC].
330. Id. at art. 2(1).
331. Id. at art. 2(2).
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However, methane hydrate project installations might
qualify as offshore units, which are defined to include offshore
natural gas installations.332 And, the 2000 Protocol333 adopted
the term hazardous and noxious substances, which could include
methane and methane hydrates.334 Thus, it is feasible that the
OPRC would apply to pollution incidents from methane hydrate
projects under the 2000 Protocol, whereas it would not have
found an oil pollution incident under the original OPRC.
Should methane hydrates qualify as hazardous and noxious
substances, OPRC would require every nation engaged in
methane hydrate activities to establish a national system for
responding promptly and effectively to pollution incidents.335 The
2000 Protocol requires extensive pre-planning and preparation
for potential pollution incidents, and strongly encourages the
cooperation of the Contracting Parties to coordinate where
possible on response capability and research into precautionary
technologies and strategies.336 But, for most countries in Europe
and North America, the requirements are parallel to other
similar commitments.337
D.

Laws of the EU

The laws of the EU are more recently drafted, on the whole,
than their counterparts in the U.S. As such, many of them reflect
more recent trends in legal theory. Generally speaking, the EU
directives support the application of strict liability; this is in part

332. “Offshore unit means any fixed or floating offshore installation or
structure engaged in gas or oil exploration, exploitation or production activities”
(internal quotations omitted). Id. at art. 2(4).
333. Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to Pollution
Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances, Mar. 15, 2000, London
[hereinafter 2000 Protocol].
334. Id. at art. 2, § 2 (“Hazardous and noxious substances means any
substance other than oil which, if introduced into the marine environment is
likely to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine
life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.”).
335. 2000 Protocol, supra note 333, at art. 4(1).
336. See generally id.
337. The OPRC does not explicitly discuss liability beyond the recovery of
costs to the parties; the assumption is liability is dealt within separate
proceedings beyond this convention.
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due to the direct enactment of the polluter pays principle into the
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU).
The EU has a wide variety of legal instruments that address
environmental protections and related industrial torts. An effort
has been made to select those directives or frameworks more
likely to be engaged in the governance of risks and hazards from
offshore methane hydrate installations. The most relevant
directives are the EIA and SEA Directives, the Offshore
Directive, the CCS Directive, and the Marine Framework
collection of directives.
The EIA Directive and the SEA Directive provide for the
cautious and public review of upcoming projects and plans that
might substantially impact the environment.338 They call for
exhaustive studies to be completed in advance of the granting of
approvals or licenses, so that specific causes of harms or hazards
could be addressed in full prior to the acceptance of such risks.339
While not providing specific requirements on how to implement
civil liability or regulatory governance beyond the collection and
review of environmental precautionary data, by the very
collection of that data they do provide for many cures that would
otherwise befall both rules of civil liability and public regulation
of offshore methane hydrate projects and of the policies and plans
to facilitate their development. As such, they function as metarules on the rules applicable to offshore methane hydrates. 340
Several directives have been selected because they touch on
the regulation and liabilities attending to industrial accidents.
The ELD was selected due to its role in providing oversight of the
legal issues related to environmental damages.341 The ELD
extends legal protection to aspects of nature that might not
otherwise be protected under more traditional rules of injury and
damages. Seveso provides for the prevention and control of events
surrounding industrial accidents.342
338. See infra Parts III(D)(1), III(D)(2).
339. See infra Part III(D)(3).
340. A review of the EU’s EIA and SEA Directives also provides some
perspective on the U.S.’s NEPA, which is similar, but was drafted earlier. See
infra Part III(E)(1).
341. See infra Part III(D)(3)(a).
342. See infra Part III(D)(3)(b).
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The Offshore Directive provides for the regulation of offshore
oil and gas installations.343 As such, to the extent that offshore
methane hydrate installations would be viewed as a type of
unconventional natural gas project, the Offshore Directive would
apply to their development and operations. The Offshore
Directive provides both broad and deep requirements on
precautionary planning related to offshore hydrocarbon
operations. But, a review of the Offshore Directive reveals that it
is primarily focused on historical modes of offshore accidents and
does not yet include provisions that would better address the
needs of an offshore methane hydrate industry.
The CCS Directive reflects the other half of the coin from the
Offshore Directive, as it could regulate the injection of carbon
dioxide into offshore reservoirs.344 As has been discussed,
offshore methane hydrates can be extracted in conjunction with
CCS injection activity; in fact, due to the economic uplifts from
facilitating methane extraction and Kyoto Protocol concerns, most
suggested commercialization studies have included some form of
CCS-type injections in the extraction process. Similar ideas have
been floated within the EU; for example, Germany’s SUGAR
Projekt would seek to inject carbon dioxide into offshore methane
hydrate reserves.345 As such, it is likely that within EU waters
the CCS Directive would regulate the development of offshore
methane hydrates. But, the CCS Directive, even if applicable,
would address only a slice of the operations related to the
development, production, and abandonment and sequestration of
the methane hydrates. The CCS Directive would probably be
most important, and most centrally applied, during the
abandonment and sequestration phases, as it might govern longterm liability and post-production ownership of the methane
hydrate fields.

343. See infra Part III(D)(4).
344. See infra Part IV. In some ways, it is not unreasonable to imagine that a
hypothetical Offshore Methane Hydrate Directive would be an amalgam of the
Offshore Directive and the CCS Directive.
345. See MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 3, § 5.1.
See SUGAR Project, GEOMAR, http://www.geomar.de/en/research/fb2/fb2mg/projects/sugar-2-phase/ (last updated Jan. 15, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/3296-MQF8.
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The Water and Marine Frameworks draw in a large number
of marine, coastal, and riparian protecting directives, decisions,
and regulations.346 They function in coordination to protect the
biota and human communities that need their ecosystems and
environments to continue to be healthy and vibrant.347 All
marine projects, while still in the planning and pre-development
stages, need to provide programs of measures to achieve and
maintain good environmental status, and when the hydrates
overlay transboundary marine ecosystems, plans for regional
cooperation must also be provided. The various international
regional marine conventions are called on by the Frameworks to
extend this planning and cooperation. The Frameworks track a
variety of hazardous activities, including chemicals transported
through the water columns, to prevent accidental damages to
those ecosystems. The Frameworks present a selection of known
fragile environmental areas and endangered biota to specifically
protect. However, while the presence of methane is known to
affect marine biota in several substantial pathways, the marine
locations and biota adjacent to those areas do not currently
appear to be specifically protected under the Frameworks.
Finally, the EU is fully engaged with the goals and
obligations of the UNFCCC. As such, it has developed a
Greenhouse Gas Mechanism to enable it and its Member States
to set and coordinate greenhouse gas emissions targets.348 The
methane that could directly be emitted and the resultant carbon
dioxide from metabolized or combusted methane are both listed
as greenhouse gases within the Kyoto Protocol, and are thus
governed within the Greenhouse Gas Mechanism.
1.

The EIA Directive

Two central directives guide the laws and regulations on
environmental harms and hazards: the EIA349 Directive and the
346. See infra Parts III(D)(6), III(D)(6)(C).
347. See infra Parts III(D)(6), III(D)(6)(C).
348. See id. § 7.
349. Directive 2011/92, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
December 2011 on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and Private
Projects on the Environment, 2011 O.J. (L 26) 1 [hereinafter EIA Directive]. The
EIA Directive reflects the codification of the original Council Directive
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SEA350 Directive. These two directives require the ex ante review
of projects, programs, and plans that might in some manner have
an impact on the environment.
The EIA and SEA Directives are elements that are invoked
in a wide array of EU laws; they are used to ensure that
consistent review and forethought are applied to environmental
issues across the EU and its Member States. In addition to their
role as positive law within the EU matrix, the EIA and SEA
provide foundational legal norms for similar review efforts within
both EU Member States, and for countries and associations
beyond the EU. As such, their influence is often guiding on
activities at the earliest stage of drafting and development.
The EIA Directive applies to any project, public or private in
nature, prior to the issuance of a permit for the onset of the
project’s development.351 A project includes the execution of
construction projects (including installations) and “other
interventions in the natural surroundings and landscape[,]”
including extractive efforts such as mineral resources.352 The
developer is the person held responsible for drafting the EIA
report, and is the applicant who initiates a project by requesting
authorization, or development consent, for the project.353 Member
States may elect to apply the EIA to projects related to their
national defense on a case-by-case basis.354 The EIA Directive
allows projects that are designed through legislative processes
and adopted by specific acts of national legislation to be exempt
85/337/EEC and its subsequent amendments: Directives 97/11/EC, 2003/35/EC,
and 2009/31/EC. The EIA Directive is currently undergoing review for an
amendment to streamline the procedures, and to improve cross member state
consistency. See Review of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
Directive, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/review.htm (last
updated Aug. 22, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Y6LJ-8ZGA; see also
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
Amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain
Public and Private Projects on the Environment, COM (2012) 628 final (Oct. 26,
2012).
350. Directive 2001/42, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
June 2001 on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Plans and Programmes
on the Environment, 2001 O.J. (L 197) 30 [hereinafter SEA Directive].
351. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at art. 1(1).
352. Id. at art. 1(2)(a).
353. Id. at art. 1(2)(b)-(c).
354. Id. at art. 1(3).
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from the EIA Directive; the Directive holds out that similar due
diligence reviews are assumed of the legislatures as guided by the
EIA Directive.355 Member States are required to integrate the
designs of the EIA Directive into their national laws to ensure
that prior to consent for development, all projects likely to have
significant effects are properly assessed.356
a.

Offshore Methane Hydrates Qualified
Under Annex I

Methane hydrates projects would require the completion of
an EIA review. The EIA Directive provides two manners of
determining when a project should be reviewed under this
Directive. There is a specific list of project types that must
complete an EIA review at Annex I; these reviews are not
optional.357 There is a secondary list of activities at Annex II that
may need review; Member States can either review those projects
on a case-by-case basis or provide ex ante threshold guidelines.358
Annex I has multiple activities that would characterize
offshore methane hydrate projects. It is almost certain that a
methane hydrate project would qualify as an Annex I project, as
it per se qualifies under several listed categories and arguably
could be included under several other Annex I categories. Or,
depending on how the process of project development was
managed and how the Member State(s) in question decide how to
handle such a review process, there are potentially several
different aspects of a methane hydrate project that might need
their own EIA review procedures.
So long as the methane hydrate project is designed to
produce in excess of 500,000 m3 of methane daily,359 then the
project would certainly qualify as an Article 4(1) - Annex I project

355. Id. at art. 1(4).
356. Id. at art. 2(1).
357. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at art. 4(1).
358. Id. at art. 4(2)(a)-(b).
359. The equivalent of 17,700,000 cf/d (17,700 mcf/d). See Frequently Asked
Questions,
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=45&t=8 (last visited Dec. 1, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/5QXT-G7CK.
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requiring a full EIA process.360 The methane extracted from
methane hydrates is the same chemical as the term natural gas,
thus methane extraction is per se natural gas extraction.361 It is
fairly unlikely that methane hydrate reservoirs contain
substantial quantities of petroleum as distinct from natural gas;
to the extent that any hydrocarbon liquids are recovered, it is
very reasonable to assume that they would fall below the “500
tonnes/day” minimum requirement.362
Several ancillary aspects of methane hydrate projects would
also likely qualify under Annex I. To the extent that CCS
technologies are engaged to offset the extract volumes of methane
with carbon dioxide, the project would be a storage site pursuant
to Directive 2009/31 (The CCS Directive).363 Depending on the
location of the methane hydrate project and the gathering and
transportation needs to move the methane and relate fluids from
the wellsites to the platforms to onshore facilities, the project may
qualify as a pipeline.364 Assuming that methane qualifies as
natural gas and if the pipelines involved in its transport were
wider than eighty centimeters (cm) and longer than forty km,
then the pipelines of the project would qualify.365 If similar
pipelines were utilized to transport carbon dioxide to the wellsites
for sequestration, then those pipelines would also qualify under
Annex I.366
Methane hydrate projects could be characterized as an
integrated chemical installation for the production of basic
organic chemicals.367 Methane is an organic chemical; its
extraction involves “chemical conversion processes” to convert
360. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex I, § 14.
361. For a discussion on the chemistry of methane hydrates and their
methane-character, see MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at
ch. 2, § 2.
362. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex I, § 14. For a discussion on the
chemistry of methane hydrates, see MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra
note 1, at ch. 2, § 2.
363. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex I, § 22. For a discussion on the
nexus of CCS and methane hydrates, see MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE,
supra note 1, at ch. 3, § 5.1.
364. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex I, § 16.
365. Id. at Annex I, § 16(a).
366. Id. at Annex I, § 16(b).
367. Id. at Annex I, § 6(a).
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methane hydrates to methane and other components.368 One
would reasonably assume that the scale of investment required to
construct methane hydrate projects presumes chemical product
volumes sufficient to qualify as “on an industrial scale.”369 To the
extent that the project is engaged in the conversion of the
methane and water volumes into steam and hydrogen, the project
might qualify as in the “production of basic inorganic
chemicals.”370 In that case, the chemical processes to convert
methane to hydrogen would better satisfy the “chemical
conversion processes” requirement.371
Methane hydrate projects might be characterized as
groundwater abstraction schemes to the extent that the water
volumes associated with the methane in the hydrate formations is
produced alongside the methane.372
It is possible that methane hydrate projects could be
characterized as “trading ports, piers for loading and unloading,”
if the offshore structures are built in such a manner to facilitate
transport of produced methane, water, or hydrogen volumes.373
Methane hydrate projects should not be characterized as
crude-oil refineries nor as gasification/liquefaction installations of
coal or bituminous shales.374 Methane hydrate projects would lift
negligible amounts of crude oil, if at all, and no volumes of coal or
shale would be extracted nor processed. To the extent that any
hydrocarbon liquids would be produced coincidentally at a
methane hydrate project, it would be very unlikely for those
chemicals to be processed or refined onsite; more likely they
would be relocated to a regular refinery location for disposition.

368. Id. at Annex I, §§ 6, 6(a). For details on the chemical processes involved,
see MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at chs. 2-3.
369. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex I, § 6.
370. Id. at Annex I, § 6(b).
371. Id. at Annex I, § 6.
372. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex I, § 11. For a discussion on the
chemistry of methane hydrates, see MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra
note 1, at ch. 2, § 2.
373. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex I, § 8(b).
374. Id. at Annex I, § 1.
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Offshore Methane Hydrates Qualified
Under Annex II

Given that the EIA procedures will almost certainly be
invoked by the Annex I analyses, it is still worthy to review the
Annex II categories because there are several additional
categories of activities that are not present in the Annex I list
that might also merit review under a methane hydrate project.
Under the category of “Energy Industry,” there are several
subcategories that might be involved as support systems to a
methane hydrate project. Industrial installations for carrying gas,
steam, or water may be involved in both offshore efforts to extract
the methane, or as part of onshore support systems.375 To the
extent that the methane hydrate project is producing substantial
volumes of natural gas that will need translation into an onshore
distribution network, it is likely that the facilities will need
storage facilities to provide safe and reliable delivery of the
natural gas into the distribution pipelines. As such, the methane
hydrate project may include the sub-categories of surface storage
of natural gas, underground storage of combustible gases, and
surface storage of fossil fuels.376
As the methane hydrates are in a solid form prior to removal
from the deposit, it would be reasonable to describe their
extraction as an extractive industry category. First, the surface
industrial installations for the extraction of natural gas that will
be associated with a methane hydrate project would likely
independently qualify as an Annex II category project.377 As the
hydrates are underground, they potentially involve underground
mining.378
While not immediately foreseeable, it is not
impossible to imagine that marine or fluvial dredging may be
involved in either the direct extraction of methane hydrates or
utilized as a means of facilitating the removal of methane
hydrates.379 While the phrasing of deep drilling is left unclarified
in Annex II, it is conceivable that fresh water can be produced
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

Id. at Annex II, § 3(b).
EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex II, §§ 3(c)-(e).
Id. at Annex II, § 2(e).
Id. at Annex II, § 2(b).
Id. at Annex II, § 2(c).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/5

68

5_Partain

2015]

FINAL_EDIT

OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATES

10/2/2015 2:19 PM

859

from the hydrate deposits and then positioned as potable water
for human or livestock consumption.380
Certain aspects, or sub-projects, of a methane hydrate project
are likely to fit within several of the sub-categories of
Infrastructure Projects. Depending on the overall footprint of the
project and its associated co-projects, e.g. electrical power
generation, it might be engaged in the development of an
industrial estate project.381 To the extent that carbon dioxide
sequestration is involved in the methane hydrate project, it would
likely involve gas pipeline installations and pipelines for the
transport of the to-be-injected carbon dioxide.382 And without
regard to the use of hydrate waters as potable waters, if the
project plans to remove those waters from the deposit, then the
project could be seen as engaged in the abstraction of
groundwater.383
It is not likely that the products from a methane hydrate
project would qualify as petroleum, petrochemicals, or as
chemical products.384 Nor is it likely that a methane hydrate
project or its products would be considered as part of a chemical
industry category.385 Nor would the methane hydrate project fit
any of the categories under Annex II’s Mineral Industry, as the
listed items are fairly specific and exclude any of the materials
involved in a methane hydrate project.386
Qualification under Annex II requires a determination from
the relevant Member State on whether the project needs an EIA
assessment.387 The requirements for the determination are
detailed in Annex III;388 they are broad and detailed in scope.
Annex III requires the detailing of the project’s characteristics; of
note are the use of natural resources, the production of waste, the
associated pollution and nuisances, and the risk of major
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

Id. at Annex II, § 2(d)(iii).
Id. at Annex II, § 10(a).
EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex II, § 10(i).
Id. at Annex II, § 10(l).
EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex II, § 6(c).
Id. at Annex II, § 6.
Id. at Annex II, § 5.
Id. at art. 4(2).
Id. at art. 4(3).
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accidents with particular regard to the substances or technologies
involved in the project.389 The location of the project is critical,
especially with regards to the existing use of the area, the
regenerative capacity of the project’s surroundings, and the
impacts on wetlands, coastal zones, nature reserves, and
parks.390 Finally the characteristics of the potential impact must
be detailed.391 All of the issues previously addressed in Annex III
must also be addressed with regards to the extent of the impact
on populations and the geographical area, on the trans-frontier
nature of the project, the magnitude and complexity of the impact
from the project, the probability of the impact, and of the
duration, frequency, and reversibility of the impact.392
i.

Risk Governance Within the EIA
Directive

The collection of data provided at the early stage of predevelopment is of focused interest to efficient governance of the
risks and harms from methane hydrate projects. The risks of the
project need to be clearly enumerated and stated,393 the
probability of the impact needs to be forecast,394 and the duration
and frequency of potential accidents needs to be squarely
addressed.395 The actual nature of the impact, of the potential
harms and hazards, needs to be surveyed; the potential for
reversibility also needs to be evaluated.396
There is value to this Annex II and III process, even if the
Member States decide to exempt the project from an EIA review.
All of this data is collected prior to the onset of the EIA
assessment itself, and then provided to the public.397
Additionally, the public (which one assumes would include both
the impacted communities and specialized public interest groups)
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

Id. at Annex III, § 1(c)-(f).
EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex III, § 2(a)-(c)(i), (ii), (iv).
Id. at Annex III, § 3.
Id. at Annex III, § 3(a)-(f).
EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex III, § 1(f).
Id. at Annex III, § 3(e).
Id. at Annex III, § 3(f).
Id.; see generally id. Annex III, §§ 2(c), 3(a), (e).
Id. at art. 4(4), (5).
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has an opportunity to engage in the determination process,
enabling it to request information and explanations that the
competent authorities might not have requested.398 Thus, from a
negligence rule point of view, the awareness of a duty to act with
care is made manifest, and the type of information that a judge
might need to evaluate the level of care undertaken is made
publicly available; even if the Member State decides to not
require an EIA, this data would greatly reduce the transaction
costs of litigation and enable both regulators and private parties
to bring lawsuits if harm does in fact result from the project.
Once a project qualifies for assessment,399 the EIA Directive
requires application of Articles 5 through 10 in the completion of
the assessment.400 Article 5 requires the assessment include all
of the information as directed under Annex IV.401 Additionally,
the developer may request clarification on what types of
information are to be included in the assessment from the specific
competent authority for the relevant member state.402 At a
minimum, the developer should submit to the competent
authorities:
(a) a description of the project comprising information on the site,
design and size of the project;
(b) a description of the main effects which the project is likely to
have on the environment;
(c) a description of the measures envisaged in order to avoid,
reduce and, if possible, remedy significant adverse effects;
(d) an outline of the main alternatives studied by the developer,
and an indication of the main reasons for his choice, taking into
account the environmental effects;
(e) a non-technical summary of the information referred to in
points (a) to (d).403

398. Id. at art. 6(1). This form of public interaction is parallel to more discrete
means of engagement, such as privately lobbying the competent authorities and
other branches of the Member State’s regulatory administration.
399. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at art. 4(1) (with reference to Annex I). See
also id. at art. 4(2), (3).
400. Id. at art. 4(1), (2) (for Annex I and II projects, respectfully).
401. Id. at art. 5(1)(f).
402. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at art. 5(2).
403. Id. at art. 5(1).

71

5_Partain

862

FINAL_EDIT

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

10/2/2015 2:19 PM

[Vol. 32

All five issues should address both their direct and indirect
effects on: (i) human beings, fauna and flora, (ii) soil, water, air,
climate and the landscape, (iii) material assets and cultural
heritage, and (iv) the interaction between all of these factors.404
The Annex IV requirements are stated simply, but they require
both broad and detailed reports. The description of the project
would need to explain both the production processes of the
methane hydrate project, and estimates of the expected residues
and emissions, which includes all forms of pollution.405 The
breadth of the emissions definition, which includes such
phenomena as vibrations, light, and heat, might include
disturbances such as earthquakes or tsunamis in the case of a
methane hydrate project.406 A review of the alternatives must be
submitted; clearly such information provides documentary proof
of both the options acknowledged to be known and tacit
admissions of technologies unknown to the developer, if they
cannot list them as an alternative one assumes that they are
unaware.407 The developers are also responsible for explaining
the choices made by the developer while taking into account the
effects of those choices on the environment.408 In Annex IV,
section three, there is a repeat of the requirements found within
the EIA Directive itself to report on the impacts on life, cultural
assets, and the environment.409 Annex IV also requires a study
of the impacts, including potential harms, of the project’s simple
existence in the environment, of its use of natural resources, and

404. Id. at art. 3(1)(a)-(d).
405. Id. at Annex IV, § 1. “A description of the project, including in particular:
(a) a description of the location of the project; (b) a description of the physical
characteristics of the whole project . . . and the land-use requirements during
the construction and operational phases; (c) a description of the main
characteristics of the operational phase of the project (in particular production
process), for instance . . . the nature and quantity of the materials . . . used; (d)
an estimate, by type and quantity, of expected residues and emissions (such as
water, air, soil and subsoil pollution, noise, vibration, light, heat [and] radiation
. . . produced during the construction and operation phases.” (emphasis added).
406. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex IV, § 1(d).
407. Id. at art. 5(1)(d).
408. Id. at art. 2.
409. Id. at art. 3(a)-(d).
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of the potential of the project to emit pollution, create nuisances,
and to eliminate, meaning discharge, waste products.410
Once the various impacts and potential harms and hazards
have been itemized, potential means of prevention, reduction, and
offsetting measures should be provided in the assessment.411 To
the extent that the developer can identify where shortfalls in
knowledge or technology exist that would improve the assessment
itself, they should ensure that such is provided in the report.412
An explanation of the scientific methods and techniques used to
develop the above forecasts is to be included in this assessment of
potential impacts.413 Finally, there is a requirement to provide a
non-technical version of the above reports within the
assessment.414
While that assessment is in drafting and undergoing review,
there are several opportunities for non-developer parties to
engage in the process. Member States are required to ensure that
all of the relevant authorities are given opportunities to express
their expertise on the assessment.415 The general public has
extensive rights reserved within the EIA Directive.416 Most
importantly, the public is to be informed when and where the
information gathered for the assessment will be made public and
when the public can participate in the assessment review.417 The
EIA Directive itself does not explicitly provide means of control,
approval, or veto to the public, but the Directive would allow each
Member State to grant this to its own citizens under its own
statutes.418 However, the public has a right reserved to either,
receive a sufficient interest in the review and development of the
assessment, or to have access to due process before a court of law
or other independent and impartial body to challenge the

410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

Id. at Annex IV, § 4.
Id. at art. 5(1)(c).
EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex IV, § 8.
Id. at Annex IV, § 5.
Id. at art. 5(5)(e).
Id. at art. 6(1).
EIA Directive, supra note 349, art. 6(2)(a)-(g).
Id. at art. 6(2)(f), (g).
Id. at art. 2.
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decision, acts, or omissions on substantive or procedural
grounds.419
The EIA Directive requires that the assessment review
engage other Member States should they be discovered to be at a
transboundary risk.420 Similarly, the transboundary-affected
Member State, once engaged, shall provide to its authorities and
the public the same access to the information as was afforded to
the parties in the original Member State.421
Critically important is the conclusion of the assessment
process, at which time the Member State(s) need to release the
reasons for the decision (and any attached conditional
requirements), an explanation of the impact of the public’s
participation on the decision process, and a description of the
main measures necessary to avoid, reduce, and offset the major
adverse effects of the approved project.422
Because the rules provide for both the technical and nontechnical provision of the information, the public and other
parties will face lower transaction costs in reviewing the
materials. This would affect both the potential ex post litigation
decisions made after an impact event, e.g., a harmful accident, or
to better facilitate the ex ante drafting of necessary regulations.
2.

The SEA Directive

Whereas the EIA Directive applied to projects, the SEA
Directive is targeted at plans and programs; in short, at legal or
political policies.423
Plans and programs, broadly speaking, are those plans and
programs that are undertaken by authorities within Member
States at local, regional, or national levels and are subject to
legislative procedure by Parliament or Government.424 The

419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.

Id. art. 11(1), as limited by art. 11(2), (3).
Id. art. 7(1)(a).
Id. at art. 7(2), (3).
EIA Directive, supra note 349, at art. 9(1).
SEA Directive, supra note 350, at art. 1.
Id. at art. 2(a).
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overall character of the Directive is procedural in nature, not
substantive.425
The preamble of the SEA Directive explains that the
precautionary principle was a central goal of the Directive, to
preserve, protect, and improve the quality of the environment,
the protection of human health, and the prudent and rational
utilization of natural resources.426
A SEA is required for every plan or program that is likely to
have significant environmental effects.427 There are specific
explicit requirements for SEAs to be drawn for any plan or
program prepared for energy, industry, transport, waste
management, and water management, among others, if those
plans or programs would set the framework for future
development of those areas of interest listed within Annex I and
II of the EIA Directive.428
Additionally, Member States should identify if other plans or
projects would have significant environmental effect beyond those
identified if review is undertaken, and if a SEA is found
unwarranted, then the authorities need to make that analysis
public.429 These SEAs are to be accomplished and completed
prior to the submission or adoption of the plans or programs by a
legislative process.430
Due to the nature of the plans and programs being
essentially of a political and legislative nature, there is inherently
a certain amount of due process and democratic political process
within the EU to support an assumption that the public
ultimately does have a say on these plans and programs. The
SEA Directive highlights the need and mandates the active
participation of the public, and other authorities beyond the
drafters of a SEA, to ensure that they have a chance to review the

425. Id. pmbl. § 9.
426. Id. pmbl. § 1. Plans or programs related to methane hydrate projects
would most likely qualify under the categories of energy and industry, and
potentially under the waste and water management categories.
427. Id. at art. 3(1).
428. Id. at art. 3(2)(a).
429. SEA Directive, supra note 350, at art. 3(4), (7).
430. Id. at art. 4(1).
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findings of the SEA and to consult on the SEA.431 Furthermore,
in the event of transboundary considerations, the SEA Directive
has functionally similar mechanisms to the EIA Directive.432
The information to be reviewed under a SEA assessment is
detailed at Annex I to the SEA Directive.433 In an effort to be as
inclusive as possible of relevant information, the Annex advises to
include all information from its immediate implications, as well
as its “secondary, cumulative, synergistic, short, medium, and
long-term permanent and temporary, positive and negative
effects.”434 It is clear that the assessment is to be drafted from as
broad and inclusive a perspective as possibly feasible; if there are
any harmful effects due to the plans or programs evaluated,
however vague, they should identified, quantified, and
probabilistically modeled for both benefits and costs.435
The notion of plans and programs are not projects, more an
art of law or policy building, and as such merit slightly different
considerations than those listed under Annex IV of the EIA
Directive.436 It should include an outline of the contents and
main objectives of the plans or programs, as well as any
interconnection(s) with other plans or programs.437 It should
describe the current state of the target environmental settings
and how they might evolve without the plans or programs.438
The assessment should make clear what characteristics are likely
to be impacted by the plans or programs and how the plans or
programs are expected to protect those areas or characteristics.439
The SEA Directive’s Annex I repeats the mantra of life from
the EIA directive;440 it also requests specification of the measures
envisaged to prevent, reduce, and offset any significant adverse
431. SEA Directive, supra note 350, at art. 6(1), (2). See id. art. 6(4) (NGOs);
See also id. at pmbl., § 15.
432. Id. at art. 7.
433. Id. at Annex I.
434. Id. at Annex I, n.1.
435. See generally id. at Annex I.
436. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at Annex IV.
437. SEA Directive, supra note 350, at Annex I(a).
438. Id. at Annex I(b).
439. SEA Directive, supra note 350, at Annex I(c), (d).
440. Id. at Annex I(f) (“human health, fauna, flora, soil, water, air ”). See EIA
Directive, supra note 349, at art. 3; see also id. at Annex IV, art. 3.
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effects of the plans or programs on such ecological and social
concerns; this should include technical descriptions of the various
monitoring methods necessary to achieve these goals.441 It also
demands for the reasons why the particular plans or programs
were selected, which options were eliminated and the reason for
their elimination, and what limits in knowledge frustrated or
limited a more complete review of the options.442 Finally, a nontechnical version of the above discussions is required.443
3. Environmental Liability and Seveso III
Directives
The EU has provided two legal instruments to address the
commercial and industrial activities that could result in
environmental and social harms, the Environmental Liability
Directive (ELD)444 and the Seveso III Directive (Seveso III).445
These establish doctrines that then have broader applications in
other areas of environmental regulation, such as the Birds and
Habitats Directives,446 the MSF Directive,447 and the Water
Framework Directive (WFD).448 The ELD is not likely to apply to
441. SEA Directive, supra note 350, at Annex I(f), (g), (i).
442. Id. at Annex I(h).
443. Id. at Annex I(j).
444. Directive 2004/35, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21
April 2004 on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and
Remedying of Environmental Damage, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56 [hereinafter ELD].
445. Directive 2012/18, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4
July 2012 on the Control of Major-accident Hazards Involving Dangerous
Substances, Amending and Subsequently Repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC,
2012 O.J. (L 197) 1 [hereinafter Seveso III].
446. Directive 2009/147, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30
November 2009 on the Conservation of Wild Birds, 2009 O.J. (L 20) 7
[hereinafter Birds Directive]. See also Directive 92/43 of 21 May 1992 on the
Conservation of Natural Habitats and of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1992 O.J. (L
206) 7 [hereinafter Habitats Directive].
447. Directive 2008/56 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17
June 2008 on Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of
Marine Environmental Policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive), 2008
O.J. (L 164) 19.
448. See Directive 2000/60 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
23 October 2000 on Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the
Field of Water Policy, 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1 [hereinafter Water Policy Directive]
(example of one of the major directives within that framework).
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the development of offshore methane hydrate projects, the Seveso
III is per se not applicable to the offshore development of
hydrocarbons such as methane hydrates.
Beyond those, the Directive on Natural Habitats governs the
impacts on special environment ecologies and on certain protected
species.449
a.

Environmental Liability Directive
i.

Unsure Applicability to Methane
Hydrates

The ELD was intended to address environmental harms and
hazards generally. The Offshore Directive and the CCS Directive
have also applied the ELD to address the liabilities from
environmental harms from offshore activities and carbon
sequestration activities.450 But, there are several reasons that
the ELD is not likely to address the events associated with
methane hydrate projects: (i) the ELD’s limited scope of
environmental damages, (ii) the Lack of applicable Annex III
activities, (iii) the difficulty of establishing potential non-Annex
III activities, and (iv) the exclusion of certain international
conventions on civil liability.
The ELD governs environmental damages caused by
occupational activities;451 its focus is squarely on damages to
nature.452 However, the ELD does not apply to all sources of
environmental hazards.453 It declares that it addresses only
449. See Habitats Directive, supra note 446.
450. It would at first appear that the ELD limits itself to waters closer to the
shoreline than where methane hydrates are deposited. However, the adoption of
the ELD methods by the Offshore and CCS Directives would extend this zone of
application.
451. ELD, supra note 444, at art. 3(1)(a).
452. ELD, supra note 444, at art. 2(1)(a)-(c). “This Directive should apply, as
far as environmental damage is concerned, to occupational activities which
present a risk for human health or the environment,” see id. at art. 2(8). Of
course, environmental harm can impact humans and human health in many
ways, but the ELD handles the human-related issues indirectly. The extent of
land damage is limited to include those contaminations that create a significant
risk of human health. See id. art. 2(1)(c).
453. See id. at art. 4.
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those causes of harm that arise from a diffuse character wherein
a causal link still functions to connect tortfeasor and accident.454
There are also exceptions for various acts of God and force
majeure that result in accidents otherwise covered within the
ELD.455 The damage can be created by nature or pose an
imminent threat456; an imminent threat requires a sufficient
likelihood of the threat in the near future.457
Environmental damage is defined as measurable adverse
change in a natural resource, which worsens the environment
against a baseline, unless permitted by relevant authorities from
the Member States458:
damage to protected species and natural habitats, which is any
damage that has significant adverse effects on reaching or
maintaining the favourable conservation status of such habitats
or species. The significance of such effects is to be assessed with
reference to the baseline condition, taking account of the criteria
set out in Annex I;
Damage to protected species and natural habitats does not
include previously identified adverse effects which result from an
act by an operator which was expressly authorised by the
relevant authorities.459

454. Id. at art. 4(3).
455. Id. at art. 4(1)(a), (b). See also id. art. 4(6) (activities related to war or
natural disasters).
456. Id. at art. 3(1)(a), (b).
457. ELD, supra note 444, at art. 2(9).
458. Id. at art. 2(2). Clearly this raises an immediate issue of metrics,
measurements, observation, and detection. In many cases, these are not
necessarily readily reduced to low-cost technologies, and thus might be seen as
preventing recognition of certain damages that are less readily reduced to
measurement or lack clear ex ante base lines against which to draw contrasts
over time. Certain damages may have occurred in a location that ex ante to
detection was not assumed to be a likely site of damage and so went unobserved
at the beginning of the operations that ultimately led to the harm. Yet, this
might also serve as an incentive to both protect the courts from the nuisance of
unserviceable pleas and to encourage the development of baseline metrics by
those interested in protecting their surroundings. Those best able to observe
suggest the ELD have a duty to themselves to monitor and take measurements.
459. ELD, supra note 444, at art. 2(1)(a). See also id. art. 2(3)(a)-(b) (definition
of protected species and natural habitats). See generally Council Directive
79/409, of 2 April 1979 on the Conservation of Wild Birds, art. 4(2), 1979 O.J. (L
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Thus, the scope of damages under the ELD is primarily
centered on those “parties” that would not otherwise be able to
bring their own complaints to trial. This limits the potential
applicability of the ELD to the various potential injuries and
harms that might result from offshore methane hydrate
accidents.
The listed activities under Annex III do not appear to overlap
with the general nature of methane hydrate projects. Annex III
activities do not include activities that are substantially related
to methane hydrate project related activities.460 Issues of waste
management, water disposal management, and water abstraction
might be relevant to a methane hydrate project, but it is not clear
that the intent of the Annex III listings had such an offshore
purpose in mind.461 It is also not clear that the operations at an
offshore methane hydrate project would be seen as in the
manufacture, use, storage, etc., of dangerous chemicals.462
Given the lack of applicable activities under Annex III and
the lack of clearly excludable conventions under Article 4, unless
the environmental risks of methane hydrates are included within
the scope of Annex III, those harms would likely only be found
applicable under the “at fault” rule of Article 3, Section 1(b).
Thus, some focus needs to be put on those non-Annex III
occupational activities that could damage protected species and
natural habitats.
While one might expect to find broad definitions of water
damages as provided within the U.S.’s Clean Water Act, such is
not available under the ELD. Water damage, another form of
environmental damage, includes any damage that “significantly
adversely affects the ecological, chemical and/or quantitative
status and/or ecological potential” of the waters addressed within
the River Basin Water Directive.463 This is partially due to

103) 1 (idea of protected species and natural habitats); see also Habitats
Directive, supra note 446, at Annexes II, IV.
460. Id. at Annex III, arts. 1-12.
461. Id. at Annex III, arts. 2, 3, 4, 6.
462. Id. at Annex III, art. 7.
463. Habitats Directive, supra note 446, at art. 2(1)(b). See also Water Policy
Directive, supra note 448, at art. 2(1) (definition of surface water upon which
ELD relied). See also ELD, supra note 444, at art. 2(5) (nominally limits waters
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separate EU actions on the EU related seas and oceans.464
However, this nuanced definition would appear to prevent the
application of the ELD to the waters under which the vast bulk of
methane hydrates are expected to lay, as methane hydrates lay
offshore the coasts beyond the reach of the River Basin
Frameworks.465
It is also difficult to connect the onshore harms of cataclysmic
methane hydrate accidents to application under the ELD. Land
damage is defined in a fairly limited sense to impacts on human
health: “significant risk of human health being adversely affected
as a result of the direct or indirect introduction, in, on or under
land, of substances, preparations, organisms or microorganisms.”466 Perhaps sudden inundation by water would
qualify as an ‘introduction of a substance that could adversely
affect human health,’ but it reads beyond the intent of the ELD.
There is a potential argument to boot-strapping the ELD into
regulating the development of methane hydrate projects, in that
arguendo methane hydrates are themselves a natural resource
deserving protection under Article 2.467 The definition of damage
includes a reference to adverse change to a natural resource; to
the extent that a methane hydrate project damaged the hydrate
deposits, and the impairment of use and production for future
generations, then the notion of environmental damage might
reasonably apply.468 However, natural resource is a defined term
within the ELD and appears to exclude natural resources such as
methane hydrates, as they are not generally considered to be a
“protected species and natural habitats, water and land,”
especially as land damage is previously defined as that which
causes adverse risks to human health by the introduction of
substances, preparations, organisms, or micro-organisms.469
to just those of the River Basin Frameworks). See generally Water Policy
Directive, supra note 448.
464. See discussion on the various water protection frameworks within the
EU. Infra Parts III(D)(6)(a), III(D)(6)(c).
465. See MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 2, §§ 4, 5,
for discussions on geology and geography of methane hydrates.
466. ELD, supra note 444, at art. 2(1)(c).
467. Id. at art. 2(12).
468. Id. at art. 2(2).
469. ELD, supra note 444, at art. 2(1)(c), 2(12).
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Finally, there may be some protected species and natural
habitats in the vicinity of methane hydrate projects; but it is most
likely that if protection of the species and habitats near methane
hydrates are to be protected that they will need to be more
explicitly detailed as a target under the relevant frameworks.
Protected habitats could include methane hydrates, as “1180
Submarine structures made by leaking gas” is a designated
habitat under the Habitats Directive,470 but 1180 is not currently
listed as a priority habitat and thus is not protected under the
ELD.471 It is also not clear that the structures itemized at 1180
are methane hydrate deposits versus other sources of subsea
methane, such as a volcanic vent.472 The 1180 is neither a special
habitat, nor is it occupied by specially protected species, so it is
not an area currently protected by the Habitat’s Directive. As a
result, it is not likely that the ELD’s damage to the natural
resources clause would apply to methane hydrates unless
amended or clarified.
The ELD excludes a list of pre-existing conventions that are
of a more specialized nature, and thus deemed better suited to
the particular harms addressed within those conventions.473 Of
the conventions listed at Annex IV, four of the five listed address
oil pollution:
i.
“International Convention of 27 November 1992 on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage;”474
ii. “International Convention of 27 November 1992 on
the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage;”475
470. Habitats Directive, supra note 446, at Annex I.
471. EUR. COMM’N, INTERPRETATION MANUAL OF EUROPEAN UNION HABITATS 16
(2013),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/legislation/habitatsdirective/docs/Int_ma
nual_eu28.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LU39-BRCK.
472. Id. The Manual describes structures of carbonate cement and is less
focused on the underlying reservoirs from whence the methane originates; the
Manual is focused on the locus of plants and animals near these structures.
Usually there are no plants, but a large diversity of invertebrates is found in
these areas.
473. ELD, supra note 444, at art. 4(2) (with reference to Annex IV). See also
id. at art. 4(3) (with reference to certain maritime related conventions).
474. Id. at Annex IV(a).
475. ELD, supra note 444, at Annex IV(b).
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iii. “International Convention of 23 March 2001 on Civil
Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage;”476
iv. “International Convention of 3 May 1996 on Liability
and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by
Sea;”477
Given this extensive exclusion of the oil spill paradigm from
the ELD, one wonders to what extent events from a methane
hydrate project might likewise become excluded from the ELD. A
careful reading of the excluded conventions reveal that damages
discussed in those conventions are unlikely to be coincident with
a methane hydrate accident. Thus, the result is inconclusive.
ii.

Governance of Risk Within the ELD

The ELD provides that the prevention and remedying of
environmental damages should be developed through the polluter
pays principle.478 Thus, operators of activities that create
environmental damages should be required to be financially
liable for those damages; this is explicitly intended to provide
economic incentives to motivate operators to minimize the risks of
such accidents so that their exposure to financial liabilities is
reduced.479
The ELD presents a mixed strategy with regards to liability;
the ELD distinguishes between Annex III activities and nonAnnex III activities.480 The ELD applies to environmental
damages caused by activities listed at Annex III and to any
damage to protected species and natural habitats caused by
occupation activities not on Annex III.481 Annex III activities are

476. Id. at Annex IV(c).
477. Id. at Annex IV(d).
478. Id. Annex IV(d)(2), (18) (explanation of ‘polluter-pays’ principle). See also
id. at art. 1.
479. Id. at art. 1(2).
480. The ELD explicitly avoids engagement with rights of compensation for
traditional damage under international agreements on civil liability. See id. at
art. 1(11).
481. ELD, supra note 444, at art. 3(1)(a)-(b).
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to be governed by a rule of strict liability.482 Non-Annex III
activities are to be governed by “at fault” rules.483
Should a competent authority find an operator nonresponsive
and thus decide to undertake such measures by themselves, the
competent authority is able to recover those expenditures from
the operators.484 To avoid a pass-through tax burden to tax
payers, competent authorities may charge the operators fees for
the transaction costs of addressing the environmental hazards
and harms.485
The ELD is limited to addressing environmental damage,
and per se, the ELD is categorically denied application to matters
of personal injury, private property damages, and forms of
It also excludes several international
economic loss.486
conventions on civil liability.487 Additionally, the ELD yields no
rights to private parties to make economic recoveries for damage
to such protected species or habitats; its application remains on
the public welfare.488
b.

Seveso III Directive

Seveso III applies to the prevention and control of major
accidents that introduce dangerous substances to the
environment; is it further stated inter alia that the accidents are
generally industrial in nature.489 In that regard, it is similar to
the perspective of the UNCTEIA and indeed Seveso III is the
implementation of that Convention within the EU.490 Seveso III
appears to take stronger language than the UNCTEIA. In
contrast to the Convention’s repeated use of “appropriate,” Seveso
III repeatedly relies on the phrase “all necessary measures.”
“Operators should have a general obligation to take all necessary

482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.

Id. at art. 3(1)(a).
Id. at art. 3(1)(b). See also id. at pmbl., § 9.
Id. at pmbl., § 18.
Id.
Id. at pmbl., § 14.
ELD, supra note 444, at pmbl., § 11.
Id. at art. 3, § 3.
Seveso III, supra note 445, at art. 1.
Id. at pmbl., §§ 1, 2, 3, 5.
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measures to prevent major accidents;”491 “the operator is obliged
to take all necessary measures;”492 the Member States must
inspect to ensure that “the operator has taken all necessary
measures;”493 and the discussion of the duties of a Member State
after an accident uses the term “necessary” three times
throughout Article 17.494
i.

Inapplicability of Seveso III to
Offshore Methane Hydrates

Seveso III provides the rules for the prevention of major
accidents involving dangerous substances.495 And Seveso III does
include both hydrogen and natural gas as dangerous
substances.496
However, Seveso III does not apply to the offshore
exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons such as methane
hydrates.497 Seveso III, also does not apply to the exploration,
exploitation, extraction, and processing of minerals from
boreholes such as methane hydrates.498
Seveso III does not cover underground storage of natural gas
in conjunction with the exploration and exploitation of
hydrocarbons such as methane hydrates.499 And finally, Seveso
III would not apply to the pipeline transport of methane,
hydrogen, or other dangerous substances.500
As such, there is very little potential for the development of
methane hydrate projects to be regulated by Seveso III.

491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.

Seveso III, supra note 445, at pmbl., § 12.
Id. at art. 5(1).
Id. at art 5(2).
Id. at art. 17(a)-(c).
Id. at art. 1.
Id. at Annex I, Part 2, §§ 15 (hydrogen), 18 (liquefied flammable gases).
Seveso III, supra note 445, at art. 2(2)(f).
Id. at art. 2(2)(e).
Id. at art. 2(2)(g).
Id. at art. 2(2)(d).
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Risk Governance Within Seveso III

Seveso III lacks a specific discussion on liability, other than
of the obligations of the Member States to ensure that operators
undertake all necessary measures.501 However, the preamble
makes clear that operator failed compliance should be met with
penalties that should be effective, proportionate, and
dissuasive.502
Given the mandate to provide for penalties for compliance
failures and the repeated phrasings of “all necessary measures,”
there is a combined semantic sense of a duty that can be failed
and that incentives should be provided to ensure that those
duties are met. However, there is no discussion of what should
occur if that duty is met and accidents still occur.
Is a strict liability rule suggested in the requirement for the
operator to undertake all measures necessary to “limit their
consequences,”503 to the mandate that the “operator takes any
necessary remedial actions?”504 It is difficult to ascertain because
there is a paucity of financial responsibility clarifications with
Seveso III;505 presumably the details rest within each Member
State’s individualized implementation. It is perhaps more
reasonable that Seveso III expects domestic regulations to be
drafted and implemented as part of a command and control
regulatory framework.
4.

Offshore Directive

As currently enacted, the Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas
Operations Amending Directive (Offshore Directive) 506 would
likely apply to the exploration, development, and production of

501. See generally Seveso III, supra note 445.
502. Id. at pmbl. § 29.
503. Id. at art. 5(1).
504. Id. at art. 17(c).
505. Neither Annex II nor Annex IV provide explicit requirements to detail
whence financing is sourced for the remediation and compensation budgets.
Annex II, § 5(c) does refer to “mobilizable resources.” Id. at Annex II.
506. Directive 2013/30, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
June 2013 on Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations and Amending
Directive 2004/35/EC, 2013 O.J. (L 178) 66 [hereinafter Offshore Directive].
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methane hydrates from offshore operations.507 However, this
article will demonstrate that the Offshore Directive remains
focused on viscous oil spill damage and could be in need of
amending to better address the potential hazards of offshore
methane hydrate operations.508
a.

Applicability to Offshore Methane
Hydrates

The subject and scope of the Offshore Directive is to ensure
the provision of “minimum requirements for preventing major
accidents in offshore oil and gas operations and limiting the
consequences of such accidents.”509
Major accidents are defined as incidents associated with
installations that involve “explosion, fire, loss of well control, or
release of oil, gas or dangerous substances” and could result in
substantial human injuries.510 Other forms of major accidents
include those that involve serious damage to the installation that
also involve substantial human injuries,511 events that lead to the
serious injury of five or more humans,512 or those events that
507. Exploration and production are defined terms of the Offshore Directive.
Id. at art. 2(15), (16) respectively. The definition of exploration includes “drilling
into a prospect and all related offshore oil and gas operations necessary prior to
production-related operations.” Id. at art. 2(15). However, traditional oil and gas
parlance distinguishes between “exploration,” the project phase focused on
finding and identifying producible oil and gas volumes, and “development,” the
project phase that occurs after the financial investment decision and includes all
the construction, drilling, and preparations prior to the onset of production
activities.
508. The Offshore Directive was adopted in response to the events of April 20,
2010, when an oil and gas well broke near the production christmas tree valve
stack, close to the seabed/ocean interface. The resulting accident brought
awareness to the dangers of deep sea oil and gas exploration and production, as
contrasted with the hazards of boat-based oil spills such as the Exxon Valdez of
1989. See Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at pmbl., § 5 (“Accidents relating
to offshore oil and gas operations, in particular the accident in the Gulf of
Mexico in 2010, have raised public awareness of the risks involved in offshore oil
and gas operations and have prompted a review of policies aimed at ensuring
the safety of such operations.”).
509. Id. at art. 1(1).
510. Id. at art. 2(1)(a).
511. Id. at art. 2(1)(b).
512. Id. at art. 2(1)(c).

87

5_Partain

878

FINAL_EDIT

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

10/2/2015 2:19 PM

[Vol. 32

could result in major environmental damages.513 Those major
accidents need to occur offshore, which is defined as those areas
within the territorial seas, EEZ, or continental shelves of member
states.514 The definition of offshore parallels the zones of “marine
waters” for the MSF Directive,515 thus the applicability of those
regulations on the avoidance of environmental damages applies to
offshore operations.516 Finally, offshore oil and gas operations
include most regular aspects of oil and gas exploration,
development and production, except for trans-coastal
transportation of oil and gas.517
As methane is natural gas, and assuming methane hydrate
operations would require installation or infrastructure, the
Offshore Directive applies to the exploration, development, and
production of methane hydrates from the offshore waters of the
Member States of the EU.518 Events resulting from the release of
methane from methane hydrate fields would be considered major
accidents if they also resulted in “significant potential to cause,
fatalities or serious personal injury,” or if the methane ventings
or seepages resulted in “any major environmental incident.”519
The additional cases of major accident also apply to those
involving damages to the installation with corresponding human
injuries or other incidents that result in substantial injuries to
five or more persons.520

513. Id. at art. 2(1)(d).
514. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 2(2).
515. Directive 2008/56, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17
June 2008 Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of
Marine Environmental Policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive), art. 3,
2008 O.J. (L 164) 19 [hereinafter Marine Strategy Framework Directive].
516. Id. at art. 3(1)(a)-(b). See also Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at
pmbl., § 58, which provides guidance that the “definition of water damage in
Directive 2004/35/EC should be amended to ensure that the liability of licensees
under that Directive applies to marine waters of Member States as defined in
Directive 2008/56/EC.”
517. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 2(3).
518. Id.
519. Id. at art. 2(1)(a), (d).
520. Id. at art. 2(1)(b)-(c).
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Risk Governance Within the Offshore
Directive

Member States are required to ensure that operators
undertake all “suitable measures” of precaution, to provide that
operators remain liable for the acts of their sub-contractors, and
that operators undertake all “suitable measures” to limit
consequences for human health and the environment.521 The
Directive requires that the Member States ensure that operators
and licensees comply with the Directive.522 The Member States
are to provide penalties within their own legal systems for
noncompliance.523
The penalties should be “effective,
proportionate, and dissuasive.”524
Environmental damage and harm caused by offshore
activities are to be regulated under the ELD.525 The definition of
environmental damage is inherited from the ELD.526 Member
States do a have an affirmative duty under the Offshore Directive
to ensure that licensed operators are financially liable for both
prevention and remediation of environmental harms from
offshore activities; this is to be accomplished by domestic
legislation.527 The phrasing suggests a rule in comport with the
operations of a strict liability rule, but the requirement does not
particularly require a rule of civil liability, regulatory guidance
would appear to suffice.528
While the Preamble to the Offshore Directive refers to a
particular standard of care, “where the cost of further risk
reduction would be grossly disproportionate to the benefits of
such reduction,”529 it does not appear that a rule of negligence
521. Id. at art. 3(1)-(3).
522. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 34.
523. Id. at art. 34.
524. Id.
525. Id. at art. 7.
526. Id. For a more complete discussion on the limitations of the ELD with
regards to offshore methane hydrates, please see the discussion on the ELD, see
infra Part III(D)(3)(a).
527. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 7.
528. Under the ELD, Annex III activities are per se under a strict liability
rule, non-Annex III activities are under a “fault-based” rule. See ELD discussion
supra Part III(D)(3)(a).
529. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at pmbl., § 14.

89

5_Partain

880

10/2/2015 2:19 PM

FINAL_EDIT

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

was suggested. Rather, the whole of the Directive appears to
reflect the polluter pays principle, and thus the rule of strict
liability.530 The licensee, as determined by Directive 94/22,531 is
to be held financially liable for both the prevention and
remediation of major accidents and their consequences.532
Additionally, the Offshore Directive is subordinated to the
rules under the EIA Directive, SEA Directive, and 94/22.533
i.

Offshore Directive’s Call for a
Regulatory Body

Overall, the Offshore Directive provides for a deliberate and
cautious review of offshore oil and gas projects prior to their
licensing and throughout their operational periods. The Member
States are required to allow for public participation during the
review process.534 Prior to the issuance of a license for offshore
oil and gas operations, the Member States must ensure that the
applicant is technically and financially capable of meeting their
responsibilities under the Offshore Directive.535 The Member
States shall also ensure that the there are sustainable financial
instruments made available to better provide for the financial
needs of major accidents and their risk management.536
Competent authorities are to be established by the Member
States to be responsible for overseeing the study, evaluation,
530. All EU environmental laws need to be read with the guidance of article
191(2) of TFEU, which states that the polluter pays principle is fundamental to
all EU legislation. “Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of
protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions
of the Union. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the
principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage
should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.”
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
art. 191, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
531. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at pmbl., §12. See Directive 94/22, of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the Conditions
for Granting and Using Authorizations for the Prospection, Exploration and
Production of Hydrocarbons, 1994 O.J. (L 164) 3.
532. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 7.
533. Id. at art. 1(3).
534. Id. at art. 5(2)(a)-(f).
535. Id. at art. 4(2)(a).
536. Id. at art. 4(3).
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regulatory compliance, and monitoring of major hazards.537
Additional requirements are set out at Annex III. The competent
authority is to remain independent and objective; it should not be
involved in the revenue or economic development discussions
related to the offshore projects it oversees.538
The European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) shall provide
technical and scientific expertise to the Member States and the
Commission, with special regards to the detection and monitoring
of transboundary oil or gas spills.539 EMSA may also assist in the
drafting and development of the Member States’ external
emergency response plans, and may also develop a catalog of
available emergency equipment and services.540 EMSA may also
assist the Commission in reviewing the external emergency
response plans of Member States to ensure that the plans are in
compliance with the Offshore Directive.541 EMSA can also run
review exercises to test the designed emergency mechanisms for
major accidents.542 EMSA has a potentially major role to play in
ensuring consistent safety levels are maintained Union-wide.
ii.

Regulatory Actions

Member States have to require that all suitable measures be
undertaken to prevent major accidents.543 Suitable is defined as
“right or fully appropriate,” in consideration of “proportionate
effort and cost, for a given requirement or situation.”544
The Member States should also require offshore oil and gas
operations to be managed on the basis of systematic risk
management so that any residual risks or hazards are
acceptable.545 Acceptable is defined as a level of risk that the
costs or efforts to further reduce its expected harms would be
grossly disproportionate to the benefits received from such
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.

Id. at art. 8(1)(a)-(f).
Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 8(2), 8(3); id. at art. 9(a).
Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 10(1), (10)(2)(a).
Id. at art. 10(2)(b)-(c).
Id. at art. 10(3)(a).
Id. at art. 10(3)(b).
Id. at art. 3(1).
Id. at art. 2(6).
Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 3(4).
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reduction.546 This is not a statement to halt efforts at risk
reduction once marginal benefits exceed marginal costs, but
rather a defense that not all technologically feasible measures
need be undertaken if, on the whole, those resources might be put
to better purposes for the impacted communities.
In this process of review, the operator/licensee is to submit a
variety of plans and procedural documents:
i. a corporate major accident prevention policy,547
ii. a safety and environmental management system
applicable to the installation,548
iii. a design notification for a production installation,549
iv. a description of the scheme of independent
verification,550
v. a report on major hazards for a production or nonproduction installation,551
vi. an amended report on major hazards in the event of a
material change or dismantling of an installation,552
vii. an internal emergency response plan,553
viii. a notification of well operation and information on that
well operation,554
ix. a notification of combined operations,555
x. a relocation notification.556
The application of these guidelines to methane hydrates is
straightforward. They require the operator to demonstrate that
the major hazards and potential accidents are well understood.
Each and every potential major hazard resulting from the
546. Id. at art. 2(8).
547. Id. at art. 11(1)(a). Detailed at id. at Annex I, § 8.
548. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 11(1)(b). Detailed at id. at
Annex I, § 9, Annex IV.
549. Id. at art. 11(1)(c). Detailed at id. at Annex I, § 1.
550. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 11(1)(d). Detailed at id. at
Annex I, § 5, Annex V.
551. Id. at art. 11(1)(e). Detailed at id. at Annex I, §§ 2, 3.
552. Id. at art. 11(1)(f). Detailed at id. at Annex I, § 6.
553. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 11(1)(g). Detailed at id. at
Annex I, § 10.
554. Id. at art. 11(1)(h). Detailed at id. at Annex I, § 4, Annex II.
555. Id. at art. 11(1)(i). Detailed at id. at Annex I, § 7.
556. Id. at art. 11(1)(j). Detailed at id. at Annex I, § 1.
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exploration and production of methane hydrates needs to be
identified and cataloged. Not only surface-related hazards, but
also those subsea- and seabed-related should be thus identified.
The potential environmental harms from venting or seeping
methane and resultant metabolites, such as carbon dioxide, needs
to be inventoried. If additional chemicals are involved in the
production of methane hydrates, such as injected carbon dioxide
or in-situ fuels and oxidizers, then their potential environmental
harms also need to be included in that study. The interactive
effects of multiple wells into a common deposit, the effects of
various production stimulation efforts, the impacts of field
deterioration, and all of the combination events that might
impact major hazards or major accidents should be analyzed.
With regard to methane hydrates, particular attention needs to
be placed on subsea and seabed activities. The likelihood and
consequences of all of the major hazards of methane hydrate
exploration and production need to be determined.
Environmental, meteorological and seabed limitations on safe
operations need to be evaluated from the perspective of methane
hydrate fields and not from traditional oil and gas well stability
perspectives. Similarly, the environmental conditions for
methane hydrates may need to include consequences from
landslides, tsunamis, and oxygen-deprived atmospheres near the
major accident sites. A list of operations and expected correlated
major hazards will need to be drawn up for methane hydrate
exploration and production. While an operator would need to
report on the number of persons adjacent to the installation per
the Offshore Directive, it might not suffice to stop there.
Operators should probably advise on the number of people who,
while not involved in the operations of the installation, may still
be impacted as a “first wave” of injuries or deaths. Due to the
tsunami, landslides, and atmospheric fire risks, those people
might be some distance from the installation.
The Member States will need to prepare their own SEAs as
they develop their “plans and programs” in response to the
Offshore Directive and each prospective operator will be expected
to complete their own EIAs as they bring projects forward for
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licensing and approvals; licensing authorities are required to
consult with competent authorities.557
Prior to the onset of well operations and the commencement
of offshore exploration and production, the Member States are
required to ensure that the operators have in place internal
emergency response plans.558 The Member States are to ensure
the operator retains and maintains appropriate expertise and
equipment to perform its internal emergency response plans
without delay whenever major hazards should emerge.559 The
Member States are also required to bring forward their own
external emergency response plans and acts of emergency
preparedness.560 Annex VII and Annex VIII provide guidelines
for the drafting of the external emergency response plans
together with the operators;561 once drafted, the plans should be
shared with the Commission and the general public for
feedback.562
Once operations commence, the Member States have the duty
to require that the operator is taking all reasonable steps, in light
of the definition of suitable, to carry out its functions and duties
under the Offshore Directive.563 If a Member State ascertains
that an operator no longer has the capacity to meet the relevant
requirements, it should remove that operator and propose a
replacement operator to the licensing authority.564 Amidst all of
the EIA and similar risk and hazard studies that need to be
presented, reviewed and enforced, the Member States need to
enforce a variety of other measures as well. The Member States
must ensure that only properly licensed parties are operators of
installations within their jurisdictions.565 Member States are
required to enforce safety zones around the approved and

557. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at pmbl., § 16. See also id. at art. 4(2),
art. 5(1).
558. Id. at art. 28(1).
559. Id. at art. 28(2).
560. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 29(1).
561. Id. at Annex VII, VIII.
562. Id. at art. 29(3).
563. Id. at art. 6(3).
564. Id. at art. 6(4).
565. Id. at art. 6(1), (2).
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permitted installations.566 The Member States need to ensure
that independent verification of the various risk and hazard
studies is performed prior to the completion of design for
production installations or prior to the onset of operations for
non-production installations; the Member States must provide
that the feedback from independent verifiers must be taken into
consideration by the operators.567 The Member States are to
ensure that both the plans and the equipment necessary to
address major hazards or major accidents is constantly kept
ready and in place by the operators.568 If the operator is also
registered within their jurisdiction, Member States are also
required to investigate major accidents outside of the EU.569
The Offshore Directive provides for extensive research and
investigation into the potential causes and concerns related to
major hazards and accidents. Note the constellation of required
documents focused on safe operation of offshore operations: the
report on major hazards, a safety and environmental
management system, a corporate major accident prevention
policy, and the combination of internal and external emergency
response plans.570 When combined, they present a host of
obligations on the part of potential operators of offshore methane
hydrate operations.
The report on major hazards, for either production
installations or non-production installations, should be developed
by
the
operator
in
conjunction
with
its
workers’
representatives.571 In addition to data on the companies and
employees involved in the proposed installation, the report should
include a complete description of the proposed installation.572

566.
567.
568.
569.
570.
571.
572.

Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 6(7).
Id. at art. 17.
Id. at art. 19. See id. at Annex IV for additional requirements.
Id. at art. 20.
See Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 11(1).
Id. at arts. 12, 13.
Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at Annex I, §§ 2(1), 2(2), 2(4).
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Carbon Capture and Sequestration Directive

Directive 2009/31, the “CCS Directive,”573 provides for the
regulation of geological storage of carbon dioxide.
a.

Applicability to Offshore Methane
Hydrates

While the CCS Directive is intended to apply to the
sequestration of carbon dioxide, as discussed in Chapter 3, many
suggested plans for offshore methane hydrate projects include
carbon dioxide injection and sequestration into the depleted
methane hydrate reservoirs. In those cases, the CCS Directive
would apply directly to those types of offshore methane hydrate
projects. Also, the concerns with gas leakage from subsurface
reservoirs parallel the risks of the offshore methane hydrate
production stage and the abandonment and sequestration stage.
The geological storage of carbon dioxide for the purposes of
the CCS Directive is defined to be the injection of carbon dioxide
streams into underground geological formations.574 The CCS
Directive applies to all geological storage of carbon dioxide within
the territory of the Member States, including within their EEZs
and on their continental shelves per UNCLOS.575 If the methane
hydrates from those offshore zones were developed in conjoined
re-injection of carbon dioxide into the hydrate deposits, then the
CCS Directive would apply to the methane hydrate project. The
storage of carbon dioxide within the water column is
prohibited.576

573. Directive 2009/31, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
April 2009 on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide and Amending Council
Directive 85/337/EEC, European Parliament and Council Directives 2000/60/EC,
2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and Regulation (EC) No
1013/2006, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 114 [hereinafter CCS Directive].
574. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at art. 3(1).
575. Id. at art. 2(1). See also id. at art. 2(2) (describing exclusions of certain
research and testing projects from regulation under the Directive).
576. Id. at art. 2(4). This is parallel to the regulations in the Marine
Framework, which do regulate the emission of carbon dioxide and methane
gases into the water column. See infra Part IV. When methane is released at a
depth into the water column with insufficient velocity, methane is likely to
become metabolized by local biota into carbon dioxide. It is not reasonable that
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Risk Governance Within the CCS Directive

The preamble to the CCS Directive indicated that the
liability matters related to the operations of CCS facilities is to be
broken up by the underlying character of the damages.
Environmental harms and damages are to be governed by the
ELD577 and climate change harms and damages by the Directive
2003/87.578
As was discussed, supra at Section 3.4.6, the ELD itself
provides little foundation for governing the risks associated with
offshore methane hydrates; so to the extent that environmental
harms would result, the Offshore Directive would likely not
provide sufficient incentives to the operators to employ optimal
levels of precaution or activity. It is also unclear, due to the
bifurcated liability rules of the ELD, if methane hydrate
accidents would be governed under its strict liability rule for
Annex III activities or under its article 3.1(b) “at fault” rules.
Directive 2003/87/EC, as amended, provides for penalties in
the case of unpermitted or excessive greenhouse gas emissions.579
Violators are required to purchase and submit sufficient
allowances, or to pay an excess emissions penalty.580 There is no
provision for civil liability; the effort to govern greenhouse gases
is solely regulatory in nature. This Directive would apply to
vented or seeped methane from offshore methane hydrate
projects, as methane is one of the listed greenhouse gases under
Annex II of the Directive.581

such transport of methane into the water column should be interpreted as
water-storage of carbon dioxide.
577. See supra Part III(A) for a discussion of risk governance under the ELD.
578. CCS Directive, supra note 573, at pmbl., § 30. The directive that
established the greenhouse gas emission trading systems within the EU is
Directive 2003/87. See Directive 2003/87, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 13 October 2003 on Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community and Amending Council
Directive 96/61/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 [hereinafter Greenhouse Gas
Mechanism].
579. Greenhouse Gas Mechanism, supra note 578, at art. 16.
580. Id. at art. 16(2), (3).
581. The list of chemicals denoted as greenhouse gases are: carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulphur
hexafluoride. Id. at Annex II.
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Member states are required to enact penalties for regulatory
noncompliance within domestic law that are “effective,
proportionate, and dissuasive.”582
i.

Assignments of Liability

In the event of a “significant irregularity,” the competent
authority must require the operator to take the necessary
corrective measures. 583 If the operator fails to do so, then the
competent authority is required to assume control and undertake
the necessary corrective measures itself, with the operator
remaining liable for the costs of such efforts.584 While the
original version of Directive 2003/87/EC provided that greenhouse
gas emissions related to force majeure events would be potentially
excludable from penalty, the current enactment no longer
contains that provision.585
At the closing of the facility, the operator is to remain liable
for the potential accidents from the storage facility until it has
been deemed that the carbon dioxide will have been completely
and permanently contained.586 After that point in time, the
liabilities for the storage facility would be transferred to a
competent authority.587
ii.

Regulatory Actions

When the CCS Directive is applicable, the operators will be
required to complete EIAs. The selection of storage sites,588 the
permitting of exploration permits,589 and the permitting of
storage,590 are likely to be seen as part of a “private project . . .
likely to have significant effects on the environment” and

582.
583.
584.
585.
586.
587.
588.
589.
590.

CCS Directive, supra note 573, at art. 28. See also id. at pmbl., § 42.
Id. at art. 16(1), (2).
Id. at art. 16(4), (5).
Greenhouse Gas Mechanism, supra note 578, at art. 29.
CCS Directive, supra note 573, at art. 17(2).
Id. at art. 18(1).
CCS Directive, supra note 573, at art. 4.
Id. at art. 5.
Id. at art. 6.
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“involving the extraction of mineral resources,” and thus require
the completion of an EIA.591
If an EIA is required, then the CCS Directive provides clear
guidance on safety planning with regards to overall geological
stability and risk assessment.592 These safety regulations are
also a strong model for regulating the field safety of methane
hydrate projects. In many places, one could replace “storage
complex” with “methane hydrate deposit” and have a good first
approximation of draft methane hydrate regulations.
Annex I to the CCS Directive provides detailed guidance on
what data and analyses should be provided in evaluating the
safety of the storage complex of the CCS project and its
surrounding area.593 First, a wide array of scientific and
engineering data must be collected. 594 Then, a variety of models
must be produced to research potential future risks and hazards.
595

591. EIA Directive, supra note 349, at art. 1(1), (2).
592. CCS Directive, supra note 573, at art. 7 (detailing the informational
requirements for storage permits). An assessment of the expected reliability of
the storage facility is required at article 7(3), the engineering details of expected
field operations are required at article 7(4), and a description of the preventative
measures on significant irregularities are required at article 7(5). Id. at art. 13
requires an extensive monitoring capability prior to permitting. Ongoing
comparisons between modeling expectations and observed data are required at
article 13(1)(a); the detection of significant irregularities is required at article
13(1)(b); the detection of migrating gas volumes is required at article 13(1)(c),
the detection of leaking gas volumes is required at article 13(1)(d); the detection
of significant adverse effects to the environment is required at article 13(1)(e);
the assessment of the effectiveness of corrective measures is required at article
13(1)(f); and the continual assessment of the overall safety and stability of the
storage complex is required at article 13(1)(g).
593. Id. at Annex I, Steps 1, 2, 3.
594. Id. at Step 1. Steps 1(a) through (g) requires the collection of a wide
variety of data types, including geology and geophysics, hydro-geology, reservoir
engineering, geochemistry, geo-mechanics, and seismicity and surveillance on
natural and man-made pathways that could provide leakage pathways. Steps
1(h) through (l) require the collation of potential interactions with local flora,
fauna, and habitats.
595. CCS Directive, supra note 573, at Steps 2, 3. Step 2 requires the building
of a complicated three-dimensional geological earth model that can be used to
forecast and understand likely stability and danger scenarios. Step 3 requires
that the model developed in Step 2 be used to perform dynamic behavior models
of the CCS activities.
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The CCS Directive provides a detailed method for conducing
risk assessments. There are three main components of that
assessment, the exposure assessment, the effects assessment, and
the risk characterization.596 The exposure assessment focuses on
the “environment and the distribution and activities of the
human population above the storage complex, and the potential
behaviour and fate of leaking CO2 from potential pathways.”597
This assessment demonstrates the nexus of the communities at
risk versus the potential location of hazardous ventings and
seepages. The effects assessment examines the particular risks
and hazards of the venting and seeping gas on the various biota
in the impacted communities, including on humans.598 The risk
characterization is a combination of several reports on the shortterm and long-term expected safety, or lack thereof, from the
proposed conditions of field usage.599 The risk characterization
should also include analysis and modeling of worst-case
scenarios.600
6.

The Marine Framework
a.

Marine Strategy Framework Directive

The MSF Directive requires that Member States develop
strategies to ensure the present health and future viability of EU
marine ecosystems and that such plans are developed and in
place by the year 2020.601
To the extent that the “programme of measures” called for
under the Directive qualify as “plans and programmes’” under the
SEA Directive, then they should be coordinated with the
requirements of the SEA Directive; as such, there are
opportunities for the public to engage in the drafting of the MSF
Directive’s “programme of measure.”602

596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.

Id. at Steps 3.3.2-3.3.4.
Id. at Step 3.3.2.
Id. at Step 3.3.3.
Id. at Step 3.3.4.
Id.
Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra note 515, at art. 1(1).
See id. at art. 5(2)(b). See also SEA Directive, supra note 350, art. 2(a).
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The Member States are obligated under the Directive to
implement marine strategies to:
(a) protect and preserve the marine environment, prevent its
deterioration or, where practicable, restore marine ecosystems in
areas where they have been adversely affected;”
“(b) prevent and reduce inputs in the marine environment, with a
view to phasing out pollution . . . so as to ensure that there are no
significant impacts on or risks to marine biodiversity, marine
ecosystems, human health or legitimate uses of the sea.603

The reference to “no significant impacts” clearly requires
some rationalization of which harms are significant and which
impacts are not; ergo, it recognizes that some impacts are indeed
tolerable and acceptable. An ecosystem level perspective is an
applied marine strategy, which also suggests a net-sum
perspective and the legislative permission to make trade-offs for
the greater social welfare, as the same section calls for the
sustainable use of marine resources for future generations of
human beings.604
The MSF Directive has a broad definition of marine waters,
which are defined as including the “waters, seabed and subsoil on
the seaward side of the baseline” extending as far out as its
Member States exercise jurisdiction under UNCLOS, to the EEZ
or coastal shelf claims.605 Marine waters also include coastal
waters, to the extent not already addressed by other EU
Directives or legislation.606 Major marine areas already covered
by separate conventions are also included within the scope of the
MSF Directive’s purview.607
Good environmental status is positively defined with the
upbeat markers of ecological diversity, of clean, healthy, and
productive oceans, and of sustainability for the future

603. Id. at art. 1(2)(a), (b).
604. Id. at art. 1(3).
605. Id. at art. 3(1)(a). See supra Part III(A)(1) for a discussion on UNCLOS,
the EEZ, and other marine jurisdictions.
606. Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra note 515, at art. 3(1)(b).
607. Id. at art. 4(1)-(2). For examples of pre-existing conventions, see
Barcelona Convention, supra note 177, Bonn Agreement, supra note 209, and
Helsinki Convention, supra note 257.
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generations.608 The physiographic, geographic, geologic, climatic,
hydro-morphological, physical, and chemical properties and
characteristics of the ecosystems must be protected and
preserved.609 Pollution is defined as the direct or indirect
introduction into the marine waters of items that could cause
harm to those marine water ecosystems.610 Sources of pollution
can include human activity, substances, energy, and
anthropogenic noise.611
i.

Applicability to Offshore Methane
Hydrates

The MSF Directive, would likely apply to the development of
methane hydrate projects.
The regulation of methane hydrate projects could be effected
via the development of specific components of marine strategies
applied to areas containing methane hydrate deposits. The MSF
Directive requires its implementation in all of the marine areas of
the EU and its Member States dependencies,612 thus it covers the
areas that contain methane hydrates.613
Each area containing methane hydrate deposits will need to
address them within a program of measures to achieve and
maintain good environmental status.614 When the hydrates
overlay transboundary marine ecosystems, the Directive calls for
a regional cooperative effort.615
If pre-existing regional

608. Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra note 515, at art. 3(5).
609. Id. at art. 3(5)(a)-(b).
610. Id. at art. 3(8).
611. Id. Thus, the activities of the development and operation of a methane
hydrate project would conceivably engage in multiple potential sources of
pollution beyond just methane leakages and venting; they could introduce a
variety of noises or energy sources into the marine waters. Additionally, there is
potentially an argument to be made that the energy released into the ocean by
methane hydrate related landslides or tsunamis could be seen as energy
releases from the project, and thus be listed as a source of pollution under this
Directive.
612. Id. at art. 4(1)-(2).
613. See MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 2, §§ 4-5,
for a discussion on methane hydrate geography.
614. Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra note 515, at art. 5(2)(b)(i).
615. Id. at art. 6(1)-(2).
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conventions are already in place, then those conventions are
called on to extend to adopt these measures and strategies.616
The marine strategies would need to adopt a survey position
on the targeted good environmental status, and the strategies are
to be developed in alignment with the descriptor elements in the
Directive’s Annex I, and the scientific factors at Annex III.617 The
programs should itemize what actions need to be undertaken to
ensure the achievement or maintenance of good environmental
statuses for the targeted marine environments.618 The programs
should establish a set of indicators and tests that can provide ongoing metrics for the observation of the programs once in place.619
It is required that the programs of measures are cost-effective
and technically feasible and that cost-benefit analyses are
undertaken to affirm those requirements prior to the placement
of those measures into service.620 The costs of the development of
the plans and their placement into service are to be supported by
EU funding due to the priority of the agenda to sustainably
preserve the marine environment.621
It is at that pre-activation stage of planning that methane
hydrates and the potential for harms and hazards from the
development of methane hydrates projects could be included
within these marine strategies. Particular attention could be
brought to the potential to affect sea-floor integrity,622 as seen
with anthropogenic stressors leading to additional methane
venting or seeping with its potential for subsea landslides.
Similarly, the various activities and effects of methane hydrate
exploration and extraction could lead to various introductions of
noise and energy that could adversely affect the marine
environment, these potential sources of pollution need to be
discussed under the Directive. 623 The potential for the effects of
vented or seeped methane to create eutrophication in the waters
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.

Id. at art. 6.
Id. at art. 3(5). See also id. at art. 8(1)(a).
Id. at art. 13(1).
Id. at art. 10(1).
Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra note 515, at art. 13(3).
Id. at art. 22(1)-(2).
Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra note 515, at Annex I, § 6.
Id. at Annex I, § 11.
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and its potential adverse effects on marine biota could be another
point of concern under the Directive.624 The observation of
metrics on these concerns should be supported under the program
of measures; if the above concerns are found covered by the
Directive, effective monitoring programs should be put in
place.625
The Commission issued its Methodological Standards
Decision to further implement the MSF Directive.626
The
Decision provided an annex with greater depth on the
environmental factors to consider when implementing the MSF
Directive.627 There are substantial concerns raised on the overall
chemical effects of emissions into the water columns, such as
nutrient levels, nutrient enrichment, and the effects on oxygen
levels, all of which could be impacted by the methane venting and
seeping.628 Also, potential physical damages to the seabed and
subsurface are detailed. “The main concern for management
purposes is the magnitude of impacts of human activities on
seafloor substrates structuring the benthic habitats. Among the
substrate types, biogenic substrates, which are the most sensitive
to physical disturbance, provide a range of functions that support
benthic habitats and communities.”629
Similarly at Descriptor 7, there are concerns on the geological
and hydrographical impacts from marine activities: “Permanent
alterations of the hydrographical conditions by human activities
may consist for instance of changes in the tidal regime, sediment
and freshwater transport, current or wave action, leading to
modifications of the physical and chemicals characteristics set out

624. Id. at Annex I, § 5.
625. Id. at Annex V. See also id. at arts. 11(1), 24.
626. Commission Decision 2010/477, Commission Decision of 1 September
2010 on Criteria and Methodological Standards on Good Environmental Status
of Marine Waters, 2010 O.J. (L 232) 14 [hereinafter Methodological Standards
Decision].
627. See id. at Annex, pt. A.
628. Id. at pt. B, §§ 5.1, 5.2, 5.3. See also MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY
ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 4, § 3 (discussing methane in water column).
629. Methodological Standards Decision, supra note 626, at Annex, pt. B,
§ 6.1. See id. § 6.2.
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in Table 1 of Annex III to Directive 2008/56/EC.”630 “Such
changes may be particularly relevant whenever they have the
potential to affect marine ecosystems at a broader scale and their
assessment may provide an early warning of possible impacts on
the ecosystem.”631
The concerns within Descriptor 7 certainly fit the character
of methane hydrate projects.632
The overall extraction of
methane from the hydrate deposits will be substantially an
exercise in sediment and freshwater transport. The potential for
landslides or tsunamis from cascade events from methane
venting or seeping could impact currents and wave action. These
issues could certainly have the potential to affect marine
ecosystems on a broader scale. Thus, methane hydrate projects
would likely be regulated under this Decision, if they were
regulated under the MSF Directive.
ii.

Risk Governance Within the MSF
Directive

Broadly speaking, the MSF Directive is not liability focused,
but rather it is focused on the development of regulatory
structures to ensure the maintenance of good marine
environments; nowhere within the Directive does it provide for
liability rules or regulatory punishments.633 The Directive does
not interface with the behavior of private parties, except
indirectly through the implementation of the marine strategies.
While not a system of civil liability, it does assign both a duty
to Member States to retain and maintain certain good
environmental statuses within their marine waters and it
clarifies that they are to do so with cost-effective and technically

630. Methodological Standards Decision, supra note 626, at Annex pt. B,
Descriptor 7.
631. Id. at pt. B.
632. See MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 4, §§ 3, 4
(discussing methane hydrate hazards).
633. The only sense of enforcement of the MSF Directive would be in the sense
that any Directive is enforceable within general EU mechanisms, but as the
MSF Directive is aimed at Member State action and not private parties, civil
liability rules would not be applicable for failure to develop policy and plans.
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feasible means.634 A broad sense of cost/benefit analysis is found
throughout the Directive.
b.

Dangerous Substances Directive

The Dangerous Substances Directive will not apply to the
development of methane hydrate projects because it has been
phased out and superseded by the MSF Directive.635 However,
much of its guidance will survive within other sources
incorporated into the corpus of material surrounding the MSF
Directive, so a brief review is warranted.636
The Directive provides, Member States are to take the
appropriate steps to eliminate pollution.637 Pollution is defined
similarly to the MSF Directive.638 States are required to develop
and implement programs to address discharges into the waters; if
the substances are listed in Annex I’s List II, then the substances
need to be given prior authorization by the competent
authorities.639 Technically, this suggests that such emissions
would be permitted, and thus exempted from the ELD as
permitted activities.640
Of particular interest is the potential lack of methane from
the listed substances under Annex I. List I of Annex I presents
634. Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra note 515, at art. 1(2)(a)-(b);
id. at art. 13(3).
635. Directive 2006/11, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
February 2006 on Pollution Caused by Certain Dangerous Substances
Discharged into the Aquatic Environment of the Community, 2006 O.J. (L 64)
52 [hereinafter Dangerous Substances Directive].
636. The argument here is that it is reasonable that no lessening of
environmental protections was intended by the adoption of the MSF Directive,
and to the extent that the Dangerous Substances Directive provides ecological
safety standards one could reasonably assume that such guidelines, for the most
part, remain persuasive and effective. Directive 67/548, of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 1967 on the Approximation of Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Classification,
Packaging and Labelling of Dangerous Substances, 1967 O.J. (L 196) 1.
637. Dangerous Substances Directive, supra note 635, at art. 3; see id. at
Annex I-II.
638. Compare id. at art. 2(e), with Marine Strategy Framework Directive,
supra note 515, at Annex II, § 8.
639. Dangerous Substances Directive, supra note 635, at art. 6(2).
640. See discussion on the Environmental Liability Directive, supra Part
III(D)(3)(a).
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“persistent mineral oils and hydrocarbons of petroleum origin,”641
but methane is not a persistent hydrocarbon as it evaporates and
dissipates rapidly if not explosively. List I also provides a listing
for those substances that are carcinogenic, but methane is not
generally thought to be carcinogenic.642 List II includes “nonpersistent mineral oils and hydrocarbons of petroleum origin,”
but it is not clear from the combined usage of oils and petroleum,
(i.e., literally “oil from rocks”), that gaseous methane would be
included, whereas gasoline would surely be included.643 Also,
List II includes substances that could affect the taste or smell of
products derived from the waters for human consumption.644 It is
unclear if vented or seeping methane in the water column would
affect the taste or smell of seafood or other such products. Ergo,
methane hydrate projects might have been regulated under List
II of Annex I, but it is uncertain.
c.

Water Framework Directive

The WFD is very similar in intent and operations to the MSF
Directive.645 Instead of a focus on marine and oceanic waters, the
WFD places its focus on what might be called a river basin
perspective because it focuses on inland waters, coastal waters,
lakes, and rivers.646 Where rivers flow into coastal areas and
have confluence with saline marine waters, those transitional
waters are covered by the WFD.647 Due to this focus on waters
inland and very near the coast, it is unlikely that methane
hydrate deposits would be found in those waters, and thus it is
641. Dangerous Substances Directive, supra note 635, at Annex I. List I, § 7.
642. Id. Annex I, List 1, § 4. See also N.J. DEP’T OF HEALTH, HAZARDOUS
SUBSTANCE
FACT
SHEET
(2011),
available
at
http://nj.gov/health/eoh/rtkweb/documents/fs/1202.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/D6KP-L75X (for non-carcinogenic character of methane, see the
health advisory on methane provided by the New Jersey Department of Health).
643. Dangerous Substances Directive, supra note 635, at Annex I, List II, § 6.
644. Id. at Annex I, List II, § 3.
645. Directive 2000/60, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
October 2000 Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of
Water Policy, 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1 [hereinafter Water Framework Directive].
646. Id. at art. 2(13); see also id., at art. 3(1); id. at art. 4(1); id. at art. 2(1), (4)(6).
647. Water Framework Directive, supra note 645, at art. 2(1), (6).
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unlikely that methane hydrate projects would be directly
regulated by the WFD.648
The WFD has a very similar definition of pollution to the one
found in the MSF Directive.649 Similar goals of healthy aquatic
ecosystems, found within the MSF Directive, can also be found
within the WFD’s good ecological status, good ecological potential,
quantitative status, and good quantitative status terms.650 The
Member States are required to develop programs of measures
that can achieve the ecological and environmental goals set out
within the WFD.651 Thus, the SEA Directive also covers these
programs, which is similar to the interface found within the MSF
Directive.652 The WFD also requires coordination with other
environmental oriented directives, including the EIA Directive.653
7.

Greenhouse Gas Mechanism

The EU has implemented the UNFCCC and its Kyoto
Protocol.654 Once a year, the Commission compiles a EU
greenhouse gas inventory.655 This inventory accounts for each
648. The caveat here is that the onshore facilities of a methane hydrate
project, and those appurtenances in proximity to those installations in coastal
waters, might be regulated under the WFD.
649. Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra note 515, at art. 3(8); Water
Framework Directive, supra note 645, at art. 2(33).
650. Water Framework Directive, supra note 645, at art. 2(22), (23), (26), (28).
651. Id. at arts. 11, 16, 17 (discussing the requirement to develop programs of
measures); see also id. at art. 4 (discussing the overall environmental objectives
of the Water Frameworks Directive).
652. See supra Part III(D)(2).
653. Water Framework Directive, supra note 645, at Annex VI, pt. A. See also
id. at Annex VI, pt. A, § (v) (referencing the EIA Directive).
654. For adoption of the UNFCCC, see Council Decision 94/69, Council
Decision of 15 December 1993 Concerning the Conclusion of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1994 O.J. (L 33) 11. For adoption of
the Kyoto Protocol, see Council Decision 2002/358, Council Decision of 25 April
2002 Concerning the Approval, on Behalf of the European Community, of the
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change and the Joint Fulfilment of Commitments Thereunder, 2002 O.J. (L
130) 1 [hereinafter Decision 2002/358]. See also Decision 280/2004 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 Concerning a
Mechanism for Monitoring Community Greenhouse Gas Emissions and for
Implementing the Kyoto Protocol, 2004. O.J. (L 49) 1 [hereinafter Decision
280/2004].
655. Decision 280/2004, supra note 654, at art. 4(1).
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Member State’s greenhouse gas emissions and sinks.656 To assist
in the coordination of the inventory, the Community and its
Member States establish registries to ensure accurate accounting,
tracking, and accrual of records and credits.657
Decision 280/2004 provides for the monitoring mechanisms
required under those agreements.658 The Commission Decision
2010/778 finally set the targeted levels of emissions in 2010.659
These two greenhouse gas decisions effectively coordinate the
EU’s compliance efforts under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto
Protocol.
a.

Applicability to Offshore Methane
Hydrates

The development of methane hydrate projects potentially put
at risk large reserves of methane, a listed greenhouse gas. 660
Accidents, minor or major, could be considered greenhouse gas
emission events.
The Kyoto Protocol called for the monitoring of all
anthropogenic greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, methane,
nitrogen oxides, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur
hexafluoride.661
Decision 280/2004 set a mechanism to monitor all
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases by sources and
sinks.662 Decision 280/2004 provides an accounting for both the
outward emission of greenhouse gases and an accounting of the
capture and/or sequestration of greenhouse gases to provide a net

656. Id. at art. 4(2).
657. Id. at art. 6(1).
658. See Decision 280/2004, supra note 654.
659. Council Decision 2010/778, Commission Decision of 15 December 2010
Amending Decision 2006/944/EC Determining the Respective Emission Levels
Allocated to the Community and Each of its Member States Under the Kyoto
Protocol Pursuant to Council Decision 2002/358/EC (notified under document
C(2010) 9009), 2010 O.J. (L 332) 41 [hereinafter Decision 2010/778].
660. Decision 280/2004, supra note 654, at art. 3(1)(a). See also discussion on
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, supra Part III(A)(3).
661. Decision 280/2004, supra note 654, at art. 3(1)(a). See also discussion on
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, supra Part III(A)(3).
662. Decision 280/2004, supra note 654, at art. 1(a).
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number emitted.663 Carbon dioxide and methane are both listed
as greenhouse gases to be monitored under the program.664
b.

Governing Risk Within the Greenhouse
Gas Mechanism

The Greenhouse gas mechanism is regulatory in nature and
does not contemplate civil liability matters. There are financial
mechanisms to dissuade Member States from exceeding their
obligatory emission limits. Routine emissions of methane or
carbon dioxide would need to be contained within the emission
targets; methane hydrate projects would need strategies that
balanced emission permits for routine emissions, emission credits
for sinking activities on-site, and potential penalties for
unpermitted emissions.665 There does not appear to be a
regulatory plan for cataclysmic levels of methane gas emissions.
The EU has committed itself and its Member States to
reducing their emissions of greenhouse gases.666 Member States
are committed to specific reductions of their greenhouse gases.667
Directives 2002/358, 280/2004 and 2010/778 require that each
Member State, and the EU as a community, achieve targeted
emissions level maximums, as listed and detailed in Directive
2010/778.668
The Directive provides that Member State emissions need to
remain within a specified range; they can remain within a threeyear moving average and they can offset by five percent by
borrowing from other year’s allotments.669 Member States can
also consume Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) and

663. Decision 280/2004, supra note 654, at art. 3(1).
664. Id. at art. 3(1)(a). See also Decision 406/2009 at art. 2(1), discussed infra
note 666.
665. With regards to potential penalties, see supra Part III(D)(5)(b).
666. Decision 406/2009, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
April 2009 on the Effort of Member States to Reduce Their Greenhouse Gas
Emissions to Meet the Community’s Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction
Commitments up to 2020, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 136 [hereinafter Decision 406/2009].
667. Id. at art. 3(1).
668. Id. at art. 7(1). See generally Decision 2002/358, supra note 654; Decision
280/2004, supra note 654; Decision 2010/778, supra note 659.
669. Decision 406/2009, supra note 666, at art. 3.
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Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) to account for reductions in
their overall emissions.670
The EU provides financial incentives to remain on target for
greenhouse gas emissions reductions. First, the EU can sanction
a Member State by reducing their next year’s allotment by the
amount overused in the current year, as multiplied by 1.08.671
Next, the Member State can be required to develop a corrective
action plan within three months of a notification of default.672
Finally, the Member States ability to plan, trade, and coordinate
with other states can be curtailed until the emission targets are
met.673
E.

Federal Laws of the U.S.

The U.S. federal regulatory regime includes several major
planks that might address harms from methane hydrate
hazards.674 They include:
i. the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA)675
ii. the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA),676
iii. the Oil Pollution Act (OPA),677
iv. the Clean Water Act (CWA),678
v. the U.S.’s adoption of the International Convention
Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of
Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969,679

670. Decision 406/2009, supra note 666, at art. 5(1). The Certified Emission
Reductions (CERs) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) are established under
Directive 2003/87, see supra Part III(D)(5)(b).
671. Decision 406/2009, supra note 666, at art. 7(1)(a).
672. Id. at art. 7(1)(b), 7(2).
673. Id. at art. 7(1)(c).
674. See RAMSEUR, supra note 281, at 10-12.
675. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-70 (2012).
676. See Outer Continental Shelf Resource Management Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-66, repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 507 (1990) (repealing §§
1813-24, the remainder of the Act is currently still in force).
677. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-62.
678. See Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act of 1972 (Clean
Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1388.
679. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1471-87.
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vi. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan,680
vii. the Clean Air Act (CAA),681 and
viii. the Methane Hydrate Research and Development Act
(MHRDA).682
The federal laws of the U.S. read like a spoonful of alphabet
soup. NEPA, OSCLA, OPA, and the CWA would be the primary
federal laws applicable to the development of offshore methane
hydrates in American jurisdictional waters.683
The NEPA supports the function of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. de facto environmental
ministry.684 All existing and future acts of legislation and
substantially related regulations need review by the EPA under
NEPA. After enactment, the EPA would steward the overall
management and enforcement of those environmental rules.685
Most importantly, the EPA would likely steward enforcement
litigation in the case of environmental damages. Thus, the EPA is
granted wide and substantive authority to determine the scope
and requirements of future regulatory efforts related to offshore
methane hydrates.
The OSCLA provides the underlying access to licensing
offshore federally administered minerals.686 Critically important,
OSCLA splits responsibility for specifically mineral-related
planning from the EPA to the Commerce Department. To the
extent that precautionary regulations or standards relate to
offshore methane hydrates themselves, they would need to be
developed or approved. This approval would fall to the Secretary
of Commerce to approve them. Thus, the environmental damages
would be bifurcated into those directly related to offshore
methane hydrate operations, and those only indirectly so
damaged; one set of regulations would be developed primarily
680. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (2014).
681. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-671.
682. See Methane Hydrate Research and Development Act of 2000, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 2001-06.
683. See infra the conclusions of Parts III(E)(1)-III(E)(8).
684. See infra Part III(E)(1).
685. See infra Part III(E)(1).
686. See infra Part III(E)(2).
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from a commerce perspective, and the other from a primarily
environmental perspective. In this result, the U.S. demonstrates
that its approach to offshore methane hydrate planning would
likely be commercially centered. Once the Commerce Department
issues its safety regulations to protect the human, marine, and
coastal environments, the Secretary, the Coast Guard, and the
U.S. Army are required to enforce those safety and environmental
regulations.687
The OPA applies to incidents of crude oil spills into the
marine environment.688 It has a very sophisticated strict liability
rule alongside a system of liability assignment and of algorithmic
liability caps based on tonnages, vessel types, and activities.689 It
also provides two modes of liability caps for those operators
acting non-grossly negligent and those acting grossly negligent.
Yet, as it primarily addresses crude oil, if a methane hydrates
accident does not co-produce oil into the ocean, then the OPA
likely would not apply.690
The CWA suffers from the same oil-focus as the OPA. As
such, it would likely not apply to offshore methane hydrate
accidents.691 However, again like the OPA, it provides a welldeveloped regulatory system of negative incentives to punitively
encourage operators to not spill oil.692 Daily fees or per-barrelsspilt fees can be imposed, and the powers to bring tortfeasors to
court are also provided under the CWA.693 It was these powers
that first brought attention to the question of how many barrels
were spilled at the BP Macondo incident, because the disparity in
spillage estimates created billions of dollars in penalty
differences. But again, while the CWA has a long and useful
history of addressing crude oil and other hazardous substances in
the ocean and other waterways, it does not currently have the
ambit to cover oceanic methane emissions.

687.
688.
689.
690.
691.
692.
693.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III(E)(3).
See id.
See id.
See infra Part III(E)(4).
See id.
33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7).
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It is important to note, while the U.S. does not belong to
UNCLOS, it does generally recognize similar legal notions
developed within UNCLOS, thus the U.S. does claim an EEZ
Also, while some
beyond its traditional coastal waters.694
methane hydrates might be found within state jurisdictional
waters, the majority of the methane hydrate deposits are
expected to be located in federal waters. And finally, while the
methane hydrates might lay offshore in federal waters, onshore
damages might be spread across multiple state jurisdictions with
distinguishable common law traditions on tortious damages and
differing state codes on liabilities. Thus, the U.S. model would be
more complicated than surveyed herein.
Nevertheless, these federal laws as a whole comport well
with the recommendations of Section 2 for a complementary
implementation of both strict liability and public regulations.
Additionally, the particular semantic structure of the federal laws
might facilitate the adaption of those rules more readily than
might be the case in other jurisdictions. Given that combination,
it could be reasonably argued that the U.S. federal laws might be
expanded to include the circumstances of offshore methane
hydrates. Additionally, most of the federal laws have been in
place for multiple decades and offer a sense of establishment and
reliability that could be built upon.
1.

National Environmental Protection Act

Broadly stated, NEPA provides a wide base of authority to
the EPA to enable deliberative efforts to be made to protect the
environment of the U.S.695
NEPA contains neither direct provisions to civil liabilities nor
regulatory penalties; it resembles the afore-discussed EU EIA
Directive in that manner.696 But its overall impact is to provide
public information, which could very much impact both the
development of regulations and the implementation of civil
liability rules.

694. See infra Part III(E)(2).
695. NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70.
696. See discussion on the EU’s EIA Directive, supra Part III(D)(1).
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NEPA directs the EPA to handle a variety of executive and
regulatory matters related to environmental legislation. One of
its key duties under NEPA is the creation and administration of
environmental reviews for bills of legislation.697 Such bills would
include the laws on leasing methane hydrate resources, laws on
the regulated operations of federally held methane hydrates, and
whatever environmental and tort laws that would be enacted to
protect the environment in the wake of methane hydrate
development.
Environmental reviews are not generally drafted within the
EPA, but rather within the specified department or other
governmental body proposing a particular piece of legislation or
path of action. NEPA requires that the environmental reviews of
the bills begin concurrently with the onset of the bill’s drafting,
and not after the bill has already been drafted.698 These
prospective reviews are designed to encourage the integration of
environmental considerations throughout the drafting process.
Environmental reviews can take one of three forms: a categorical
exclusion (CE), an environmental assessment (EA), or an
environmental impact statement (EIS).699 A CE is employed
when the draft bill is expected to present no calculable
environmental impact.700 An EA is undertaken if the draft bill
presents potential environmental concerns; a positive finding
under an EA leads to an exhaustive EIS.701 Finally, an EIS is a
comprehensive report to address all of the identified
environmental concerns once the EA has identified them.702 In
general, federal agencies have institutionally been encouraged to
tilt towards CEs and away from EAs, because they are cheaper to
execute, and thus this leaves many environmental aspects of
draft bills often unexplored.703 While the NEPA statute does not
overtly require public access or participation to the review
697. KRISTINA ALEXANDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20621,
OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (NEPA)
REQUIREMENTS 2 (2008).
698. 40 C.F.R. § 1500(b) (2014).
699. See ALEXANDER, supra note 697, at 3.
700. Id.
701. See id. at 4.
702. See id.
703. Id. at 4-5.
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process, the associated regulations do provide those rights to the
general public.704
Should methane hydrates approach commercial development,
the NEPA will require both the drafting of rules and regulations
to manage the overall impact to the American environment, and
NEPA will require a process that is open to the general public.
NEPA also clarifies that the drafting of such bills of law will not
occur within the EPA, but within the departments or agencies
previously appointed to oversee such areas of regulations.
2.

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)

OCSLA would regulate those methane hydrates within U.S.
territorial waters. The OCSLA provides for the recognition of the
mineral assets of the U.S. offshore in its territorial and EEZ
waters. It also provides the regulatory framework to lease those
minerals.
The onset of methane hydrate development is also limited by
previous efforts to prevent offshore development of oil and gas
within the U.S. A variety of specific statutes banning offshore
developments, e.g. the North Carolina Outer Banks Protection
Act, and presidential executive moratoria have either directly
prevented the leasing of areas offshore both the West and East
Coasts or have prevented budget allocations from supporting the
administrative costs of that licensing. Today, only the areas
offshore Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas are active in
development activities.705
a.

Applicability to Offshore Methane
Hydrates

OCSLA defines minerals to include both oil and gas,706 and
thus methane hydrates.707 Likewise, OCSLA includes minerals,
704. Id. at 5.
705. See Areas Under Moratoria, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT.,
http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/Areas-UnderMoratoria.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/KR8PDK3Q (maps of some of the moratoria areas).
706. OSCLA provides the legal definitions of oil and gas separately. See 30
C.F.R. § 559.002 (2014) (“Gas means natural gas as defined by the Federal
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and thus methane hydrates, within its definitions of “lease,”708
“exploration,”709 “development,”710 “production,”711 and “fair
market value.”712 As such, OCSLA provides the legal foundations
for leasing and economically managing methane hydrates within
the U.S.’s EEZ.
What might not be expected though, is that OCSLA provides
to the Secretary of Commerce, not the Department of the Interior
or the EPA, the duties to perform EAs on prospective and ongoing methane hydrate leases and operations.713 Nevertheless,
NEPA remains in application, as it applies to all federal
agencies.714
b.

Risk Governance Under OCSLA

OCSLA calls for the implementation of a regulatory
framework and an overseeing regulatory body. The Commerce
Secretary is required to monitor the human, marine, and coastal
Energy Regulatory Commission.”) (“Oil means a mixture of hydrocarbons that
exists in a liquid or gaseous phase in an underground reservoir and which
remains or becomes liquid at atmospheric pressure after passing through surface
separating facilities, including condensate recovered by means other than a
manufacturing process.”) (emphasis added).
707. 43 U.S.C. § 1331(q) (2012) (“The term ‘minerals’ includes oil, gas, sulphur,
geopressured-geothermal and associated resources, and all other minerals which
are authorized by an Act of Congress to be produced from ‘public lands’ as
defined in [§ 1702] of [this title].”).
708. 43 U.S.C. § 1331(c) (“The term ‘lease’ means any form of authorization
which is issued under [§ 1337 of this title] or maintained under [§ 1335 of this
title] and which authorizes exploration for, and development and production of,
minerals.”).
709. Id. § 1331(k) (“The term ‘exploration’ means the process of searching for
minerals.”).
710. Id. § 1331(l) (“The term ‘development’ means those activities which take
place following discovery of minerals in paying quantities, including geophysical
activity, drilling, platform construction, and operation of all onshore support
facilities, and which are for the purpose of ultimately producing the minerals
discovered.”).
711. Id. § 1331(m) (“The term ‘production’ means those activities which take
place after the successful completion of any means for the removal of minerals,
including such removal, field operations, transfer of minerals to shore, operation
monitoring, maintenance, and work-over drilling.”).
712. Id. § 1331(o).
713. Id. §§ 1346 (a)(1), (b).
714. See discussion on NEPA, supra Part III(E)(1).
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environments of the outer Continental Shelf, and the coastal
areas impacted by the development and production of methane
hydrates.715 The Commerce Secretary, alongside the Coast
Guard, “require[s], on all new drilling and production operations
and, wherever practicable, on existing operations, the use of the
best available and safest technologies which the Secretary
determines to be economically feasible, wherever failure of
equipment would have a significant effect on safety, health, or the
environment.”716
The Secretary is required to study any area included in an oil
and gas lease sale in order to determine what information would
be needed for the assessment and management of the
environmental impacts on the human, marine, and coastal
environments of the outer Continental Shelf and of the coastal
areas which may be affected by oil and gas or other mineral
development.717 The collection of that data should lead to
regulations to protect the human, marine, and coastal
environments; thereafter the Secretary, the Coast Guard, and the
U.S. Army are required to enforce those safety and environmental
regulations.718 The Act provides for both civil and criminal
penalties and punishments for violations of those regulations.
OCSLA does provide for both civil and criminal penalties,719
and it allows citizen suits against both private and public
parties,720 but generally under the Chevron doctrine, the
Secretary of Commerce is given broad authority to interpret the
statute and regulate accordingly. OCSLA provides no specific
liability, remedy or punishment for environmental harms caused
by the operation of the mineral leases assigned under its
authority.

715.
716.
717.
718.
719.
720.

43 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).
43 U.S.C. § 1347(b).
Id. § 1346(a).
Id. § 1348(a).
Id. §§ 1350(b), (c).
Id. § 1349(a)(1).
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Oil Pollution Act

The OPA is the major federal act for addressing hydrocarbon
spills within the jurisdictional waters of the United States;721
thus it extends beyond state waters into federal jurisdictions
offshore.
It was designed to consolidate federal regulatory authority
and to clarify the liabilities attending oil spills in the wake of the
Exxon Valdez incident in Alaska.722
a.

Inapplicability to Offshore Methane
Hydrates

OPA applies to oil and to hazardous substances that are
released in an unpermitted manner into water, but it does not
apply to certain hazardous chemicals as defined under other
statutes. 723 So while methane emissions might be regulated
elsewhere under federal law as a hazardous substance, it is not so
for OPA.
721. While the U.S. has taken notice of UNCLOS, it has not ratified it. Its own
notions of jurisdictional waters take note of the vocabulary of UNCLOS, but are
enacted separately under federal law. Thus, OPA applies to the EEZ of the U.S.,
but the legal basis is not the international standard, per se. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 2701(8) (“‘[E]xclusive economic zone’ means the zone established by
Presidential Proclamation Numbered 5030, dated March 10, 1983, including the
ocean waters of the areas referred to as ‘eastern special areas’ in Article 3(1) of
the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary, signed June 1, 1990.”). The U.S.
EEZ extends “200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of
the territorial sea is measured.” See Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605
(Mar. 10, 1983).
722. See RAMSEUR, supra note 281, at 13.
723. See infra Part III(E)(4) for discussion of the CWA and the list of
hazardous substances that apply to water. Methane is not currently listed under
these laws; e.g., methane is sometimes regulated under the CAA, but as an air
pollutant and not as a hazardous air pollutant, which is what was carved out
under OPA. For the purposes of OPA, oil “does not include any substance which
is specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under
subparagraphs (A) through (F) of § 101(14) of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act and which is subject
to the provisions of that Act[.]” 33 U.S.C. § 2701(23). That subsequent definition
refers to listings of hazardous substances under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1317(a), 1321(b)(2)(A), the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921, the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412, and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2606.
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While technically methane could be included under
petroleum, it would not appear to be so contemplated within
OPA.724 There is not a singular reference to natural gas or
methane within OPA. Section 2701(2) provides a standard
definition for a volume measure of a barrel of crude oil, but
nowhere in OPA is there a comparable definition of volume or
mass for natural gas or methane, nor are there any conversion
factors provided to convert them into barrels equivalent. On the
whole, accidents primarily motivated by natural gas or methane
events would appear to fall outside of the scope of OPA’s liability
scheme.
It is clear that the drafters of OPA were concerned with the
particular ecological and community damages of the Exxon
Valdez crude oil incident and focused on the impact of crude oil;
the exclusion of natural gas and methane may have resulted from
a lack of historical accidents that would have enabled popular
political action.
b.

Risk Governance Under the OPA

OPA provides that the tortfeasor is to be held strictly liable
for all public and private cleanup costs.725 It does not displace
state-level jurisdiction, state-level rules of civil liability, or state
regulations to the extent that such rules exist and to the extent
that certain federalism issues, such as pre-emption, are not in
conflict; thus liability for oil spills in general might fall
concurrently under both federal and state laws, including OPA.726

724. Oil is defined as any kind of oil, but it is not explicitly stated that
methane or methane hydrates would be included within that term; a reasonable
reading suggests that natural gas and methane would be excluded from the
definition of oil. See 33 U.S.C. § 2701(23) (“‘[O]il’ means oil of any kind or in any
form, including petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with wastes
other than dredged spoil, but does not include any substance which is
specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs
(A) through (F) of section 101(14) of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (42 U.S.C. § 9601) and which is
subject to the provisions of that Act.”).
725. James E. NICHOLS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41266, OIL
POLLUTION ACT OF 1990 (OPA): LIABILITY OF RESPONSIBLE PARTIES 1
(2010). See 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32); see also RAMSEUR, supra note 281, at 12.
726. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2718(a), (c).
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There are limits to the liability imposed by OPA. Liabilities
are “capped,” or limited by the type of vessel from which the
hydrocarbon escaped.727 The listings include vessels, ports, and
rigs;728 (i) tank vessels,729 (ii) vessels,730 generally, (iii) onshore
facilities and deepwater ports,731 (iv) offshore facilities (excluding
deepwater ports),732 and (v) mobile offshore drilling units.733
These five categories have limits imposed by tonnage, hulling,
and character of activity.734 Those liability limits are set aside
when the hydrocarbon spill results from acts of gross negligence
or willful misconduct.735
While OPA functions with strict liability, it is important to
note that the overall liability is determined under a variant of a
‘duty of care’ rule.736 The economic incentive is similar to that of
routine strict liability for accidents under the scope of liability,
but operators are effectively sheltered from more catastrophic
liabilities, facilitating investment in the energy sector. All
accidents result in liability. Unlike under a rule of negligence,
due precaution will not completely shield the operator from
damages. An OPA operator retains liability for damages even
727. See RAMSEUR, supra note 281, at 13.
728. Listings, infra, derive from the liability limiting rules found within 33
U.S.C. § 2704.
729. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(1).
730. Id. § 2704(a)(2). See also id. § 2701(37) (“‘[V]essel’ means every
description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being
used, as a means of transportation on water, other than a public vessel.”).
731. Id. § 2704(a)(3). See also id. § 2701(24) (“‘[O]nshore facility’ means any
facility (including, but not limited to, motor vehicles and rolling stock) of any
kind located in, on, or under, any land within the United States other than
submerged land.”). “‘[D]eepwater port’ is a facility licensed under the Deepwater
Port Act of 1974 (33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524),” which includes, for example, the
crude oil offloading LOOP facility offshore Louisiana. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(6).
732. Id. § 2704(a)(4). See also id. § 2701(22) (“‘[O]ffshore facility’ means any
facility of any kind located in, on, or under any of the navigable waters of the
United States, and any facility of any kind which is subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States and is located in, on, or under any other waters, other than a
vessel or a public vessel.”).
733. Id. §§ 2704(b)(1), (2). See also id. § 2701(18) (“‘[M]obile offshore drilling
unit’ means a vessel (other than a self-elevating lift vessel) capable of use as an
offshore facility.”).
734. Id. § 2704.
735. See RAMSEUR, supra note 281, at 12.
736. 33 U.S.C. § 2702.
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under demonstrable (e.g., non-reckless or grossly negligent
behavior) precaution.737
Additionally, it should be noted that OPA provides liability in
complement to liabilities and penalty fines provided by other
sources of law within the U.S. It would thus be misleading to
suggest that the complete set of damages to be faced by a
tortfeasant operator would be strictly limited to these particular
limits; they are merely the liability limits under OPA.
The statute refers to both “removal costs” and “damages,”
reflecting that the statute pursues both the immediate and
indirect notions of damages.738 Those costs may include injury to
natural resources, loss of personal property and resultant
economic losses, loss of subsistence use of resources, lost revenues
resulting from injuries to property or natural resources, lost
profits and earnings from injuries to property or natural
resources, and the costs of providing additional public services
during or after the hydrocarbon spill incident.739
Certain damages are only recoverable by units of the federal
or state government,740 in particular, certain environmental
damages and wasting acts that impact governmental revenues.741
4.

Clean Water Act

The CWA would likely govern neither methane hydrates, nor
their potential association with environmental harms. Methane

737. Id. § 2704.
738. For an example of such phrasing, see id. § 2702(a). See also id. § 2701(5)
(“‘[D]amages’ means damages specified in § 1002(b) of this Act [33 U.S.C.
§ 2702(b)], and includes the cost of assessing these damages.”). See also id.
§ 2701(30) (“‘[R]emove’ or ‘removal’ means containment and removal of oil or a
hazardous substance from water and shorelines or the taking of other actions as
may be necessary to minimize or mitigate damage to the public health or
welfare, including, but not limited to, fish, shellfish, wildlife, and public and
private property, shorelines, and beaches.”). See also 33 U.S.C. § 2701(31)
(“‘[R]emoval costs’ means the costs of removal that are incurred after a
discharge of oil has occurred or, in any case in which there is a substantial
threat of a discharge of oil, the costs to prevent, minimize, or mitigate oil
pollution from such an incident.”).
739. See RAMSEUR, supra note 281, at 11-12.
740. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(D).
741. Id.
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has not been included within the more general oil spill and
hazardous substances discharge rules.
a.

Inapplicability to Offshore Methane
Hydrates

Oil is defined as a viscous liquid and not as a gaseous
substance.742 As such, methane and other natural gases would
not qualify as oil. Similarly, crude oil, is volumetrically measured
in “barrels,” but no such legal definition is provided for emitted
gas within the CWA.743
Methane from methane hydrates is not likely to qualify as
chemical wastes, nor is it likely to fit any of the other enumerated
items. It could be defined to be included under the term
hazardous substances, but such would require explicit listing
within the associated regulations.744 The current listing of
hazardous substances includes no mention of natural gas,
methane, ethane, or butane.745 Thus, as methane is neither oil
nor a listed hazardous substance, its emission into water sans coproduced oil is not covered by the CWA.
Furthermore, oil and gas operations are specifically written
about within this section; it excludes certain materials associated
with oil and gas production.746 The CWA excludes “water, gas, or
742. Id. § 1321(a)(1) (“‘[O]il’ means oil of any kind or in any form, including,
but not limited to, petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with
wastes other than dredged spoil[.]”).
743. Id. § 1321(a)(13) (“‘[B]arrel’ means 42 United States gallons at 60 degrees
Fahrenheit.”).
744. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(14) (directing the definition of hazardous
substances to the rule of (b)(2)). See also id. § 1321(b)(2)(A) (“The Administrator
shall develop, promulgate, and revise as may be appropriate, regulations
designating as hazardous substances, other than oil as defined in this section,
such elements and compounds which, when discharged in any quantity into or
upon the navigable waters of the United States or adjoining shorelines or the
waters of the contiguous zone or in connection with activities under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act or the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, or which may
affect natural resources belonging to, appertaining to, or under the exclusive
management authority of the United States (including resources under the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976), present
an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare, including,
but not limited to, fish, shellfish, wildlife, shorelines, and beaches.”).
745. 40 C.F.R. § 117.3 (2014).
746. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6)(B).

123

5_Partain

914

FINAL_EDIT

10/2/2015 2:19 PM

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

other material which is injected into a well to facilitate
production of oil or gas, or water derived in association with oil or
gas production” from inclusion within the definition of
Thus, potential injectants into the hydrate
pollutants.747
deposits, such as carbon dioxide, would be exempt from the CWA
(caveat: such injectants would need their own permitting as part
of the operator’s licensing arrangement).
b.

Risk Governance Under the CWA

The CWA is a very broad grant of regulatory power that
supports much of the EPA’s activity base. As such, it supports a
regulatory body.
The CWA does provide for both regulatory penalties and civil
liabilities for oil spills and hazardous substances discharges. The
regulatory penalties provide for an administrative hearing
process and are limited to $125,000.748
Should the Secretary opt to forego the administrative route
for judicially enforced civil liabilities, the judgment can get much
larger.749 The civil liabilities are based on both the volumes of oil
spill and a determination of the character of causations. Polluters
of spilt volumes are to be held liable under a rule of strict
liability.750
Spilling events not derivative of grossly negligent behavior
face liabilities cum civil penalties in an amount up to $25,000 per
day of violation, or an amount up to $1,000 per barrel of oil or
unit of reportable quantity.751 If the accident follows from grossly
negligent behavior, then the liabilities cum civil penalties
increase to not less than $100,000, and not more than $3,000 per
barrel of oil or unit of reportable quantity.752

747.
748.
749.
750.
751.
752.

Id.
33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(B)(ii).
Id. § 1321(b)(7)(F).
Id. § 1321(b)(7).
Id. § 1321(b)(7)(A).
Id. § 1321(b)(7)(D).
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Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties

Under the U.S.’s adoption of the International Convention
Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties, 1969, 753 offshore methane hydrates
operations would not likely be regulated
Oil is defined as “convention oil,” i.e., “crude oil, fuel oil,
diesel oil, and lubricating oil.”754 Non-liquid gaseous volumes,
such natural gas or methane, would not be seen as included
within convention oil. Similarly, “a substance other than
convention oil” is defined to mean “those oils, noxious substances,
liquefied gases, and radioactive substances” specifically listed
within the protocol or determined to be a hazard to human
health, to harm living resources, to damage amenities, or to
interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.755
Natural gas or methane is only listed if included within
“liquified gases” or as an interference with legitimate usages of
the sea that harms living resources.756 Methane as extracted
from offshore deposits would not manifest as a liquefied gas until
substantially downstream of the extraction process. Methane is
rendered into LNG only when prepared for oceanic transport via
boat; should the methane be transported onshore for processing
and marketing no LNG would likely be produced.
Similarly, methane does not generally find itself included
within noxious gases, and it generally has no affinity with
radioactivity. Thus, it would likely fail to be included under the
listings of those “oils, noxious substances, liquefied gases, and
radioactive substances” determined to be a hazard to human
health, as methane would likely be qualified as one of the four
categories.757

753. Id. §§ 1471-87.
754. 33 U.S.C. § 1471(3).
755. Id. § 1471(1). See 33 U.S.C. § 1471(1)(B), in reference to 33 U.S.C.
§ 1473(a).
756. 33 U.S.C. § 1473.
757. Id. § 1471(a). See id. § 1473(a).
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National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan

For similar reasons, as seen in the U.S.’s Intervention on the
High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, the National Oil
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan has not
been applied to methane environmental hazard planning.
Natural gas is usually not considered to be either oil or a
hazardous substance. Also, most emergency response planners
have not foreseen a need for “methane clean-up” in the same way
that they need to plan for crude oil clean up operations.
7.

Clean Air Act

The CAA could regulate methane emissions from crude oil
and natural gas production operations, but so far methane has
not been included. In a letter sent by New York Attorney General
Eric T. Schneiderman to Lisa P. Jackson, the Administrator of
the EPA, Schneiderman announced that the State of New York
intended to sue the EPA to bring about changes in the CAA to
include the regulation of methane emissions from oil and gas
operations.758 New York was joined in the letter by the states of
Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
and Vermont. The letter explains that while the EPA issued
preliminary regulations on methane emissions from oil and gas
operations in 1985, those regulations were never made effective,
contrary to the requirements of 42 U.S.C. §7411(b)(1)(B).759 The
states argue that the EPA needs to regulate methane emissions
from existing sources of methane emissions, as well as from new
and modified facilities, under 42 U.S.C. §7411(d)(1)(A).760 This
case has not yet been brought to court, and it will be several years
at least before a final decision is rendered. But, it is clear from

758. Letter from Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. Att’y Gen., George Jepsen, Conn.
Att’y Gen., Joseph R. Biden II, Del. Att’y Gen., Douglas F. Gansler, Md. Att’y
Gen., Martha Coakley, Mass. Att’y Gen., Peter Kilmartin, R.I. Att’y Gen., &
William H. Sorrell, Vt. Att’y Gen., to Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Adm’r (Dec. 11,
2012), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/ltr_NSPS_Methane_Notice.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/W6J5-MDPH.
759. Id.
760. Id.
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the substantial efforts of these many states that the CAA is not
currently regulating methane emissions, and thus the CAA is not
currently applicable to potential methane hydrate events or
accidents.
8.

Methane Hydrate Research and Development
Act

The MHRDA761 provided for the financing of research to
develop technologies that could reduce the incidence and impact
of damages from methane hydrate development, from methane
“degassing” and from events related to drilling into methane
hydrate deposits. But, the MHRDA makes no provisions for the
development or use of regulations on environmental hazards from
methane hydrate development.
The MHRDA was originally passed in 2000, and was
amended in 2005. Its design is to support the funding for research
and development in methane hydrates; all of the research and
development activities are to be coordinated by the Department of
Energy.762 It provides for no civil liabilities and provides for little
in the way of regulations beyond standard NEPA requirements. It
does provide a research budget to ascertain if those items might
become necessary.
Intriguingly, nowhere in the Act are methane hydrates or gas
hydrates defined; the only functional reference to their character
is a statement that methane hydrates can offset the decline in
America’s domestic natural gas assets.763
a.

Risk Governance Under the MHRDA

There is a requirement for the investment in projects that:
(D) assist in developing technologies required for efficient and
environmentally sound development of methane hydrate
resources;

761. 30 U.S.C. §§ 2001-06.
762. Id. § 2003(a)(3).
763. 33 U.S.C. § 2001(5) (“[M]ethane hydrate may have the potential to
alleviate the projected shortfall in the natural gas supply[.]”).
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(F) conduct basic and applied research to assess and mitigate the
environmental impact of hydrate degassing (including both
natural degassing and degassing associated with commercial
development);
(G) develop technologies to reduce the risks of drilling through
methane hydrates.764

However, there is no regulatory language requiring the
drafting or planning for the use of those technologies, nor for the
drafting or development of regulations that would respond to the
incident of environmental damages from methane hydrate
development.
But, at least there is official recognition that there is a
technological problem that certain environmental harms could
result, and technologies to mitigate those harms should be
invested in. The listed hazards to the environment are: (i) the
development of methane hydrates generally, (ii) methane hydrate
venting (therein referenced as “degassing”), and (iii) the risks
associated with drilling into methane hydrate deposits.765
MHRDA does require the assembly of a “Methane Hydrates
Advisory Committee” that should include members from
environmental organizations alongside other members from
“industrial enterprises, institutions of higher education,
oceanographic institutions, [and] state agencies.”766 However,
none of the listed reports from that committee and the associated
research has focused on the environmental hazards and their
mitigating technologies.767
The Secretary of the Department of Energy is also directed to
ensure that the “data and information developed through the
764. Id. § 2003(b)(1)(D)-(G).
765. Id. § 2003(b)(1).
766. 33 U.S.C. § 2003(c)(1).
767. See
Methane
Hydrates,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
ENERGY,
http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oilgas/FutureSupply/MethaneHydrates/MH_ReferenceShelf/RefShelf.html
(last
visited Oct. 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/LV6T-D6JB. For a list of
reports, see also Publications and Presentations of DOE Supported Methane
Hydrate R&D 1999-2014, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Oct. 2014),
http://www.netl.doe.gov/file%20library/research/oilgas/methane%20hydrates/MHBibliography.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/M4DY-938M.
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program are accessible and widely disseminated as needed and
appropriate.”768
Perhaps most interestingly, the MHRDA requires the
Secretary to “ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, greater
participation by the Department of Energy in international
cooperative efforts.”769 It is unclear to what extent that request
is aimed strictly at research and technology or to what extent it
can be responsive to the aspirations of the Methane Hydrates
Advisory Committee.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A.

Emergent Need for Standards

There is an emergent need to provide rules of civil liability
and regulations for the development of offshore methane
hydrates. Tremendous economic benefits are challenged by
substantial accidental risks and hazards. The time to begin the
studies for those rules and regulations should be soon, as the
industry is likely to develop within the coming decade. The
argument is that it is more likely than not that some investors or
nations might begin the development of offshore methane
hydrates in the very near future. As such, it would be advisable to
develop the necessary norms and standards in advance of those
programs and projects.770
Offshore methane hydrates could provide new sources of
natural gas and fresh water supplies. Importantly for the timing
of its development, many countries that currently lack access to
domestic energy supplies are expected to possess reserves of
offshore methane hydrates. For some countries, that access to
768. 30 U.S.C. § 2003(e)(3).
769. Id. § 2003(e)(6).
770. To be clear, the argument presented is not an argument to stimulate
investment to ensure earlier adoption of offshore methane hydrates. The
argument is predicated on the recognition of several nations’ stated national
agendas to begin the extraction of offshore methane hydrates and in recognition
of the imminent technological feasibility of those agendas. Should any of those
or other actors actually move forward with plans to develop offshore methane
hydrates, it would be constructive to have the necessary standards in place
ahead of those development efforts.
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local energy supplies within their political control could provide
strategic stability and continuity of energy supplies critical for
economic growth and development. Such policy concerns could
motivate some countries to begin offshore methane hydrate
production before it is commercially competitive with more
conventional energy supplies.
However, the commercial feasibility of developing offshore
methane hydrates might arrive sooner than previously expected.
The engineering technology of offshore methane hydrates is
rapidly advancing, and the costs of methane hydrate extraction
and production are dropping. It is a common view of methane
hydrate researchers that offshore methane hydrates may become
commercially viable within the next ten years.771 Japan and
South Korea have both established national research programs to
obtain that commercial capability by 2015.772
If it becomes the case that the technologies and cost
structures of offshore methane hydrates reach commercial or
politically sufficient levels of advancement, it would be beneficial
for both energy investors and for the general public to have
already determined optimal standards. Once the economic
motives of methane hydrate projects become more evident, it
might become more difficult to negotiate the development of the
necessary standards.
At the present moment, the development of offshore methane
hydrates finds a fairly united community of researchers
supported by both private investment and government
support.773 Once projects become commercial in nature, one
might expect certain adversarial positions to be taken; public
versus private, corporate versus academic.774 It might be best to
attempt to find common ground on standards and on optimal
precautions and optimal levels of offshore hydrate development
before that competitive aspect of eventual development opens up.
771. See MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 3, §§ 2, 3.
772. See id. §§ 4.1, 4.2.
773. See MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE FIERY ICE, supra note 1, at ch. 3, § 4.
774. For example, different energy corporations might try to gain proprietary
advantages in technology by hiring key researchers. Also, governments might
have alternative goals for national resources than commercial operators might
have.
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B. General Recommendations
What the future of offshore methane hydrates needs is a
clear and operational set of guidelines and incentives to ensure,
both for the private operators and the general public, that such
offshore operations will achieve the socially optimal safety level,
so that both private profits and general welfare can be best
obtained. The recommendations of this article are that a
combined rule of strict liability for the resulting damages and the
development of effective public regulations would best provide for
the optimal level of safety.775
In summary of section 3, supra, there are various laws that
would be applicable as written, but many would need adjusting to
better accommodate the circumstances of offshore methane
hydrates.
Those laws, such as the EIA and SEA Directives and the
NEPA, but also those like OSCLA, that require EAs to be
completed prior to the licensing and permitting of offshore
activities, are most complete and less in need of revision or
updating. Those specific laws focused on hydrocarbon accidents
and similar industrial accidents are generally poorly suited to the
specific circumstances of offshore methane hydrates as currently
enacted.
The EU has two directives, the Offshore Directive and the
CCS Directive, that are so close to the nature and character of
offshore methane hydrate operations that one wonders if it might
be feasible to adjust those existing directives.
First, the Offshore Directive reflects careful drafting to be
inclusive of both known historical oil spill accidents and other
potential types of offshore accidents; the generic phrases “major
accident,” “major hazard,” and “environmental impact” are oft
used in lieu of more specific forms of accidents. However, the
historical bias of well-known oil spill events does lurk within the
legal paradigm of the Offshore Directive. The Preamble connects
the Offshore Directive to oil spills caused by ships.776 Additional
language could be added to emphasize the potential for both
775. Supra Part II(C). For additional depth in those arguments, see supra
notes 26, 27.
776. Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at pmbl. 49.

131

5_Partain

922

FINAL_EDIT

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

10/2/2015 2:19 PM

[Vol. 32

crude oil and natural gas accidents within offshore extraction
operations. Specific mention of the unique circumstances of
methane hydrate accidents could buttress the application of the
Offshore Directive to such events.
In discussing the importance of the preservation of the
Arctic’s environment, focus is put on Arctic marine oil pollution
with no discussion of the harms of natural gas emissions, venting,
or seepage.777 The definitions section of the Offshore Directive
includes an “oil spill response effectiveness” term, but no analog
for methane hazards.778 Such could be readily remedied by either
providing parallel definitions and concerns for methane related
events, or by expanding the current terms to be more inclusive
and more clear. For example, the EMSA is charged with the duty
to monitor to the extent of an “oil or gas spill,” but gases do not
spill as such.779 The word choice reflects historical expectations
of an “oil and gas spill” event, alike the 2010 Gulf of Mexico
incident, wherein crude oil has been the dominant semantic
concern.780 Consider the discussion on “[i]nternal emergency
response plans,” in which there is a requirement for an analysis
of the oil spill response effectiveness of the proposed plans.781
The internal emergency response plan is required to include a list
of necessary equipment including those for capping a spill; no
requirement or analog terms are made for dealing with gaseous
venting or seepages.782 There is a requirement for environmental
factors to be considered in the estimate of the oil spill response
effectiveness metric, but no symmetrical analysis is suggested for
gaseous accident response plans.783
Further, reference is made to dispersants, which only find
use against crude oils.784 The external emergency response plan
is required to address “oiled animals” that might reach the coast

777.
778.
779.
780.
781.
782.
783.
784.

Id. at pmbl. 52.
Id. at art. 2(32).
Id. at art. 10.
Id. at art. 10(2)(a).
Id. at art. 14(1).
Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at Annex I, § 10(5).
Id. at Annex I, § 10(8).
Id. at Annex I, § 10(12).
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in advance of the “actual spill.”785
Similarly, when well
operations are to be undertaken, a similar requirement exists for
an analysis of the oil spill response effectiveness of the proposed
plans.786 Neither requires an analysis for response effectiveness
to methane accidents. The same asymmetry is found in the
requirements for the report on major hazards for operation of a
production installation787 and for the report on major hazards for
a non-production installation.788
So, while the Offshore Directive can be read to include
planning for major accidents and major hazards of the
exploration and production of methane hydrates, the Offshore
Directive retains a semantic bias for crude oil spills. By
broadening its existing terms or by providing parallel details for
events related to both conventional and methane hydrate related
accidents, the Offshore Directive could be extended to better cover
the circumstances of offshore methane hydrates.
As discussed earlier, the CCS Directive is a perfect fit for
those aspects of offshore methane hydrate projects that do elect to
engage in co-productive carbon dioxide injections back into the
hydrate deposits. To that extent, the CCS Directive is well
drafted for application to offshore methane hydrate projects.
However, because of certain similarities between the CCS
technologies and hydrate extraction technologies, they can be
viewed as the reverse of each other. Some of the terms developed
within the CCS Directive might be employable within a future
Offshore Methane Hydrate Directive or as terms to assist in the
redrafting of the current Offshore Directive. “Leakage” is defined
in article 3.5 to include any release of carbon dioxide from the
storage complex, and “storage complex” is defined in article 3.6 to
include the storage site and the surrounding geological
domain.789 The definition of “significant irregularity” in article
3.17 parallels the concerns of deteriorating stability of methane
hydrate fields; ‘“significant irregularity’ means any irregularity in
the injection or storage operations or in the condition of the
785.
786.
787.
788.
789.

Id. at Annex VII (h).
Id. at art. 15(1).
Id. at Annex I, § 2(5).
Offshore Directive, supra note 506, at Annex I, § 3(5).
CCS Directive, supra note 573, at art. 3(5)-(6).
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storage complex itself, which implies the risk of a leakage or risk
to the environment or human health.”790 Any efforts undertaken
to correct significant irregularities or leakages are defined as
“corrective measures” in article 3.19.791
If these types of suggestions were implemented, then the
conjoint application of strict liability with sophisticated public
regulations could be readily affected within the EU and its
Member States.
The general trend of U.S. federal laws related to oil spills has
focused on the assignment of liability based on rules of strict
liability, liability caps, and penalties for lost volumes. As such,
the American federal laws could also be readily amended if its
current character were to be retained. Once that were
accomplished, existing safety regulations could be updated; as the
American Petroleum Industry (API) provides the bulk of such
regulation privately within the API, one assumes that those
materials could and would be updated as offshore methane
hydrate projects approached early development.
OCSLA primarily addresses the leasing of minerals, and was
found to be effectively applicable to offshore methane hydrates in
its current form. OCSLA could be expanded with substantially
minor edits to bring attention to the need to provide oversight for
methane safety in addition to the existing language on crude oil
and on minerals in general. OCSLA already provides a grant of
administrative powers to the Commerce Secretary to provide
regulatory guidance to ensure the best available practices and
safest technologies; these regulatory powers could be used to
support development of the appropriate standards and rules for
the development of offshore methane hydrates.
OPA at large has a strict liability rule that could be readily
adjusted to include methane hydrate accidents. OPA could have
accidents and operators redefined to include the circumstances
related to offshore methane hydrate accidents. Specifically, OPA
could be amended to explicitly provide for the inclusion of marinebased methane emission accidents to parallel its current
definition for oil spills. OPA could also include volumetric
790. Id. at art. 3(17).
791. Id. at art. 3(19).
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standards for methane to parallel with its crude oil barrel
standards. OPA currently provides a taxonomy of vessel and
facilities in defining the liability caps for oil spills; methane
hydrates operations might deserve a similar, but separate listing
of facility types if liability caps were to be retained for methane
hydrate operations.792 To better address particular concerns
related uniquely to offshore methane hydrate accidents, there
might be several enumerations of particular acts or omissions
that would substantiate gross negligence for offshore methane
hydrate operators.
The CWA enables fines and penalties for marine pollution.
The CWA could be amended more simply than OPA by including
methane as a marine pollutant for the purposes of the CWA. Once
included as a marine pollutant, volumetric standards for emitted,
seeped, or vented methane should also be developed and included
in measures parallel to the existing volumetric provided for
barrels of crude oil. Finally, the penalty areas of the CWA could
be amended to include both barrels of crude oil leaked or volumes
of methane emitted.
There are existing organizations in place that could assist
with the development of private regulations for offshore methane
hydrates. For example, the API provides over 600 standards for
the oil and gas industry.793 Additionally, there are other research
groups and environmental groups that maintain research related
to the development of offshore methane hydrates. These groups
could be encouraged to begin drafting suggested private
regulations. Those draft regulations could also serve to inform
public regulatory bodies in the development of their own
regulations, or in the coordinated development of integrated
regulatory mechanisms.

792. For example, offshore methane hydrate extraction facilities might be
onboard a drilling and producing vessel or they might attached to a moored or
connected structure.
793. For example, the American Petroleum Institute (API) maintains an
“inventory of over 600 standards and recommended practices.” See Publications,
Standards, and Statistics Overview, AM. PETROLEUM INST., available at
http://www.api.org/publications-standards-and-statistics (last visited Nov. 30,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/GP3P-RUCD.
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FINAL CONCLUSIONS

Offshore methane hydrates provide a cornucopia of potential
benefits and hazards. Because the effects of these benefits and
hazards would engage far beyond a private cluster of individuals,
a public law response is needed.
This article has also found that the technological hurdles are
being reduced, that the costs of extracting and producing offshore
methane hydrate are dropping, and that several nations have
explicitly stated that they intend to produce offshore methane
hydrates within this decade. As such, the timing to develop the
necessary rules of civil liability and regulations is pressing.
The theory of law and economics has provided a means of
evaluating alternative rules of civil liabilities and of alternate
public regulations. It is the result of this article that a rule of
strict liability should be implemented in a complementary fashion
with public and private regulations. That combination would
provide a more complete set of precautionary incentives to the
relevant actors, a more complete set of information to all parties,
and the combination would reinforce the effectiveness of both
systems of risk governance.
There are existing and functional rules to address
hydrocarbon accidents. The basic paradigm for spilt crude oil is
broadly in alignment with the recommendations of this article.
The rules generally display a preference for the rule of strict
liability. The rules often call for extensive amounts of public
regulations in parallel to the assignment of strict liability.
Where problems were found it was found that they were
usually a result of the simple problem that accidents predicated
upon methane leakages were not explicitly included in the
drafting of oil spill laws and conventions. Even when broader
terms of hazardous substances were included within such
frameworks, it appeared that water-borne methane was not
included. Thus, water-born methane has fallen between the
cracks, so to speak, of otherwise sound and useful laws and
regulations.
This article concludes that such oversight could and should
be readily remedied. The fundamental frameworks that already
exist could and should be extended to include the potential for the
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commercial development of offshore methane hydrates. Such
efforts could be dove-tailed into existing regulatory frameworks
and case law histories by amending the existing laws to be more
inclusive.
Such a process, although perhaps the efficient choice from a
transaction cost perspective, would still require extensive
discussion and commentary. Changes to EU Directives would
likely engage mechanisms under the EIA and SEA Directives.
Changes to U.S. federal laws would require both administrative
and public processes under NEPA. These procedural reviews
would not be quick and should not be unsafely expedited. To
provide sufficient time to ensure safety and public support, these
reviews should be started sooner rather than later.
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